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INTRODUCTION
It is an unfortunate sign of our ambiguous times that the First
Amendment's free speech protection no longer commands universal
support among progressive constitutional scholars and legal activists.
The political and legal circles that only a decade ago could be
counted upon to defend First Amendment values are now increasing-
ly willing to qualify their support for free speech, if not to abandon
the cause altogether. Critical race theorists, feminists of the
MacKinnon school and civic republicans have, each in their own
ways, attacked the old-fashioned left-liberal fixation on the First
Amendment and the quaint, if not antiquarian notions of intellectual
freedom that the Amendment represents. Thus, old-line free speech
litigation organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union
("ACLU") have become the targets not just of conservative politi-
tJohn W. and Ashley E. Frost Professor of Law, Florida State University College
of Law.
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cians, but also of the new progressives, who deride the ACLU for
being "a handmaiden of the pornographers, the Nazis and the Ku
Klux Klan"' because of its insistence on representing the free speech
rights of those groups.
The anti-free-speech trend has advanced to the point that
progressive critics of the First Amendment have begun to claim
victory over relativistic liberalism. Richard Delgado announced not
long ago that
the ground itself is shifting. The prevailing First Amendment
paradigm is undergoing a slow, inexorable transformation. We are
witnessing the arrival, nearly seventy years after its appearance in
other areas of law, of First Amendment legal realism. The old,
formalist view of speech as a near-perfect instrument for testing
ideas and promoting social progress is passing into history.
Replacing it is a much more nuanced, skeptical, and realistic view
of what speech can do, one that looks to self- and class interest,
linguistic science, politics, and other tools of the realist approach
to understand how expression functions in our political system.2
Like most progressive opponents of a strong First Amendment,
Delgado assures us that this new way of looking at free speech
represents an evolutionary advance over the previous intellectual
model. 'WVe are losing our innocence about the First Amendment,"
Delgado writes, "but we will all be wiser, not to mention more
humane, when that process is complete."'
First Amendment critics such as Delgado see a new era dawning,
in which free speech will lose the aura it has developed over the
years and will be put into proper perspective as merely one constitu-
tional value among many other equally important values. The
immediate consequence of this approach is that the First Amend-
ment could be trumped by other values whenever the government
could reasonably claim that speech must be suppressed in further-
ance of some other important social goal. Unlike previous censor-
ship regimes, which previous generations of political and legal
progressives thought served the interests of wealth and power, this
new, postmodern censorship is presented as serving goodness,
'Andrea Dworkin, The ACLU. Bait and Switch, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 37, 37
(1989).
2 Richard Delgado, First Amendment Formalism Is Giving Way to First Amendment Legal
Realism, 29 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 169, 170 (1994) (footnotes omitted).
3Id.
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equality and truth. The new critics proffer censorship with a human
face.
Delgado is hardly alone in heralding this brave new First Amend-
ment world. Variations of his position have become commonplace
among progressive law professors and students, although not yet
significantly among members of the practicing bar and judges. The
incessant theoretical devaluation of the First Amendment by
progressive scholars has put many of the remaining academic
supporters of strong free speech protection on the defensive. For
example, Kathleen Sullivan has recently attempted to defend First
Amendment values against progressive attacks generated by what she
terms the "free speech wars."4 Sullivan rejects the prescription for
more speech regulation, but gives considerable deference to the
claims of those who propose to reduce significantly First Amendment
protections. "The new speech regulators demand a response from
those who would leave speech mostly deregulated; and they deserve
a response that goes beyond the rote and reflexive invocation of free
speech as an article of faith."5 Sullivan argues that the old defenses
of free speech are no longer sufficient, and that new defenses must
be devised "for those in my generation whose respect for the new
speech regulators' insights does not extend to agreement with their
proposed solutions."6
In this Article, I join Sullivan in rejecting the solutions of the
postmodern censors. I will argue, however, that she has given the
claims of the new regulators too much credit. The theoretical
advances celebrated by Delgado and other progressive critics of the
First Amendment are not really advances at all. They are simply
refurbished versions of arguments used since the beginning of
modem First Amendment jurisprudence to justify government
authority to control the speech (and thought) of citizens. The fact
that these arguments are now being used in the service of different
social and political ends cannot cloak the fact that the underlying
theories are the same ones that justified the prosecutions of antiwar
protesters, socialists and anarchists in the early years of this century.'
I Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech Wars, 48 SMU L. REv. 203, 213 (1994) (warning
that "appeal to the First Amendment as self-evident truth" may not be effective against
the "new speech regulators").
5 Id.
6 Id. at 214.
7 The clearest example of this theoretical convergence isJustice Sanford's majority
opinion in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 667-71 (1925), which upheld the "criminal
anarchy" convictions of socialists under a theory of social constructionism similar to
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Moreover, despite the different objectives of the new censors, their
reasons for supporting government control over speech are not
significantly different from those of their reactionary predecessors.
Both the new and the old censors fear political radicalism and its
supposed attractiveness for the masses; both seek to implement an
elitist system of value development, under which individuals will
receive constant guidance from an enlightened government on the
subject of public morality; and both insist that the principles of free
speech should be treated as indistinguishable from the often
dangerous or despicable principles of those who enjoy its protection.
Thus, both the new and the old censors use prejudice against a
practitioner of speech (communists, anarchists and conscientious
objectors in the old days, "pornographers, the Nazis and the Ku Klux
Klan"8 today) to justify opposition to the principles that allow
disfavored speakers to gain access to the public's eyes and ears.
This Article assesses several major components of the "new"
progressive theories of censorship and details the similarities between
these new theories and earlier ones. The Article also addresses the
obvious consequence of this analysis: Just as the new arguments for
censorship track the old justifications, the old arguments against
censorship-tracing back to Milton, Mill, Holmes and
Brandeis-remain responsive to the flaws of any theoretical system in
which government is empowered to regulate speech and thought.
This Article is structured around what Sullivan has identified as
the three cornerstones of postmodern censorship theory. Thus, Part
I is devoted to the postmodern theory of social constructionism, Part
II addresses the postmodernists' rejection of the public/private
distinction, and Part III discusses postmodern egalitarianism.9 In
each of these parts, I will address the corresponding arguments of
three main branches of postmodern censorship theory: critical race
theory, represented by Richard Delgado, Mari Matsuda and Charles
Lawrence; civic republicanism, focusing especially on the work of
Cass Sunstein; and the branch of feminism usually associated with the
writings of Catharine MacKinnon.' ° Specific problems with the
that of the postmodernists. See also Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)
(upholding the convictions of antiwar activists); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211
(1919) (same). For further discussion of this point, see infra Part I.D.
8 Dworkin, supra note 1, at 37.
9 See Sullivan, suPra note 4, at 209-13. Sullivan uses the term "Legal Realism" to
describe the second component, noting that this is one of the primary sources of the
modern arguments against the public/private distinction. Id. at 211.
0 I should acknowledge at the outset of this Article that the labels I use to group
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various forms of postmodern censorship theory will be detailed at
length below, but the critique that follows is oriented around a
consistent theme: The postmodern censorship theory offered by this
new generation of politically progressive legal scholars is neither
progressive nor, for that matter, even "postmodern." In the end, it
is just censorship.
different theorists are inaccurate to the extent that they suggest a complete uniformity
of views on the subject of free speech by all those who identify themselves with a
particular school of thought. This is especially true of the term "feminism," since
there is a large, diverse and vibrant body of literature written by feminists who
vigorously disavow efforts to censor speech even in the ostensible service of goals such
as sexual equality. See, e.g., Kate Ellis, Introduction to CAUGHT LOOKING: FEMINISM,
PORNOGRAPHY & CENSORSHIP 6 (Kate Ellis et al. eds., 1986) ("In putting out this
booklet, we are expressing our belief that the feminist movement must not be drawn,
in the name of protecting women, into the practice of censoring 'deviant' sexual
representation or expression."); Carole S. Vance, Pleasure and Danger: Toward a Politics
of Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 7 (Carole S.
Vance ed., 1984) ("We cannot create a body of knowledge that is true to women's
lives, if sexual pleasure cannot be spoken about safely, honestly, and completely.");
NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE FIGHT FOR
WOMEN'S RIGHTS 13 (1995) (chastising"MacDworkinites" and "pornophobic feminists"
for embracing the "quick fix" of censorship); Nan D. Hunter & Sylvia A. Law, Brief
Amid Curiae of Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce, et aL, in American Booksellers Ass'n
v. Hudnut, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFoRM 69, 69 n.1 (1987-1988) (arguing for the
unconstitutionality of an Indianapolis antipornography ordinance, which defined
pornography as "the sexually explicit subjugation of women"); Carlin Meyer, Sex, Sin,
and Women's Liberation: Against Porn-Suppression, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1100 (1994)
(suggesting that the movement to suppress pornographic imagery is "inimical to
feminist ideological and political goals"). Likewise, there are proponents of civic
republicanism who argue that a proper interpretation of the theory would not support
censorship efforts such as university speech codes. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Speaking
of Virtue: A Republican Approach to University Regulation of Hate Speech, 75 MINN. L. REv.
938, 938-944 (1991) (attacking hate speech regulations as illegitimate and futile
attempts to coerce civic virtue). As to the third group of postmodern censors,
however, there seems to be a general consensus among the most prominent critical
race theorists favoring the regulation of speech in order to further the goal of greater
racial equality. While recognizing that there are differences on the subject of free
speech among theorists who align themselves generally with the theoretical schools
identified in this Article, I shall, in the interest of efficiency, use the labels of the
various groups with the understanding that, for the purposes of this Article, terms
such as "feminism" and "civic republicanism" refer only to the branches of those
theoretical schools that favor censorship of speech on the grounds discussed below.
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I. POSTMODERN CENSORSHIP AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM
The social constructionist argument is perhaps the clearest thread
linking the various groups proposing new theories to justify speech
regulation. Some version of this motif is the centerpiece of critical
race, civic republican and feminist treatments of free speech.
Although each group emphasizes different factors, the central
argument is the same: Everyone in society is "constructed" by his or
her society; antisocial individual behavior will occur as a direct result
of the socialization that an individual experiences in his or her
everyday life; such behavior cannot effectively be controlled solely
through the application of disincentives or postbehavior punishments
for illegal action; therefore, factors contributing to individual
socialization must be subject to governmental control in order for
the government adequately to protect every citizen's full participa-
tion in the society's social and political life.
The details emphasized by the different procensorship factions
merely flesh out the central components of the argument by relating
the claims concerning adverse socialization to the particular
experiences of specific groups. These details bear out that the
postmodern censors are true radicals in the sense that they define
the world in a way that is contrary to the common understanding of
those outside their ideological fold. The postmodern censors are
also deeply conservative, however, in that they would reinstitute a
degree of government control over speech and thought that has been
unknown since World War II-and they would do so precisely so that
the government could mold political reality to its own liking. Thus,
the instincts of the postmodern censors do not reflect the deeply
antigovernment biases of the radical anarchists, conscientious
objectors and antiwar (and thus necessarily antigovernment) left-wing
radicals of the early twentieth century. Ironically, the new censors
have instincts about speech and behavior that track the rigid,
hierarchical and deeply reactionary predilections of the government
that fought hard to silence earlier generations of radicals. Thus, the
postmodern position on censorship is "radical" only in its deviation
from what has become the constitutional norm, not in its alignment
with earlier manifestations of the political left.
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A. Constructing Evil: Racism
The postmodern censors believe that oppressive speech must be
controlled by the government not only because antisocial speech
creates the reality of oppression, but because antisocial speech is the
oppressive reality in a more meaningful sense than the various
physical manifestations of that oppression. The postmodernists view
manifestations of oppression such as discrimination in housing
or education as less intractable than the ideology of racism or
sexism that provides the inspiration and justification for such
discrimination. A prominent example of this approach is Professor
Charles Lawrence's interpretation of Brown v. Board of Education."
Lawrence, a critical race theorist and a proponent of Stanford
University's speech code, has written at length about his interpreta-
tion of Brown, which he interprets through the prism of social
constructionism.
According to Lawrence, Brown is "[a] [c] ase [albout [r] egulating
[r]acist [s]peech."l2 He argues that "[t]he key to this understand-
ing of Brown is that the practice of segregation .. . was speech....
Brown held that segregated schools were unconstitutional primarily
because of the message segregation conveys-the message that black
children are an untouchable caste, unfit to be educated with white
children." 3 Lawrence cites language in Chief Justice Warren's
Brown opinion concerning the stigma that segregation attached to
black students in segregated schools: "To separate [children] from
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone." 4 Lawrence argues that the Brown decision was concerned
primarily with eliminating the stigmatizing message of racism that was
conveyed by the system of segregated education. He then argues that
since the Court itself removed racist messages (in the form of
segregation) from the protection of the First Amendment, the Court
should not stand in the way of other government efforts to eliminate
similar racist messages in the form of private speech. He concludes
that "Brown and the anti-discrimination law it spawned provide
precedent for the position that the content regulation of racist
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
12 Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 DUKE L. 431, 438.
s Id. at 439.
4 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
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speech is not only permissible but may be required by the Constitu-
tion in certain circumstances."
15
The alternative, and far more common, explanation of Brown is
that the Court held segregated public schools unconstitutional
primarily because such schools provided black children with a
measurably inferior education than that which they provided to white
students. This interpretation maintains that the Court was concerned
not so much with the message of segregation as with the mechanisms
of segregation and the concrete effects such mechanisms had on the
lives of black children. The actual holding of the case, after all, is
that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal."
16
According to this interpretation, the "feeling of inferiority" 7 to
which ChiefJustice Warren referred is relevant in that it contributes
in specific ways to the concrete reality of segregation, most directly
by making it harder for black children to achieve the same level of
educational attainment as the more privileged white children.'8
Under this interpretation, Brownwas primarily directed at eliminating
every manifestation of government-enforced educational, political
and social ostracism; the Court assumed that eliminating these
concrete effects would also diminish the force of the ideological
racism that justified segregation.
Lawrence's primary focus on the message of racism, rather than
racism's concrete manifestations, reflects his view that "all racist
speech constructs the social reality that constrains the liberty of non-
whites because of their race." 9 Contrary to the common interpre-
tation of Brown, Lawrence argues that eliminating the physical
manifestations of racism will be futile if the ideology of racism is not
eradicated. He argues that in the absence of this broader attack,
racism will continue to exert its overriding influence on the lives of
those targeted by racism, in even more subtle and insidious ways than
did the overt segregation addressed in Brown. Lawrence adopts the
position of Professor Kendall Thomas that race is a social construc-
15 Lawrence, supra note 12, at 449.
16 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
17 Id. at 494.
s The Court supported its linkage of stigma to educational attainment by citing
several sociological studies in footnote 11. See id. at 494-95 n.11. Although much
maligned at the time by the opponents of Brown, the Court's conclusions about the
effects of segregation on the education of black students have been reaffirmed by
subsequent studies. See William L. Taylor, Brown, Equal Protection, and the Isolation of
the Poor, 95 YALE L.J. 1700, 1705-07 (1986) (reporting significant improvements in
blacks' educational attainment since Brown).
19 Lawrence, supra note 12, at 444.
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don. Lawrence argues that race is "derived through a history of
acted-upon ideology" and that "the cultural meaning of race
continues to be promulgated through millions of ongoing contempo-
raneous speech/acts."" One consequence of this ongoing social
construction of race, according to Lawrence, is the perpetuation of
an almost insuperable structural racism: "We simply do not see most
racist conduct because we experience a world in which whites are
supreme as simply 'the world."'2 1 In Delgado's phrasing of the
same point, "[i]ncessant depiction of a group as lazy, stupid, and
hypersexual-or ornamental for that matter-constructs social reality
so that members of that group are always one-down."
22
Like other manifestations of the social constructionism argument,
critical race theorists use social constructionism to attack the concept
of a "marketplace of ideas," which they view as an indispensable
element of any First Amendment jurisprudence that provides broad
protection of free speech. The critique of the marketplace metaphor
offered by Lawrence and Delgado represents a view that is prevalent,
if not universal, among critical race scholars. In sum, their argument
is that the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor is an inappropriate
guidepost for First Amendmentjurisprudence because the intellectu-
al "market" will never be free. The market is not free, the argument
asserts, because all discussions about social or political policies will
be carried out within what Delgado calls the "reigning paradigm, the
set of meanings and conventions by which we construct and interpret
reality."21 Within this paradigm, "[s] omeone who speaks out against
the racism of his or her day is seen as extreme, political, or incoher-
ent."24 Many potential "sellers" and "consumers" will be excluded
from the marketplace altogether: "[C] ommunication is expensive,
so the poor are often excluded; the dominant paradigm renders
certain ideas unsayable or incomprehensible; and our system of ideas
and images constructs certain people so that they have little
credibility in the eyes of listeners. "25 Thus, critical race theorists
21 Id. at 443 n.52.
21 Id. at 443.
1 Delgado, supra note 2, at 171-72.
2 Id. at 171.
24 Id.
I Id. Lawrence expresses a similar view:
Just as the defect of prejudice blinds the white voter to interests that overlap
with those of vilified minorities, it also blinds him to the "truth" of an idea
or the efficacy of solutions associated with that vilified group. And just as
prejudice causes the governmental decisionmakers to misapprehend the
1996]
202 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 145: 193
argue that the outcome of any competition among ideas is foreor-
dained: "The American marketplace of ideas was founded with the
idea of the racial inferiority of non-whites as one of its chief
commodities, and ever since the market opened, racism has
remained its most active item in trade.
26
Although this is not the place for a comprehensive defense of
Holmes's metaphor, I believe that critical race theorists (and other
postmodern censors) have greatly overestimated the significance of
the metaphor in defining the rules of First Amendment jurispru-
dence, which treats speech as important in itself, regardless of the
speech's market value or consumer popularity. Indeed, the postmod-
ern censors have probably misconstrued the basic meaning of the
marketplace-of-ideas concept. 27  For present purposes, however,
Lawrence's and Delgado's arguments against the marketplace of
ideas underscore how radically the postmodern censors would
revamp not only First Amendment law, but also our most basic
notions of citizenship in the American democratic state.
What most offends critical race theorists about the marketplace-
of-ideas metaphor is its presumption that the intellectual "consum-
ers" in the marketplace are free actors, capable of intelligently and
fairly considering competing political ideas, policy proposals and
value systems before forming conclusions of their own about the
direction in which the country and its government should move.
According to critical race theorists, such freedom is not possible
because the "consumers" in the marketplace of ideas are so infused
with the received values of a corrupt system that they cannot possibly
exercise independent judgment about the ideas that come into the
market. Most prejudice is unconscious, Lawrence notes, and "just as
prejudice causes the governmental decisionmakers to misapprehend
the costs and benefits of their actions, it also causes all of us to
misapprehend the value of ideas in the market.... [W]hen an
costs and benefits of their actions, it also causes all of us to misapprehend
the value of ideas in the market.
Lawrence, supra note 12, at 470 (footnote omitted).
26 Lawrence, supra note 12, at 468.
7 For a recent contribution to the marketplace-of-ideas literature, see Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Free Speech and Unfree Markets, 42 UCLA L. REV. 949 (1995). Sullivan notes
that, unlike the production of regular commodities, speech is not valued primarily as
a proprietary activity. Rather, speech is valued "independent of people's willingness
to pay for it." Id. at 963.
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individual is unaware of his prejudice, neither reason nor moral
persuasion will likely succeed."2"
From the perspective of the critical race theorists, there is no easy
way to solve this problem: the marketplace of ideas is irrevocably
flawed so long as the participants in the market are indoctrinated by
a racist culture. Thus, the psychology of the market participants
must be changed before the marketplace can operate. Professor
Mari Matsuda, another prominent critical race theorist, has provided
one rationale for this response to the market distortion problem:
As we learn more about the compulsive/psychosocial aspects of
racism, we may come to see how allowing the racist speaker to fall
into an accelerating upward spiral of racist behavior is akin to
letting a disease go untreated. The paternalistic ring of the disease
model causes dis-ease given our knowledge of the harm done under
that model to innocent nonconformists, the weak, the poor,
women, and children. On the other hand, extreme libertarian
individualism denies the racists the opportunity to know what life
might be like if their escalating racism were to be restrained.
29
Although Matsuda is referring specifically to a racist speaker in
this passage, it seems that the same "disease model" must be applied
to everyone in society, given Matsuda's comment that "at some level,
no matter how much both victims and well-meaning dominant-group
members resist it, racial inferiority is planted in our minds as an idea
that may hold some truth."30 Like Matsuda, other critical race
theorists heavily emphasize the distorting effects of unconscious
racism. We are all infected; the infection badly clouds our judgment,
and therefore, we must be cured of the disease that taints our
political and social perspectives before being allowed to participate
fully in our own self-governance.
Matsuda's emphasis on the need for an ideological "cure" for
unconscious prejudice underscores the comprehensive nature of the
proposals generated by critical race theorists in response to their
views on social constructionism. Because of racist social condition-
ing, individuals are presently incapable of thinking for themselves
about matters involving race. Thus, wholesale re-education of the
populace is necessary before we can even begin to consider a system
of unfettered free speech. When critical race theorists advocate
Lawrence, supra note 12, at 470.
MariJ. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Stoy, 87
MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2340 n.101 (1989).
so Id. at 2339.
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government-enforced suppression of racist speech (a term that
certainly includes overtly racist epithets, but as a matter of logical
necessity also has to include many other forms of discourse that
convey demeaning or unflattering messages about a racial group"
1 ),
they are not merely seeking to protect the status and sensibilities of
minority-group members who are the targets of that speech. Rather,
they are also seeking to replace one "reigning paradigm" with
another. They are seeking to reconfigure the now-flawed intellectual
marketplace by excising from the market an entire set of ideas, so
that those ideas cannot once again infect the citizenry with the
disease of racism.
Thus, critical race theorists do not propose to eliminate the
distortions they find in the marketplace; on the contrary, they
propose to distort the market intentionally in a different way. One
set of ideas will be favored over another, as critical race theorists
argue is presently the case. But even accepting the critical race
theorists' view that one particular set of ideas currently serves as a
"reigning paradigm" governing society, 2 there is still a crucial
S1 One wonders, for example, whether notorious recent books like The Bell Curve
or The End of Racism would be candidates for suppression under a system governed by
critical race principles of social construction. See DINESH D'SOUZA, THE END OF
RACISM 245-87, 477-524 (1995) (defending "rational discrimination" and arguing that
dysfunctional black culture, rather than racism, accounts for economic disparities
between whites and blacks); RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL
CURVE 269-70, 389 (1994) (arguing that disparities between I.Q. scores of racial
groups may be hereditary and not subject to correction by environmental interven-
tions). Both books have been denounced as racist. See, e.g., Elaine R. Jones, Higher
Learning, ESSENcE, Apr. 1995, at 128, 128 (describing The Bell Curve as "racist
pseudoscience"); Jack E. White, The Bigot's Handbook, TIME, Oct. 2, 1995, at 87, 87
(quoting Robert Woodson's characterization of TheEnd of Racism as espousing a "racist
ideology"). The contributions of such "legitimate" books to the social construction
of a racist culture should concern critical race theorists far more than the barely
coherent racist rantings of cultural outsiders such as Klansmen and skinheads. But
if the ideas of Herrnstein, Murray and D'Souza pose a greater threat to the proper
social construction of race than the ideas of the Klan, and if critical race theorists
clearly would permit the censorship of the Klan's racist expressions, then critical race
theorists logically should also favor the censorship of the ideas of Herrnstein, Murray
and D'Souza. I hasten to add that although I vehemently disagree with the theories
espoused by Herrnstein, Murray and D'Souza, the basic theme of this Article is that
my views on the subject (or anyone else's) should never justify censorship of
expressive materials such as these. The point here is simply that the critical race
theorists' censorship proposals potentially have far greater implications for debate
about social policy than is obvious from their usual focus on loud-mouthed miscreants.
12 For example:
[I]t is not just the prevalence and strength of the idea of racism that makes
[sic] the unregulated marketplace of ideas an untenable paradigm for those
individuals who seek full and equal personhood for all. The real problem
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difference between their proposed system and the one it would
replace. Under the system proposed by critical race theorists, the
new reigning paradigm would be enforceable through an entire set
of sanctions not currently available to enforce ideological conformity:
fines, civil damages and even jail sentences."8 And of course, there
is always the possibility that the critical race theorists' attacks on the
First Amendment will be only partly successful. It does not take
much imagination to conceive of the possibility that very different
ideological forces could turn the critical race theorists' system to very
different ends than Lawrence, Delgado and Matsuda would like.
After the well-meaning critical race theorists have eliminated most or
all constitutional restrictions on government regulation of speech,
the predominant forces in the government could easily choose to use
their new powers in ways that reinforce the very "reigning paradigm"
that the critical race theorists now find so oppressive. I will return
to these and other problems associated with the critical race theory
approach to social constructionism after briefly reviewing two other
similar postmodern censorship theories.
B. Constructing Evil. Sexism
The feminist version of the social construction argument contains
most of the same elements that are at the heart of critical race
theory. Like critical race theorists, feminists such as Catharine
MacKinnon have argued for many years that pornography (defined
to include expressive materials that are sexually demeaning to
women, but not necessarily legally obscene 4) has "constructed"
women in many negative ways, making it impossible for women to
realize their full potential either as citizens or as happy and produc-
tive individuals. For MacKinnon, "pornography institutionalizes the
sexuality of male supremacy, which fuses the erotization [sic] of
is that the idea of the racial inferiority of non-whites infects, skews, and
disables the operation of the market (like a computer virus, sick cattle, or
diseased wheat).... [R]acism makes the words and ideas of blacks and
other despised minorities less saleable, regardless of their intrinsic value.
Lawrence, supra note 12, at 468.
11 On the application of criminal sanctions to racist speech, see Charles R.
Lawrence M, Crossburning and the Sound of Silence: Antisubordination Theory and the First
Amendment, 37 VILL. L. REv. 787 (1992) (criticizing a Supreme Court decision striking
down a statute imposing criminal sanctions for racial hate speech).
4 For MacKinnon's view on the differences between "obscenity" and "pornogra-
phy," see CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Not a Moral Issue, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 146,
150-54 (1987); see also id. at 262 n.1 (defining "pornography").
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dominance and submission with the social construction of male and
female. Gender is sexual. Pornography constitutes the meaning of
that sexuality. Men treat women as who they see women as being.
Pornography constructs who that is.
" 31
Pornography has been a central focus of MacKinnon's work
because she seems to believe that pornography is the single most
important defining characteristic of the modern female personality.
She asserts flatly that "pornography constructs the social reality of
gender," such that all women are "defined in pornographic
terms." 6 Like critical race theorists, MacKinnon argues that society
has managed to construct such an efficient and effective discrimina-
tory structure that few people recognize the true nature of that
system: "To the extent pornography succeeds in constructing social
reality, it becomes invisible as harm."
37
As with the critical race critique, MacKinnon's theory asserts that
the products protected by the present system of free expression harm
both the dominant speakers (men) and the victims who are targets
of the discriminatory speech (women). MacKinnon sketches the
harm done to men only briefly and this harm usually takes obvious
forms, such as men's inability to relate to women. 8 In contrast,
MacKinnon's description of the harms imposed by the present system
on women is very detailed, graphic and (at least to an outsider's eye)
oddly unflattering to the group of victims to which she offers her
support. Throughout MacKinnon's writings, women are described
as weak and as victimized by their own sexuality (that is, the sexuality
constructed for them by male-dominated society). "Sexualized
objectification is what defines women as sexual and as women under
male supremacy." 9 According to MacKinnon, female sexual desire
"is socially constructed as that by which we come to want our own
self-annihilation." 0 She views other traits possessed by women in
a similar light. For example, MacKinnon criticizes Carol Gilligan's
celebration of women's care-giving tendencies,41 and contends that
35 Id. at 148 (endnote omitted).
36 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Francis Biddle's Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights, and
Speech, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 34, at 163, 166.
37 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 204
(1989).
58 See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 36, at 189-90 (describing how one man's
experiences with pornography made it difficult for him to connect with women).
-" CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, DesireandPower, inFEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supranote
34, at 46, 50.
40 Id. at 54.
41 See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982). Gilligan posits a three-stage
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"[f]or women to affirm difference, when difference means domi-
nance, as it does with gender, means to affirm the qualities and
characteristics of powerlessness."42
The feminist version of social constructionism is also like the
critical race version in that the critique of reality-and its prescrip-
tion for future action-goes beyond simply regulating the more
extreme antisocial expression that is the immediate subject of most
feminist and critical race writings. The image that MacKinnon uses
repeatedly in her work is that of a film containing depictions of
women being raped, beaten and killed,4" and the overt intent of
MacKinnon's writings is to eliminate what she sees as the widespread
availability of this material. Yet, as one skeptic of the MacKinnon
approach noted recently, this narrow focus detracts from the larger
critique of society that is "unmodified" feminism's main point:
A common misreading of the feminist critique implicates only
manifestly coercive or violent pornography in the maintenance of
patriarchal subordination. In fact, the feminist critique is a good
deal more radical; it concerns the social construction of sexuality,
not violence, and a narrow focus on violent pornography trivializes
the feminists' point.'
Indeed, MacKinnon's critique is probably even more radical than this
quote suggests, because to the extent that sexuality infuses every facet
of a person's personality (as MacKinnon clearly believes), her
perspective requires a radical transformation of human personality
in its most basic respects.
There is little in the writings of MacKinnon or other feminists
who take a similar position to indicate how such a radical transfor-
mation of personality is supposed to occur. But it is very clear that
path of moral development in women. In the third and most advanced stage, "[c]are
becomes the self-chosen principle ... that remains psychological in its concern with
relationships and response but becomes universal in its condemnation of exploitation
and hurt." Id. at 74.
42CATHAJUNE A. MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 34, at 32, 39.
4S See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 36, at 171. MacKinnon writes:
In pornography, there it is, in one place, all of the abuses that women had
to struggle so long even to begin to articulate, all the unspeakable abuse: the
rape, the battery, the sexual harassment, the prostitution, and the sexual
abuse of children. Only in the pornography it is called something else: sex,
sex, sex, sex, and sex, respectively.
Id.
"Jeffrey G. Sherman, Love Speech: The Social Utility of Pornography, 47 STAN. L. REV.
661, 664 n.19 (1995).
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the first step in this radical transformation is the widespread use of
coercive government power to eradicate speech that runs counter to
the MacKinnonite perspective on issues of gender and sexuality. The
First Amendment is not a barrier to the pervasive government
control over expression that carries improper messages because,
according to MacKinnon, "pornography is more actlike than
thoughtlike." 45 MacKinnon argues that speech is indistinguishable
from the sorts of harmful physical actions-battery, rape, mur-
der-that the government has long controlled through the use of its
various coercive tools. "In pornography, pictures and words are sex.
At the same time, in the world pornography creates, sex is pictures
and words. As sex becomes speech, speech becomes sex."4' Note
that her argument is not that the speech causes the act (although she
believes that, too47); her argument is that the speech is the act-and
is therefore subject to regulation as such:
To express eroticism is to engage in eroticism, meaning to perform
a sex act. To say it is to do it, and to do it is to say it. It is also to
do the harm of it and to exacerbate harms surrounding it. In this
context, unrecognized by law, it is to practice sex inequality as well
as to express it.48
MacKinnon's argument, like that of critical race theorists,
proceeds logically to a conclusion that is fundamentally at odds with
the modern Western view of the proper relationship between a
government and its citizens. The notion that "bad" speech "con-
structs" people in negative ways, and that this negative social
construction is properly the concern of the government, leads
necessarily to the corollary that the government is properly con-
cerned with "constructing" a society of "good" people. Under this
theory, one of the government's main tasks (assuming the govern-
ment is controlled by a working majority of "good" officials who are
themselves correctly constructed) is to create a citizenry in its own
image. This is directly contrary to the relationship between citizens
and the government that serves as the basis for modern democratic
theory.
4- MACKINNON, supra note 37, at 204.
4 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDs 26 (1993).
47 SeeMAcKINNON, supra note 36, at 184 ("Specific pornography does directly cause
some assaults. Some rapes are performed by men with paperback books in their
pockets." (endnote omitted)).
48 MAcKiNNON, supra note 46, at 33.
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MacKinnon's equation of speech and action is the key to
understanding how deeply her approach would alter the current law
and the common understandings about democratic citizenship on
which that law is based. At the simplest level, by equating speech
and action, MacKinnon would have the government hold the speaker
(or film director or writer) of antisocial ideas accountable for those
ideas as if the speaker had acted on those ideas; a verbal depiction
of a rape fantasy presumably would be punishable as rape. But the
implications of MacKinnon's theory extend far beyond the pornogra-
phy that is her immediate subject. The analysis also would hold
speakers accountable for the negative consequences of a political or
social perspective embodied in abstract or theoretical speech, as well
as pornographic speech. MacKinnon comes close to saying this
explicitly:
Together with all its material supports, authoritatively saying
someone is inferior is largely how structures of status and differen-
tial treatment are demarcated and actualized. Words and images
are how people are placed in hierarchies, how social stratification
is made to seem inevitable and right, how feelings of inferiority and
superiority are engendered, and how indifference to violence
against those on the bottom is rationalized and normalized. Social
supremacy is made, inside and between people, through making
meanings. To unmake it, these meanings and their technologies
have to be unmade.49
Elsewhere, MacKinnon specifically suggests suppression (at least
in an educational context) of "academic books purporting to
document women's biological inferiority to men, or arguing that
slavery of Africans should return, or that Fourteenth Amendment
equality should be repealed, or that reports of rape are routinely
fabricated." 0
The suggestion that someone could be prohibited-especially in
a classroom setting-from advocating the repeal of a constitutional
amendment tells us how far MacKinnon diverges from the world of
democratic constitutionalism in which we currently live. Given her
position on social constructionism, however, this extreme stance is
inevitable. Simply regulating the tawdry and quasi-underground
market in pornography would not be sufficient to achieve
MacKinnon's goal of eliminating all manifestations of social
domination and the subordination of women. This larger goal can
19 Id. at 31 (foomote omitted).
50 Id. at 107.
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only be achieved if the government suppresses all expressive works
that are viewed (in the eyes of a government official representing the
views of those controlling the government) as contradicting the goals
of equality and antisubordination. To permit such contrarian works
would be to risk undermining the government's social construction
of its citizens through the instilling of positive, egalitarian values.
This point serves as a natural bridge to the third example of
postmodern censorship, civic republicanism, which is concerned
primarily with the government's role in creating citizens that exhibit
the proper characteristics for participating in a just society, in part
through the suppression of "bad" speech.
C. Constructing Virtue
Like feminist and critical race theorists, civic republicans such as
Cass Sunstein express grave doubts about the free-wheeling system of
free speech that has developed during the last seventy years.-1 The
source of the civic republicans' skepticism about free speech is a
broader version of the critical race theorists' concerns about racism
and Catharine MacKinnon's concern about sexism. In particular,
civic republicans argue that a republican form of government (such
as the one established under the United States Constitution) should
do more than mediate between the selfish desires of different
interest groups. As opposed to a pluralist notion of democratic
government, based on the reconciliation of competing interests,
"republican approaches posit the existence of a common good, to be
found at the conclusion of a well-functioning deliberative process."52
This "common good" will be determined after a deliberative process
51 Of course, there are many different strains of civic republicanism, and just as
many different proponents of the theory. I will focus here on Cass Sunstein because
he is probably the most prominent advocate of civic republicanism, he has written
extensively on the issue of free speech, and his reservations about the system of free
speech are consistent with other prominent civic republican advocates such as Frank
Michelman. See Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional
Argument: The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291, 319 (1989)
(arguing that antipornography laws might be constitutional). Although my criticisms
apply directly only to Sunstein's version of civic republicanism, I believe that
Sunstein's version is probably the most logical and internally consistent version of civic
republicanism. Therefore, as I have argued elsewhere, any honest application of the
theory will exhibit the same types of serious and probably insurmountable flaws. See
Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 801,
897-98 (1993).
52 Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1554 (1988)
(footnote omitted).
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during which citizens will exercise "political empathy"53 and "'think
from the [position] of everybody"'54 in considering society's prob-
lems and in choosing a collective response. In contrast to pluralist
versions of democratic theory, in which groups respect political
compromise by agreeing to disagree about fundamental social values,
civic republicans posit a political system that "is designed to produce
substantively correct outcomes. 55
I have explained elsewhere my disagreement with the civic
republicans' basic premises about republican government,56 and will
not repeat those general criticisms here. My present concern is the
civic republican view of the government limiting expression to foster
something the republicans call "civic virtue." Civic virtue is an odd
concept in civic republican theory because, although Sunstein calls
it the "animating principle" of civic republicanism,57 civic republi-
can theorists have never really defined what the term means. It
seems clear, however, that civic republicans believe that "civic virtue"
will be one of the main "substantively correct outcomes" of republi-
can political deliberation. 8
The term is probably synonymous with the "common good" that
Sunstein believes will be "found at the conclusion of a well-function-
ing deliberative process."59 Thus, under a properly constructed
(i.e., civic republican) political structure, the government will be
entitled to assume that, after an appropriate amount of deliberation,
the decisions it reaches about fundamental values are substantively
correct. And, conversely, those running the government are entitled
to conclude that the citizens who obstinately cling to disfavored
values are wrong. As Sunstein says, "[the republican] conception
reflects a belief that debate and discussion help to reveal that some
values are superior to others. Denying that decisions about values
are merely matters of taste, the republican view assumes that
'practical reason' can be used to settle social issues."60
5 Id. at 1555 (foomote omitted).
54 Id. at 1569 (quoting Susan Moller Okin, Reason and Feeling in Thinking About
Justice, 99 ETHIcS 229, 244 (1989)).
55 Id. at 1554.
56 See Gey, supra note 51, at 897-98 (summarizing the weaknesses of civic
republicanism).
17 Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 31
(1985).
5' Sunstein, supra note 52, at 1554.
59 Id.
' Sunstein, supra note 57, at 31-32 (footnote omitted).
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Problems arise when this "universalist""1 view of the political
process is combined with an equally universalist view of the role of
the individual in that political process. Like the two postmodern
censorship theories considered above, civic republicans consider the
individual to be little more than a messy conglomeration of the
individual's social influences. "Under [a republican] regime, purely
private preferences are understood to be shaped by circumstances;
they are social constructs."62 Among the social influences on private
preferences, Sunstein lists "the context in which the preference is
expressed, the existing legal rules, past consumption choices, and
culture in general."" Since social influences change, individual
preferences likewise evolve as they adapt to new social conditions.
And, more ominously, individual preferences are especially suscepti-
ble to positive government intervention.
The government is obviously one of the most powerful, and
therefore most effective, social influences on the formation of
individual preferences. Sunstein states very benignly the role played
by the civic republican state in the social construction of individual
values, filtering his version of social constructionism through the
republican notion of direct citizen participation in government
policymaking. In this conception, government becomes the "deliber-
ative process in which a person chooses her own ends and does not
merely attempt to satisfy whatever ends she 'has."'6 4 This is an
admirably participatory view of the governmental process. But
Sunstein is somewhat vague about what will happen in that process
to those who remain unconverted to the ends chosen by the majority.
Sunstein never conclusively deals with the problems that will occur
whenever his system encounters steadfast dissent over fundamental
values. His preferred solution to such problems is suggested by his
comment that "a democratic government should sometimes take
private preferences as an object of regulation and control."6 5 In
other words, the government should seek to cure the dissenters of
their misguided attitudes.
For all his talk about popular sovereignty and self-governance,
Sunstein must (and in fact, does) endorse governmental restrictions
6' For a discussion of universalism, see Sunstein, supra note 52, at 1554-55.
62 Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interferences with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REv.
1129, 1133 (1986).
1 Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3, 5 (1991).
I Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1132-33.
1 Sunstein, supra note 63, at 13.
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on an individual citizen's ability to engage in certain kinds of
expression, so that the government may mold citizens' personalities
and attitudes in positive ways. This not only involves government
prohibition of "anti-social" speech, such as pornography or hate
speech, but also government efforts to prevent citizens from
maintaining a steady diet of unenlightening expression, such as
popular but low-quality light entertainment programming on
television. 6  And this is probably only the beginning. The individu-
al personality is a many splendored thing, and it is doubtful that a
civic republican government could stop itself from refurbishing its
citizens' personalities until the job is complete. It is difficult to see
a logical limitation on the open-ended proposition that "a democratic
government should sometimes take private preferences as an object
of regulation and control."67
By increasing the government's power in this way, Sunstein also
simultaneously accedes to increasing the power of whatever sector of
society musters the political resources to gain control over the
government. No matter how empathetic citizens endeavor to behave
in a large, diverse democracy, there will always be substantial,
irreconcilable differences between some groups and individuals, even
"at the conclusion of a well-functioning deliberative process."68
Unless Sunstein intends to propose a system that operates only by
consensus-a completely hypothetical system-then he must
recognize that some people will win and some people will lose in
every democratic political system, including those labelled "civic
republican." Unfortunately, in a civic republican system, the
principles dictate that if the winners think little enough of the losers'
perspective on some important matter (race, sex, violence on
television), then the government may force the winners' views upon
the losers without fear of constitutional limitation.
Sunstein's explanation for giving the government this kind of
power over individual expression in a civic republican system is
nothing more than a simple extension of the social constructionism
argument. According to the social constructionism argument,
6 On the latter point, see Cass R. Sunstein, A New Deal for Speech 17 HASTINGS
COMiM. & ENT. L.J. 187, 160 (1994) (arguing that the First Amendment should be
interpreted to permit greatly increased government supervision of private broadcast-
ing, including mandatory content review by supposedly nonpartisan experts of
children's programming, and specific programming mandates for increased public
affairs programming).
67 Sunstein, supra note 63, at 13.
s See Sunstein, supra note 52, at 1554 (footnote omitted).
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individuals are "constructed" by their social influences. Some of
those social influences are produced by market forces that are
themselves driven by the self-interest of other market participants,
which do not necessarily coincide with the public interest. This leads
individuals to do or want things that are not good for them and are
harmful to the commonweal. Thus, in Sunstein's formulation of the
argument, the overriding influence of social forces creates a schism
between an individual's "actual interests" and that individual's
"interests as subjectively perceived [by that individual]. "" Accord-
ing to Sunstein, the market distortions that produce an individual's
subjectively (but incorrectly) perceived interests "will support
considerable legislative and judicial intrusion into private preference
structures" to correct such distortions. 70  In other words, the
government should be given the authority both to sort out the
"actual" from the merely "subjectively perceived" individual prefer-
ences and to correct for "bad" social conditioning by creating an
elaborate system of social controls and value instruction intended to
produce individuals imbued with a range of government-dictated
"actual" preferences.
Needless to say, implementation of this theory would radically
change the relationship between the individual and government that
has long been the basis for this society's system ofjudicially protected
civil liberties. Despite its radical consequences, Sunstein's compre-
hensive theory of government merely takes the social constructionist
premise of all postmodern censorship schemes and carries that
premise to its logical conclusion. If individuals are nothing more
than uncognizant mirror-images of their collective social influences,
then there is no real barrier to using another form of "good"
collective power to counteract those "bad" social influences. One
product of collective influence replaces another, with no net loss of
individual freedom. Social constructionist arguments assume that
there is no such thing as a constitutionally relevant individual, and
that individual freedom of thought is a cruel delusion. Therefore,
constitutional rights (such as the right of free speech) that depend
on mythical notions of individuality are empirically flawed and may
be dispensed with in favor of some alternative system of collective
value determination filtered through and enforced by the govern-
ment. Nothing is lost, because the thing that the old system sought
69 Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1171.
71 Id. at 1172.
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to protect (the free-thinking individual) never existed in the first
place. This is the essence of what Richard Delgado lauds as the "new
paradigm" for free speech."
Of course, this "new paradigm" responds to the old paradigm in
which individuals do really exist, freedom from coercion (both
governmental and social) is possible, and those who control the
government do not have the authority to recast the views of dissident
citizens to satisfy the leaders' notions of good and evil. Oddly
enough, the "new paradigm" is not so new itself. It is essentially the
same argument that governments have always used when confronted
with unruly masses that insist on rejecting the government's superior
understanding of what is good for them. As the next subsection
indicates, the flaws in the old version of the "new paradigm" are the
same as those that plague its postmodern revivalists.
D. The Intellectual Precursors of Social Constructionism
There is nothing new about the notion that individuals are
"constructed" by their social circumstances and that it matters what
individuals read, hear or watch on television and movie screens.
Governments have always justified their efforts to censor dissenting
speech on the ground that they must do so to prevent bad ideas from
gaining adherents among society's easily duped masses. WhenJustice
Sanford wrote in Gitlow v. New York that a Socialist Party faction's
"Left Wing Manifesto" "involve [s] danger to the public peace and to
the security of the State,"72 Sanford was referring to the possibility
that Gitlow's manifesto would convince other individuals to partici-
pate in revolutionary action, possibly including violence. When
Sanford wrote that the government may criminalize revolutionary
speech in order to "suppress the threatened danger in its incipien-
cy,"73 he was referring to the possibility that a steady diet of radical
ideas would "construct" (to use the modern term) a legion of new
revolutionaries by changing the thought patterns of previously
apathetic and docile citizens. The early Court's supporters noted
pointedly that radical speech was likely to teach the unhappy lower
classes unhealthy political lessons, and thus all examples of such
speech had to be eradicated by the government to prevent precisely
7' See Delgado, supra note 2, at 170.
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the sort of widespread and harmful social conditioning that postmod-
ern censors now vociferously lament.7 4
The focus on negative social conditioning has also been prevalent
in the immoral speech cases since the first reported opinions on the
subject, and in fact the Supreme Court still uses its own variation on
the social constructionism argument as one of the primary justifica-
tions for modem obscenity law. The problem of immoral social
conditioning was a key to the House of Lords' decision in Regina v.
Hicklin,7 5 the notorious nineteenth-century British case that estab-
lished the standard that would govern both British and American
obscenity law for almost one hundred years. The standard for
obscenity set by that case was "whether the tendency of the matter
charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds
are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a
publication of this sort may fall."
76
The concern reflected in the Hicklin standard is precisely the
same as the elitist modern notion that many people cannot distin-
guish between their "actual interests" and their "interests as subjec-
tively perceived." 77 The concern is that the unreflective masses are
always prone to giving in to their baser instincts,78 and therefore are
always susceptible to being "depraved and corrupted" if the benefi-
cent government does not step in and save them from expressive
temptation. This notion not only forms the basis of the postmodern
censorship theories discussed in this Article, but also guides the
Court in its pronouncements permitting government control of
sexual speech. Although the Court has modified the Hicklin standard
several times since it first took up the subject of sexually explicit
speech in 1957, 79 the Court continues to justify government regula-
74 SeeJohn H. Wigmore, Abrams v. U.S.: Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Thuggeiy
in War-Time and Peace-Time, 14 ILL. L. REv. 539, 550 (1920) ("If these five men could,
without the law's restraint, urge munition workers to a general strike and armed
violence, then others could lawfully do so; and a thousand disaffected undesirables,
aliens and natives alike, were ready and waiting to do so.").
75 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360 (1868).
76 Id. at 371.
7 See supra text accompanying note 69.
71 For Sunstein's explanation of the human tendency to favor pleasing, short-term
"first-order preferences" over difficult, long-term "second-order preferences," see
Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1140-41.
7 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Roth gave us the "prurient
interest" test, which permits government to prohibit only sexual speech that appeals
to "prurient interests.'" Id. at 487. The Court has never systematically attempted to
clarify the meaning of "prurience," relying instead on vague suggestions that
"prurience" must appeal only to "shameful or morbid interests in sex," and not to
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tion of such speech by referring to the need to control immoral
expression in order to prevent the widespread debasement of public
morals.
In one of the 1973 decisions establishing the modern test for
obscenity, Chief Justice Warren Burger noted, on behalf of the
Court, that
It]he sum of experience, including that of the past two decades,
affords an ample basis for legislatures to conclude that a sensitive,
key relationship of human existence, central to family life, commu-
nity welfare, and the development of human personality, can be
debased and distorted by crass commercial exploitation of sex.
80
Catharine MacKinnon and Chief Justice Burger essentially agree that
the "crass commercial exploitation of sex" constructs gender relations
in undesirable ways. They may disagree on what desirable gender
relations would look like and, unlike the Court, MacKinnon would
undoubtedly enforce the logic of her convictions consistently and
with rigorous legal sanctions if she had the chance. In the end,
however, there is little difference between MacKinnon and Burger on
the theoretical merits of social constructionism.
For all the elaborate theoretical baggage that the postmodern
censors use to support the claims of social constructionism, the
theory amounts to nothing more than the argument that speech is
sometimes so compelling that it convinces a listener (or reader or
viewer) to adopt an entirely new perspective on the world. Holmes
made the same point more eloquently: "Every idea is an incitement.
It offers itself for belief and if believed, it is acted on unless some
other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the
movement at birth."8" It is difficult to see what the postmodern
censors have added to this simple truth by arguing that individuals
are "socially constructed," except perhaps to emphasize that ideas are
sometimes offered in insidious and subtle ways, and are sometimes
adopted by individuals who do not carefully and rationally consider
the merits of harmful but superficially attractive beliefs. This is the
same basic attitude that the government and its supporters on the
"normal" interest in sex. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504-05
(1985). Whatever the term means, it is undoubtedly intended to ensure that
protected speech appeals only to higher-order, intellectual "second-order preferences"
as opposed to baser, visceral "first-order preferences." See supra text accompanying
note 78.
80 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973).
"1 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Court in the 1920s held about immigrants and members of the
working class, who were perceived by the government to be especially
susceptible to the siren song of radical socialism. 82 Fear of society's
moral gullibility is also the persistent theme of the Court's continu-
ing willingness to permit suppression of sexual speech that "debases
and distorts" human personality. The new explanation for censor-
ship, therefore, adds nothing to the old.
E. The Flaws of Social Constructionism
Although they locate themselves on different ends of the political
spectrum, postmodern and conservative censors have similar
responses to the effects that harmful speech might have on suscep-
tible citizens in an unsettled, uncertain and sometimes dangerous
world. In a nutshell, that response is fear-that is, fear of radicalism
(among the conservatives), or fear of rampant racism, sexism and
short-sighted political selfishness (among the postmodernists). In
both cases, the claim is that the feared evil threatens to destroy the
positive values of democracy that both postmodern and conservative
censors claim to represent. This fear leads each group to propose
the same solution: Suppress the expression of ideas that are the
source of the fear. Hence, censorship.
The advocates of the conservative and postmodernist censorship
proposals build on the almost universal acknowledgement that even
a democratic government occasionally will have to suppress some
speech to preserve public order, although the censorship proponents
sometimes seek to portray this basic pragmatic reality as if it were a
novel contribution to free speech theory. Postmodernists, in
particular, are fond of ridiculing the supposedly dominant "absolu-
tist" position on speech,8 3 despite the fact that the absolutist
82 In Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919), which upheld the conviction of
a German-language newspaper for the publication of antiwar articles, Holmes likened
the newspaper's readers to dry tinder: "[O]n the record ... it is impossible to say
that it might not have been found that the circulation of the paper was in quarters
where a little breath would be enough to kindle a flame .... " Id. at 209. Justice
Sanford repeated this image in Gitlour
A single revolutionary spark may kindle a fire that, smoldering for a time,
may burst into a sweeping and destructive conflagration. It cannot be said
that the State is acting arbitrarily or unreasonably when in the exercise of
its judgment as to the measures necessary to protect the public peace and
safety, it seeks to extinguish the spark without waiting until it has enkindled
the flame or blazed into the conflagration.
Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 669.
83 See, e.g., CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, The Sexual Politics of the First Amendment, in
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position has never held sway over more than perhaps one Justice in
the entire history of the Supreme Court.84 The real difference
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 34, at 206, 208 ("Absolutism has developed through
obscenity litigation, I think, because pornography's protection fits perfectly with the
power relations embedded in First Amendment structure and jurisprudence from the
start."). MacKinnon even argues that the absolutist position has prospered in part
because of the influence that Playboy magazine has had on its readers:
I must also say that the First Amendment has become a sexual fetish through
years of absolutist writing in the melodrama mode in Playboy in particu-
lar.... What is conveyed is not only that using women is as legitimate as
thinking about the Constitution, but also that if you don't support these
views about the Constitution, you won't be able to use these women.
Id. at 209; see also Matsuda, supranote 29, at 2356 ("[E]ven strong civil libertarians are
likely to admit that the absolutist view is unworkable."); Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech
Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 255, 260 (1992) ("The basic commitments of the absolutist
view are now clichds, even dogma. Despite that view's novelty and the lack of direct
historical support on its behalf, it has won a dramatic number of victories in the
Supreme Court.").
The exception, of course, isJustice Black, who argued that the FirstAmendment
prohibited regulation of free expression "without deviation, without exception,
without any ifs, buts, or whereases .... " Edmond Cahn, Justice Black and First
Amendment "Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 549, 559 (1962). The
qualifying word "perhaps" in the text accompanying this note refers to the fact that,
for all his expressed absolutist inclinations on matters of expression,Justice Black had
a decidedly unfriendly attitude toward extending constitutional protection to clearly
communicative symbolic speech. See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 609-10 (1969)
(Black,J., dissenting) (refusing to extend constitutionally protected free speech to flag
burning). Black's free speech "absolutism" is therefore far removed from the
"everything is speech" caricature that appears in the work of the postmodernists.
The problems with the grandiose claims made by the postmodernists may be
rooted in their flexible use of the First Amendment nomenclature. The standard
meaning of the word "absolutist" suggests someone who asserts a form of First
Amendment protection that is complete and unconditional. This meaning is
exemplified by Justice Black's famous dictum that the First Amendment's "no law"
language means literally no law. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959)
(Black, J., concurring) ("I read 'no law ... abridging' to mean no law abridging.").
Some of the postmodernists use the word "absolutist," however, simply as a label for
theorists who would permit some government regulation of speech, but (in the minds
of the postmodernists) not enough. Thus, Cass Sunstein presents as examples of the
"absolutistview" cases involving commercial speech, obscenity, libel, publication of the
names of rape victims, advocacy of crime, campaign financing, corporate speech, hate
speech and flag burning. See Sunstein, supra note 83, at 260-61 & n.19. Interestingly,
not a single case that Sunstein cites as an example of "absolutism" even suggests,
much less holds, that any of these categories of speech is protected completely,
unconditionally or without exception. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541
(1989) ("Our holding today is limited. We do not hold that truthful publication [of
names of rape victims] is automatically constitutionally protected . . . ."); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408-10 (1989) (recognizing that flag burning is not protected
speech if actual breach of the peace results); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 786 (1978) (indicating that corporate speech is not protected from
government interference by the First Amendment when a "compelling state interest"
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between the postmodernists and their antagonists is not the differ-
ence between short-sighted First Amendment "absolutists" and
benign representatives of a diverse population; the real difference is
between theorists who trust the government to channel thought
through regulation of expression, and those who do not. Although
every First Amendment theorist of note would permit some regula-
tion of speech, the more protective versions of First Amendment
theory-an amalgam of which forms the heart of the Supreme
Court's First Amendmentjurisprudence regarding political speech-
include a central presumption that runs in favor of speech and
against suppression. This presumption means that governmental
suppression of speech should be permitted only if the government's
fears of imminent danger are fully justified, the speech is a direct
and immediate cause of the danger, the suppression of speech is a
logical response to these well-grounded fears, and the costs of
suppression do not outweigh the benefits of social peace and
ideological tranquility.
The primary lesson of the Holmes and Brandeis opinions in the
early speech cases8 -opinions that have now superseded the
majority's approach in those cases 6 ---is that the old antiradical
justifies such interference). Describing these decisions as "absolutist" does not convey
an accurate impression of the law produced by these decisions, but use of the term
does serve the rhetorical purpose of conveying the postmodernist view that the
extensive protection offered to speech in these cases represents an unhealthily
extremist position, which should be brought back in line through a wholesale
reconsideration of the government's power over speech.
s See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(arguing that only production of a "clear and imminent danger" of some substantive
evil allows a state to restrict speech and assembly, but that the organization and
assembly of the Communist Party, even to "teach criminal syndicalism," do not meet
this standard); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(noting that because "[e]very idea is an incitement," publication would be a crime
only if it constitutes "an attempt to induce an uprising against government at once
and not at some indefinite time in the future"); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("It is only the present danger of immediate evil
or an intent to bring it about that warrants Congress in setting a limit to the
expression of opinion where private rights are not concerned.").
86 The Court announced as early as 1951 that it was adopting the Holmes/Brandeis
approach in First Amendment cases involving political speech, see Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 507-08 (1951), although it would take the Court another 18 years
fully to incorporate the Holmes/Brandeis standard into constitutional doctrine. See
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (holding that Supreme Court
decisions beginning with Dennis have "fashioned the principle that the constitutional
guarantees of free speech.., do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy
of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
AGAINST POSTMODERN CENSORSHIP THEORY
censorship scheme could not pass this test. For many years, the
Court has adopted the Holmes/Brandeis view that in the early free
speech cases the government's fears of speech were overwrought, the
suppression of speech did not address any real political danger, and
a great deal of legitimate dissent was lost in exchange for no
particular social gain. The postmodern censors would now have us
renounce these lessons and return to something like the standard
thatJustice Sanford proposed seventy years ago. The only difference
is that the targets of the suppression would now be different.
Unfortunately, the new censorship schemes cannot pass the test any
more easily than the old scheme, in part because of serious defects
in the social constructionist argument that forms the foundation of
the new censorship schemes. Specifically, the social constructionist
premises of the postmodern censorship theories are flawed in at least
four ways: empirically, epistemologically, politically and theoretically.
1. The Empirical Flaw
The empirical problem with the social constructionist argument
has several manifestations. The first manifestation is the frequent
attempt by postmodern censors to equate speech with some other,
nonexpressive phenomenon such as discrimination. This claim is
made most clearly in the feminist literature, as in Catharine
MacKinnon's unsuccessful attempt (in conjunction with Andrea
Dworkin) to write a statute that would withstand constitutional
scrutiny by defining pornography as discrimination. s7 Indeed, all
of MacKinnon's writings on the subject of pornography seem
directed primarily toward rebutting the common claim of First
Amendment advocates that pornography involves the expression of
ideas and is therefore conceptually distinct from illegal action such
as discrimination."8 MacKinnon argues that the communication of
pornographic images is itself a form of discriminatory action, and
therefore should be treated by the government as essentially indistin-
action").
87 See MACKINNON, supra note 34, at 262 n.1 (defining pornography as "the graphic
sexually explicit subordination of women"). The Indianapolis version of this statute
was held unconstitutional in American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th
Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). For one example of the critical race
theory version of the speech-as-discrimination argument, see Lawrence, supra note 12,
at 440-44. Lawrence argues for an understanding of the "inseparability of racist
speech and discriminatory conduct." Id. at 442.
1 Her latest book is devoted almost entirely to this subject. See MacKinnon, supra
note 46.
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guishable from many other forms of discrimination that the
government routinely regulates.
MacKinnon's analysis of pornography is, to say the least,
controversial. MacKinnon's attempt to describe pornography as
something other than the communication of ideas is a response to
the probably insuperable difficulties inherent in the narrower claim
that pornography directly causes particular illegal actions such as
rape.8 9 MacKinnon attempts to avoid these causation difficulties by
making the much broader claim that pornography instills in men and
women certain ideas about gender that create a discriminatory
society, which in turn subjugates women in almost every aspect of
their lives. According to this argument, since the ideas expressed in
pornography constitute discrimination, there is no need to link these
ideas causally to any other phenomenon.
Unfortunately, this approach does not cure the causation
problem; it makes the problem worse. Even if we leave to one side
the disputable value judgments inherent in MacKinnon's theory that
gender is presently constructed in undesirable ways by the easy
availability of sexually explicit speech, her theory requires a number
of empirical conclusions that can never be proved. These unknowns
include conclusions about the precise meanings of a very large and
diverse body of speech, the psychological effects such speech has had
on particular individuals (which, of course, must be isolated from the
effects created by other aspects of society and the idiosyncrasies of
individual personalities), the social consequences of these psychologi-
cal effects, and the multiple ramifications of a policy authorizing
governmental suppression of speech. The controversy surrounding
MacKinnon's account of reality does not necessarily demonstrate that
her account of reality is false; but the controversy does demonstrate
that her account of reality is not a matter of empirical fact.
MacKinnon's claims, like the claims of her opponents, are political
89 For descriptions of these problems, see Augustine Brannigan, Obscenity and Social
Harm: A Contested Terrain, 14 INT'LJ.L. & PSYCHIATRY 1-10, 10 (1991) ("[I]t would
seem more plausible to consider the pornographic as a scapegoat which exemplifies
all the sexist tendencies of our culture than to theorize its role as a determinate cause
of sexist attitudes and sexual aggression in our societies."); Steven G. Gey, The
Apologetics of Suppression: The Regulation ofPornography as Act and Idea, 86 MICH. L. REV.
1564, 1599-1606 (1988) (noting that "no one has been able to demonstrate that
identifiable, physical harms result directly from pornography"); Daniel Linz et al., The
Attorney General's Commission on Pornography: The Gaps Between "Findings" and Facts, 1987
AM. B. FOUND. REs.J. 713, 713-28, 723 (describing the absence of evidence supporting
the "view that exposure to sexually violent material leads to aggressive or assaultive
behavior outside the confines of the laboratory").
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opinions that are imbued with value judgments, which people of
good faith may accept or deny. The point is: MacKinnon may be
wrong about what pornography does, and she may also be wrong
about the consequences of giving government the authority to dictate
how sexuality will be addressed in speech by citizens.
This distinction is important because MacKinnon and the other
postmodern censors treat the current debate over free speech as a
debate between faith and fact; that is, the free speech advocates'
blind faith in the value of expression, versus the censors' empirically
verifiable proof of particular factual evils created by free speech.
The case for suppression of speech becomes much weaker if the
postmodernist claims are seen as being at least as speculative as the
claims of the most avid and absolutist free speech proponent. The
postmodernists make essentially unprovable claims that the cited
harms (such as the denial of equality due to discriminatory social
conditioning) are directly attributable to free speech, that this social
situation would improve markedly if the government were given
significantly greater control over how people thought about them-
selves and the world, and even that postmodernist sympathizers
would be able to control the government once they gave it this new
power over speech (this is the political flaw discussed below)." In
this light, postmodernist proposals to give the government expansive
new power over speech themselves represent willful acts of blind
faith.
Other manifestations of the empirical problem with post-
modernism's theory of social constrctionism also involve the
difficulty of accurately assessing the meaning, import and conse-
quences of speech. All postmodern censorship is premised on the
need to suppress "bad" speech to further "good" social values (such
as equality) through social conditioning. But any attribution of value
and consequences to particular speech requires empirical judgments
that are problematic in ways that are similar to the problems arising
from Catharine MacKinnon's questionable claims about sexual
expression. This problem dooms Cass Sunstein's attempt to divide
human preferences into upper-level "second-order preferences,"
which the state may seek to foster through the dissemination or
encouragement of certain kinds of speech, and lower-order "first-
order preferences," which the government may discourage through
11 See infra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
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the prohibition of other kinds of speech.9 1 The first-order/second-
order preference dichotomy cannot withstand analysis because
regardless of the mechanism used to delineate these categories, any
conclusion will be tainted by the values brought to the table by the
regulators. There is simply no empirically verifiable way to deter-
mine whether some preferences are "worse" than others, except to
insert a series of self-serving judgments about "good" and "bad,"
which will determine the outcome of the analysis before it even takes
place.
92
2. The Epistemological Flaw
The empirical flaw in postmodernist social constractionism is
related to the theory's epistemological flaw. The epistemological flaw
arises when the claims of social constructionism are turned on the
postmodern censors themselves. The epistemological flaw is this: If
the postmodern censors are correct in their claim that everyone in
society is "constructed" by society in ways that distort their ability to
understand and respond wisely to the true nature of the reality
around them, how can we be sure that the solutions offered by the
postmodernists are not themselves so badly distorted that their
preferred solution will do more harm than good, if they do any good
at all? How do we even know that the postmodern censors' charac-
terization of the problem is correct? How do we know, for example,
that the critical race theory and feminist proposals for censorship are
11 See Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1140-41.
12 At one point, Marl Matsuda writes:
Racist speech is best treated as a sui geneis category, presenting an idea so
historically untenable, so dangerous, and so tied to perpetuation of violence
and degradation of the very classes of human beings who are least equipped
to respond that it is properly treated as outside the realm of protected
discourse.
Matsuda, supra note 29, at 2357. But from a slightly different perspective, government
control over expression is also a sui generis category "so historically untenable, so
dangerous, and so tied to perpetuation of violence and degradation of the very classes
of human beings who are least equipped to respond," id., that it is properly treated
as unacceptable in a democratic state. One of these propositions leads to government
suppression of some speech involving race; the other rejects such a solution. But
neither of these propositions can be judged "true" or "false" without the application
of value choices about the meaning of democratic government that are outside the
realm of empirical proof. The postmodern censors are entitled to argue in favor of
their version of democracy, but they cannot win the argument by demonstrating that
some category of speech is, as a matter of empirical analysis, not worthy of being
treated as speech.
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not themselves based on misjudgments about the importance or
effects of racist and sexist speech?
For that matter, is it not possible that the postmodern censorship
theories distort reality by emphasizing the dangers of speech too
heavily? As Cass Sunstein has pointed out: "The reduction of
cognitive dissonance is a powerful motivating force: people attempt
to bring their beliefs and perceptions in line with existing prac-
tice." 3 He has also noted: "Preferences may be distorted ... by
interest-induced beliefs on the part of the beneficiaries of existing
practice." 4 Regardless of why the postmodern censorship theories
were first formulated, once a theorist adopts the theory as his or her
own, and expends the time and effort advancing that theory, the
theorist inevitably begins to perceive reality through the prism of that
theory.9 5  To borrow Sunstein's phrasing, the postmodernists'
preference for greater government control of speech may be
distorted by the interest-induced beliefs of theorists who have a great
deal of time and energy invested in a particular set of policy
proposals. These proposals for government control of speech are,
therefore, by the terms of the proposals themselves, deeply suspect.
Another variation on this theme is the possibility that the
theorists are too close to the problems they describe to make
accurate judgments about the costs and benefits of their proposals.
Charles Lawrence chides civil libertarians for downplaying the
importance of racist expression, based in part on his own encounters
with racist speech.9" But is it not possible-again, based on
Lawrence's own use of the social constructionist argument-that such
encounters have had a distorting effect on Lawrence's preference for
broad government regulation of racist speech? As a minority,
Lawrence has had to endure countless examples of gratuitous racism.
But he has extrapolated from his reaction to these specific instances
of racism some very broad theories of government regulation of
speech and ideas, which will have ramifications far beyond the
93 Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CAL. L. REv. 751, 759 (1991).
11 Sunstein, supra note 52, at 1544.
9 5 Again, this is a point made by the postmodernists themselves: "Narrative theory
shows that we interpret new stories in terms of the old ones we have internalized and
now use to judge reality. When new stories deviate too drastically from those that
form our current understanding, we denounce them as false and dangerous." Richard
Delgado & David H. Yun, Pressure Valves and Bloodied Chickens: An Analysis of
Paternalistic Objections to Hate Speech Regulation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 871, 882 (1994).
9" See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 12, at 460-61 (recounting an incident of racist
graffiti at a school where his sister taught and criticizing claims that such incidents are
"isolated").
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specific context that motivated Lawrence. Specific examples-even
those that evoke an understandable, immediate and visceral
response-may not always be the best guide to general solutions for
complicated problems.97
Judgment can be distorted by being too close to a problem as
well as by being too far away. This is especially true in the area of
speech, since so much controversial speech touches upon our
deepest beliefs about ourselves and our society. The First Amend-
ment protection of free speech is so strong in large part because
speech can so easily elicit a harsh and immediate response from a
government that is in the business of responding to the popular
emotion of the moment. In recent history, one of the prime
purposes of the First Amendment has been to prevent government
overreaction to speech that causes great psychic distress to those who
have access to government power, but which does not immediately
and directly incite some illegal action or undercut the more typical
governmental means of responding to antisocial activity.98 In a way,
97 A related point has been made by Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry regarding
the recent trend toward "storytelling" as a framework for legal analysis. See Daniel A.
Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45
STAN. L. Rav. 807, 809 (1993) ("[S] torytellers need to take greater steps to ensure that
their stories are accurate and typical, to articulate the legal relevance of the stories,
and to include an analytic dimension in their work.").
98 The flag-burning cases are the best example of this First Amendment function.
See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (holding that prosecution for
flagburning in violation of the Flag Protection Act of 1989 cannot be justified on
content-neutral grounds and thus violates the First Amendment); Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding unconstitutional a Texas statutute criminalizing
desecration of the flag based on offensiveness of the expression).
Another variation on this theme is Vincent Blasi's argument that "the overriding
objective at all times should be to equip the [F]irst [A]mendment to do maximum
service in those historical periods when intolerance of unorthodox ideas is most
prevalent and when governments are most able and most likely to stifle dissent
systematically." Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment 85
COLUM. L. REV. 449, 449-50 (1985). Blasi specifically emphasizes the dangers
represented by the "instinct toward intolerance" that periodically characterizes the
political system in this (and probably every other) country:
Because the instinct to suppress dissent is basic, primitive, and aggressive, it
tends to have great momentum when it breaks loose from the shackles of
social constraint. Aggression is contagious, and hatred of strangers for what
they believe is one of the safest and most convenient forms of aggression.
The problem is compounded by the fact that the suppression of dissent
ordinarily is undertaken in the guise of political affirmation, of insisting that
everyone stand up and be counted in favor of the supposed true values of
the political community.
Id. at 457.
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the speech-protectiv6 Supreme Court is doing exactly what post-
modernist theory would have it do, which is to view skeptically the
pronouncements of a body of officials whose judgment is very likely
clouded by self-interest, shortsightedness and the fear of loss that
always accompanies social privilege.
None of this criticism is meant to suggest that Professors Sunstein
or Lawrence or any of the other postmodern censors are deluded or
irrational or incapable of accurately perceiving or describing reality.
I mean only to take note of the fact that the postmodernists cannot
escape the corrosive effect of their own arguments regarding social
constructionism and distorted preferences. If everyone's view of the
world is irretrievably distorted by the observer's socially constructed
psyche, then no one, including the postmodern critics of present
reality, can escape their own distorted perceptions in order to
critique society and suggest solutions to our problems. Any sugges-
tions for social reform should be viewed as distorted, the product of
cognitive dissonance, and/or generated by "interest-induced beliefs
on the part of the beneficiaries of existing practice."99 The status
quo is tainted, but then again so is every alternative to the status quo.
There is no way out of the logical loop of social constructionism,
which suggests that even if (and perhaps especially if) the postmoder-
nists are right, we should be deeply suspicious of proposals that give
any group of political actors the unchecked authority to "take private
preferences as an object of regulation and control."'
3. The Political Flaw
Even assuming that the postmodern censors have correctly
described the problem of antisocial speech and are not overreaching
in their proposals for the suppression of that speech, it is unlikely
that these theorists could ever achieve their ultimate goal of a society
effectively cleansed of the ideas and expression targeted by their
proposals. The third flaw of social constructionism-which I have
labelled the "political flaw"-relates to this problem. The political
flaw arises because the postmodern censors routinely assume that
adoption of their first proposal (recommending the elimination of
judicially enforced constitutional protection for antisocial speech)
will lead inevitably to the adoption of their second proposal
(recommending specific legislative action to suppress racist, sexist
I Sunstein, supra note 52, at 1544.
100 Sunstein, supra note 63, at 13.
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and other no-value expression). The political flaw is that adoption
of the first proposal will not necessarily lead to the adoption of the
second because the postmodern censors cannot guarantee that their
sympathizers will control the levers of political power. In other
words, the censors could easily win the battle to eliminate constitu-
tional protection of speech, only to lose the battle over exactly which
forms of speech should be regulated. From the postmodernist
perspective, this would create the worst of all worlds because after
the postmodern critics have robbed everyone, including themselves,
of judicial protection for speech, they may find a government that
marches to a very different political drummer. That government
could easily conclude that the critical race/feminist/civic republican
theories discussed here represent dangerously inflammatory and
collectivist ideas that should be suppressed in the interests of good,
old-fashioned (that is, pre-1960s) racial, sexual and sociopolitical
tranquility.
This possibility is the most obvious flaw in the postmodern
censorship literature, and it is therefore somewhat puzzling that
none of the theorists proposing new censorship schemes really come
to terms with their potential dilemma. One typical postmodernist
response to this problem is to claim that the new censorship
proposals do not undermine the protections of dissent built into
existing First Amendmentjurisprudence, but merely propose narrow
exceptions to the rule that antisocial speech is protected by the First
Amendment unless it incites immediate illegal action." 1 These
overtures to general free speech principles are not responsive to the
key problem of how to ensure that the "good guys" will obtain and
retain political power in the brave new First Amendment world. It
would not take much creativity for a deeply conservative government
to use the very same social constructionist theory supporting the
101 See Lawrence, supra note 12, at 434 n.20 ("I have spent the better part of my life
as a dissenter. As a high school student I was threatened with suspension for my
refusal to participate in a civil defense drill, and I have been a conspicuous consumer
of my [F]irst [A]mendment liberties ever since."); id. at 458 ("I argue that carefully
drafted regulations can and should be sustained without significant departures from
existing [F]irst [A] mendment doctrine."); Matsuda, supra note 29, at 2356 (proposing
"an explicit and narrow definition of racist hate messages [that] will allow restriction
while respecting [F]irst [A]mendment values"); Sunstein, supra note 85, at 315
(proposing that the government be allowed to regulate nonpolitical speech--such as
pornography and hate speech-on a much lower showing of harm than the courts
presently require, because the "speech... serves few or none of the goals for which
speech is protected, and... causes serious social harms").
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postmodern speech regulations tojustify the government's own very
different ideological ends.
The postmodernists propose that speech should be treated as
merely one of many values in the constitutional constellation, and
that the elective bodies of government should be given the authority
to subordinate free speech values to other social values, such as
equality. "We are beginning to realize," Richard Delgado argues,
"that... judges who set out to be scrupulously fair may not be able
to balance values in cases, such as those concerning hate speech,
when free speech and another value (say community) come into
conflict." 0 But "community" is not the only alternative value that
the government is permitted to pursue under our constitutional
scheme. If the "new paradigm" of speech were adopted to govern
First Amendment analysis, there would be nothing to stop a
conservative government from claiming that judges are equally
incapable of balancing the values of speech and the right to life of
a fetus, or judging the immorality inherent in speech that advocates
sexual license, homosexuality or drug use. Once we accept the basic
postmodern premise that free speech should sometimes be subordi-
nated to other, superior social values, the decision as to which social
values are important enough to trump the rights of dissenters to
disagree with the political majority about ethical fundamentals
becomes a purely political matter.
Many political factions would be happy to adopt the "new
paradigm" of free speech in the hope that they could obtain
sufficient political power to silence their adversaries and "construct"
the values of the next political generation. The potential battle over
the right to manage social discourse and control the apparatus of
political education would substantially raise the stakes in every
political contest. We have already seen a microcosm of this sort of
ideological warfare in the battles to control school boards waged by
the religious right and their opponents in recent years.1'0 Under
the "new paradigm" of free speech, control of the government would
mean nothing less than the right to train each new generation of
citizens in the proper ways of viewing reality. The new regime would
turn on its head Justice Thurgood Marshall's notion that "[olur
102 Delgado, supra note 2, at 178.
z See Jill Smolowe, Outfoxing the Right: Moderates Recapture a Handful of School
Boards by Publicizing the Obsessions of Ultraconservatives, TIME, July 10, 1995, at 88, 38
(describing political counterattack by opponents of ultraconservatives who captured
control of several school boards in Texas, California and Florida in 1992 elections).
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whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving
government the power to control men's minds." ' 4 Under the "new
paradigm," government would be specifically invited to control (or
"construct") citizens' minds to ensure that those minds are protected
from antisocial values and other forces in society. The new paradigm
rejects the essential democratic precept that everyone in society has
the right to disagree-verbally, loudly and even obnoxiously-with
even the most fundamental values represented by the political
majority and its government. Under the present First Amendment
regime, everyone has the right to be wrong. Under the "new
paradigm" proposed by the postmodern censors, dissidents showing
signs of being improperly constructed become candidates for social
reconstruction in the values favored by whatever faction happens to
control the government at a particular time.
I doubt that any human institution could ever accomplish the
comprehensive task of positive social construction that the post-
modernists set for government. But if we assume for the sake of
argument that a government could accomplish this Herculean feat
of social engineering, the postmodernists would be faced with a life-
or-death battle over political control that they and their progressive
allies could not realistically expect to win. The agreement that racial
minorities and other political outsiders would be ill-served by a
reduction in First Amendment protection has been criticized as
paternalistic." 5 But the postmodernists have no possible response
104 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
105 See Delgado & Yun, supra note 95, at 876-86; Delgado, supra note 2, at 172-73.
Although Delgado has argued that such arguments are paternalistic, he has himself
made a similar argument in criticizing Robin West's proposal that social activists
should replace their reliance onjudicially enforced individual rights with a focus on
legislatively enforced individual moral responsibilities. See Robin West, The Supreme
Court, 1989 Term-Forward: TakingFreedom Seriously, 104 HARv. L. REV. 43, 103 (1990)
("The impetus for individual freedom ... must come from the responsible citizen, the
thoughtful and empathetic juror, the caring parent, and the careful legislator, not
from Herculean judges."). Delgado's response to West's application of this proposal
to speech mirrors my argument in the text:
According to West, even though a citizen has a right to speak, the message
of that speech is still subject to societal scrutiny because some messages are
so antisocial that they should not be spoken. Will this approach single out
a Madison Avenue advertising firm that is trying to sell large, gas-guzzling
cars, or will it scrutinize the flag-burner or ghetto resident who shakes a fist
and shouts "Pigs, outl" at a passing patrol car? The irresponsible label will
be reserved for speech that makes us uncomfortable, or that violates
majoritarian values and standards. This is not a serious problem for Vaclav
Havel's Czechoslovakia, whose relatively homogeneous population is united
by a common history. In ours .... it is.
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to the simple fact that the numbers are against them. If the govern-
ment is allowed to regulate speech to advance other social goals, the
social goals that will most often be cited as a justification for
regulating speech are the goals that appeal to the political majority.
This majority will by definition be composed of groups and individu-
als that represent the status quo-the same status quo that is the
source of the negative social conditioning that the postmodernists
oppose. If the postmodernists dislike the way mainstream private
institutions shape public perceptions and preferences now, they will
be exponentially more distressed when those institutions gain the
ability to coordinate their efforts with a compliant government.
4. The Theoretical Flaw
The various postmodernist censorship theories are plagued by
one simple theoretical flaw: Although the stated objective of all
these theories is to create a more egalitarian political system, the
theories actually produce a political system that is inherently and
irrevocably elitist. The main source of this elitism is the social
constructionist underpinning of all postmodern theories.
When reduced to their most basic objective, all postmodern
censorship theories purport to be a method by which those who have
previously been denied the opportunity to participate fully in the
political or social system will gain access to democratic government.
Explanations and defenses of postmodern censorship theories
commonly stress that speech-regulation proposals are designed to
advance the interests of groups that have been left outside tradition-
al, mainstream political discourse. The theory is that by eliminating
speech attacking or denigrating outsiders such as racial minorities or
women, members of insider groups will eventually view the outsiders
more favorably, will include members of traditional out-groups in the
new, postmodern political discourse, and will ultimately share power
with the outsiders. At the same time, the targets of the denigrating
speech will be emboldened by the new protection offered to them by
a postmodern government, which will encourage them to seek and
use political power in the manner that in-groups have done for
generations. This is the theory: inclusive, democratic and egalitari-
an.
Richard Delgado, Pep Talks for the Poor: A Reply and Remonstrance on the Evils of
Scapegoating, 71 B.U. L. REv. 525, 529-30 (1991) (footnotes omitted). Richard
Delgado, meet Richard Delgado.
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Unfortunately, this democratic and egalitarian theory is elitist to
its core. This is the inevitable conclusion given the postmodernists'
recommendation that we take a system that exists largely without
central controls over expression (the old paradigm) and replace it
with one in which a single powerful entity-the government-would
have the authority to approve or disapprove of the expression of
anyone on any subject that the government decides must be
regulated for the sake of other, more important social values (the
new, postmodern paradigm). As this dichotomy indicates, there are
only two possible systems of free expression-a system in which top-
down regulation of expression is the exception, and a system in
which top-down regulation is the rule.106 A system in which top-
down regulation of expression is the exception at least attempts to
allocate to nongovernment actors the right to choose their particular
worldview and make their own basic decisions about social values.
These decisions may be heavily influenced by the world around each
citizen, but the world is a chaotic place, and the absence of systemat-
ic indoctrination ensures that every view can at least potentially be
heard. A system in which top-down regulation is the rule makes basic
value choices a matter for collective determination and control. This
is an elitist system because in any large, complex, modern society,
political decisions will always be made by a select group that
inevitably will contain only a fraction of the general population.
The elitism inherent in the postmodern approach to speech
becomes especially troubling when it is combined with the absolute
moral certainty with which many of the postmodernists assert their
counterspeech values. When Mari Matsuda writes that "[w]e can
attack racist speech-not because it isn't really speech, not because
it falls within a hoped-for neutral exception, but because it is
wrong,'' ° she articulates the sort of absolutist position that
contains the seeds of antidemocratic disaster when imposed collec-
tively by the government through common sanctions such as civil
106 Melville Nimmer has made the same point about attacks on marketplace
theories of free speech:
If acceptance of an idea in the competition of the market is not the "best
test".. . [then] what is the alternative? It can only be acceptance of an idea
by some individual or group narrower than that of the public at large.
Thus, the alternative to competition in the market must be some form of
elitism.
MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 1.02 [B], at 1-12 (student ed.
1984).
107 Matsuda, supra note 29, at 2380.
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fines and criminal penalties. Every individual in society has a set of
moral absolutes such as Matsuda's, and most of us would share
Matsuda's observation quoted above. But it is precisely because
conflicting moral absolutes are by definition irreconcilable that the
First Amendment is presently interpreted to prevent those who
control the government from imposing their moral absolutes on
those who would openly disagree. The postmodernists' alternative
is not only elitist and antidemocratic, but also dangerous in more
basic ways. Justice Jackson's famous reminder that "[c] ompulsory
unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the grave-
yard"" 8 still applies-even to opinions that the government believes
are clearly wrong.
Finally, as with the other flaws in postmodern censorship theory,
the theoretical flaw provides an opportunity to turn social construc-
tionism against the postmodernists who champion it. The post-
modernists' proposal to permit government to regulate speech that
implicates other important social values would teach politicians
undesirable lessons about their presumptively superior knowledge,
perspective and infallibility. Giving politicians more power to
"construct" their constituents would simply reinforce the arrogance
of power that is already the bane of any democratic political culture.
The First Amendment may have its problems, but at least in its
consistent message of deep skepticism about the validity of power
and its uses, the Amendment contributes to the "construction" of a
more manageable variety of politician.
II. POSTMODERN CENSORSHIP AND THE
PUBLIC/PRVATE DISTINCTION
A common theme of all postmodern censorship arguments is that
expression such as pornography, hate speech and other "no-value"
communication reflects values that society knows are wrong. For
example, Mar Matsuda argues that racism is "an idea so historically
untenable, so dangerous, and so tied to perpetuation of violence and
degradation of the very classes of human beings who are least
equipped to respond that it is properly treated as outside the realm
of protected discourse."'0 9  Presumably, Catharine MacKinnon
would say the same thing about pornography, and there are undoubt-
edly other examples of what Richard Delgado calls "no-value speech,
"I West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943).
109 Matsuda, supra note 29, at 2357.
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or negative-value speech, which not only could, but should be
restricted [J "110
The key to the postmodernist position on "no-value" or "negative
value" speech is that regulation of this speech is merely a means to
a much more comprehensive end. The postmodernists would have
the government regulate examples of "no-value" speech not primarily
to cleanse public discourse, or even to protect the immediate targets
of offensive expression, but rather to erase the ideas themselves from
the minds of everyone in society. The main purpose of postmodern
speech regulation is to reconstruct fundamentally how everyone in
society views the world. As Delgado notes,
we use symbols to construct our social world, a world that contains
categories and expectations for "black," "woman," "child," "crimi-
nal," "wartime enemy," and so on. Once the roles we create for
these categories are in place, they govern the way we speak of and
act toward members of those categories in the future."'
This is the essence of the social constructionist arguments discussed
in the previous section. Taken to their logical conclusion, these
arguments indicate that the postmodern censors will have achieved
their ultimate goal only when they have completely revised every
individual's ideas about social relations.
Given the background provided by the social constructionist
arguments, it is almost a logical necessity that the postmodernists
reject efforts to insulate some aspects of personal expression from
government control. Under postmodern censorship theory, anything
that contributes to the development of social values or political
perspectives should be subject to government regulation, even if the
influence occurs outside the traditional public sphere. Thus, the
second cornerstone of postmodernist censorship is the renunciation
of the public/private distinction. In Cass Sunstein's modest formula-
tion, "a democratic government should sometimes take private
preferences as an object of regulation and control.""1 2 Any attempt
to preserve a sphere of private communication and enculturation
would doom postmodern efforts to instill proper democratic values
and eradicate "historically untenable and dangerous" ideas such as
racism or sexism.
no Delgado, supra note 2, at 173 (footnote omitted).
1 Delgado & Yun, supra note 95, at 878-79 (footnote omitted).
112 Sunstein, supra note 63, at 13.
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Attacks on the public/private distinction have been a common
component of critical race, feminist and civic republican literature
for many years. The nature of the analyses, however, is somewhat
different. The critical race theorists and feminists emphasize that the
preservation of a private sphere has historically subjugated women
and racial minorities. The civic republicans focus on the perceived
inconsistency in the way courts have treated governmental regulation
of economic affairs, as compared with the way courts have treated
governmental regulation of antisocial speech. The civic republicans
liken the courts' approach in the speech cases to the notorious
Lochner decision,' in that the speech cases require governmental
neutrality and thereby reinforce the status quo. Since the critical
race/feminist and civic republican arguments raise different issues,
they will be addressed separately.
A. The Critical Race and Feminist Attacks on the
Public/Private Distinction
Criticism of the notion that the government should respect a
realm of "private" expression has long been a fixture in both critical
race and feminist literature. Feminists, in particular, have produced
a large body of work analyzing the concept of privacy, including
private expression. In many ways, criticism of the concept of privacy
is the linchpin of Catharine MacKinnon's version of feminism. She
views the legal protection of privacy as a key way in which govern-
ment has historically shunted the concerns of women into a
no-woman's-land, and excluded women from the sorts of protective
social intervention that have traditionally protected men. I will leave
for others a comprehensive critique of the broader literature,1 4
and focus here on the elements of the feminist critique that inform
that critique's stance on the regulation of speech such as pornogra-
phy.
"' See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (holding that "[t he general
right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the
individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution"),
overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
"' An excellent starting point is: Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private
Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2 (1992) ("When the external elements of [the feminist
challenge to the public/private distinction] become too sweeping.... they become
misleading and counterproductive and may actually facilitate the devaluation of
important aspects of human life that are currently identified as 'private' and
.personal.'").
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The feminist critique of privacy is a subset of the theory's broader
critique of the concept of human freedom. At its most extreme, this
critique denies the very existence of freedom-especially freedom
cast in the form of free will. MacKinnon's statement that, "[t]he
liberal ideal ... holds that, so long as the public does not interfere,
autonomous individuals interact freely and equally,""' correctly
points out that the concept of privacy is closely tied to notions of
human freedom, and that both freedom and privacy are essential
elements of liberal democratic theory. According to MacKinnon,
these presumptions of freedom are inapplicable to women:
[Privacy] is personal, intimate, autonomous, particular, individual,
the original source and final outpost of the self, gender neutral. It
is, in short, defined by everything that feminism reveals women
have never been allowed to be or to have, and everything that
women have been equated with and defined in terms of men's ability
to have."
6
The liberal notion of privacy is, according to MacKinnon, "a right
of men 'to be let alone' to oppress women one at a time. It
embodies and reflects the private sphere's existing definition of
womanhood.... It keeps some men out of the bedrooms of other
men."117
The feminist critique of privacy is bound with the claims of social
constructionism discussed in the previous section. MacKinnon
opposes the protection of privacy because she believes that privacy
provides the matrix for the oppressive construction of gender.
"[Privacy] has preserved the central institutions whereby women are
deprived of identity, autonomy, control and self-definition; and has
protected the primary activity through which male supremacy is
expressed and enforced."' Thus, human freedom is nonexistent
because women (and men as well, albeit in different ways) are
"taught" to be unfree.
According to MacKinnon, pornography is a primary means of
creating and sustaining this mindset of intellectual bondage, and the
concept of privacy is a primary means of maintaining the dominance
of pornography and the pornographic worldview. "To the extent
that pornography succeeds in constructing social reality, it becomes
115 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED, supra note 34, at 93, 99.
116 Id.
11" Id. at 102 (footnote omitted).
"I Id. at 101.
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invisible as harm."'' 9 MacKinnon contends that pornography's
success is attributable largely to the fact that liberal theory has carved
out an area of privacy in which the state cannot effectively respond
to pornography's lessons. She views Stanley v. Georgialq---in which
the Supreme Court prohibited the state from prosecuting the private
possession of legally obscene materials-as a virtually pure example
of this tendency. In contrast to Justice Marshall's vigorous opposi-
tion in Stanley to "the assertion that the State has the right to control
the moral content of a person's thoughts,""' MacKinnon prefers
state control. After considering the alternatives, MacKinnon
concludes: "[W]hile defenders of pornography argue that allowing
all speech, including pornography, frees the mind to fulfill itself,
pornography freely enslaves women's minds and bodies inseparably,
normalizing the terror that enforces silence from women's point of
view."
1 22
In MacKinnon's view, protection of privacy amounts to protection
of systematic domination. In this way, MacKinnon views privacy as an
automatic ally of the status quo. Specifically, she asserts that "[t]he
existing distribution of power and resources within the private sphere
will be precisely what the law of privacy exists to protect."123
MacKinnon would abandon the protection of privacy, as well as every
other major premise of current First Amendment doctrine, including
the "most basic assumption" that any speech is truly free. She would,
quite literally, turn First Amendment doctrine on its head and
impose a new definition of "freedom" in the form of government
control in the service of particular social goals. This new definition
is necessary because "[flor women, the urgent issue of freedom of
speech is not primarily the avoidance of state intervention as such,
but finding an affirmative means to get access to speech for those to
whom it has been denied."1 24 This means not just expanding the
universe of speakers by using government resources to give women
and other subjugated people access to the means of communication;
it means using the coercive apparatus of government to suppress
pornography and other "expressive means of practicing inequali-
ty," " even if they occur in private.
'19 Id. at 155.
120 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
121 Id. at 565 (footnote omitted).
1' MACKINNON, supra note 34, at 155.
12 MACKINNON, supra note 115, at 101.
124 Id. at 158.
12 MACKINNON, supra note 46, at 107.
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The critique of the critical race theorists' public/private distinc-
tion is similar to MacKinnon's analysis, although the critical race
version of the critique tends to focus on the specific ways in which
(according to the critical race theorists) government protection of
speech reinforces the discriminatory messages of private speech. For
example, Matsuda argues that by providing legal protection for racist
speech the government surreptitiously endorses the content of that
speech and magnifies the injury to those targeted by the speech. She
interprets the government's refusal to sanction racist speech (because
of existing First Amendment rules) as functionally indistinguishable
from explicit governmental endorsement of racism. Thus, according
to Matsuda:
State silence ... is public action where the strength of the new
racist groups derives from their offering legitimation and justifica-
tion for otherwise socially unacceptable emotions of hate, fear, and
aggression.... [T]he law's failure to provide recourse to persons
who are demeaned by the hate messages is an effective second
injury to that person.12
Lawrence also organizes his criticism of current First Amendment
law around the assertion that First Amendment theory fails to take
into account private as well as public harms. He argues that "First
Amendment doctrine and theory have no words for the injuries of
silence imposed by private actors." 127 Lawrence asserts that these
private "injuries of silence" are analogous to government censorship
and should therefore be a factor in First Amendment analysis.
Specifically,
First Amendment law ignores the ways in which patriarchy
silences women, and racism silences people of color. When a
woman's husband threatens to beat her the next time she contra-
dicts him, a First Amendment injury has occurred. "Gay-bashing"
keeps gays and lesbians "in the closet." It silences them. They are
denied the humanizing experience of self-expression. We all are
denied the insight and beauty of their voices.
12
According to Lawrence, the government's refusal to recognize
these injuries is attributable to "the mystifying properties of constitu-
tional ideology," such as the state action doctrine and the public/
private dichotomy that is implicit in the state action doctrine.1
9
116 Matsuda, supra note 29, at 2378-79.
127 Lawrence, supra note 33, at 801.
12 Id. at 802-03 (footnotes omitted).
129 Lawrence, supra note 12, at 444.
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Lawrence makes two conceptually distinct arguments against using
the First Amendment to restrict government regulation of private
speech. On one hand, Lawrence argues that all aspects of privacy-
including private speech-are problematic because "we naively
believe that everyone has an equal stake in this value.""'0 Lawrence
argues that in reality, privacy does not protect everyone equally;
therefore, the distinction between private and public actions should
be abandoned in favor of a focus on the degree of harm incurred by
both private and public actions. This revised analytic focus would
tend to favor government regulation of private racist speech in order
to prevent "infringement of the claims of blacks to liberty and equal
protection."131
Thus, according to Lawrence's first argument, the real issue
raised by government regulation of hate speech is not whether the
government should be permitted to regulate the expression of
private speakers, but rather whether "we should balance the evils of
private deprivations of liberty against the government deprivations of
liberty that may arise out of state regulations designed to avert those
private deprivations." 1 2 Presumably, government censorship would
be permitted if the government determined that the degree of harm
created by the private speech outweighed the degree of harm created
by the government censorship. Of course, this balancing approach
towards censorship would mean that the extent of the government's
legal authority to regulate speech would be determined by the
government itself. This government determination, however, is an
unavoidable consequence of eliminating the public/private distinc-
tion and the concept of limited public authority on which the
public/private distinction depends.
In contrast to Lawrence's first argument, he also argues (along
the lines of Matsuda's argument quoted above 33) that by refusing
to censor racist speech, "the government is involved in a joint
venture with private contractors to engage in the business of
defaming blacks.""s Lawrence's second argument does not neces-
sarily entail an outright attack on the public/private distinction
because it asserts that the state action requirement of the Fourteenth
and First Amendments is met by the failure of the state to regulate
"DId. at 445.
1 Id. at 446.
132 Id.
133 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
" Lawrence, supra note 12, at 446.
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racist speech. According to this argument, the government has
merely "handled] over the copyright and the printing presses to its
partners in crime"8 5 and, therefore, has converted an ostensibly
private action into an action of the state. Lawrence bolsters this
claim with the contention that "there has not yet been satisfactory
retraction of the government-sponsored defamation in the slavery
clauses, the Dred Scott decision, the black codes, the segregation
statutes, and countless other group libels." 8 ' Thus, according to
this argument, the regulation of private speech is necessary to fulfill
the government's obligation to "disestablish [] the system of signs and
symbols that signal blacks' inferiority."' 7 This obligation apparent-
ly can be fulfilled only by government action to eradicate the very
idea of racism from both the public and private areas of the culture.
Although Lawrence's two arguments are conceptually distinct,
they lead to the same results: The elimination of the First Amend-
ment as an effective limit on the government regulation of speech
and the imposition of a straight balancing analysis for the determi-
nation of whether government regulations of speech are constitu-
tionally permissible. In the critical race theory formulation, the First
Amendment's protection of intellectual freedom from government
control becomes merely one among many "narratives" of constitu-
tional adjudication and political power.' As noted in the intro-
duction to this Article, the critical race theorists (along with other
postmodern censors) treat their proposal as benign, noble, and
progressive; in their own terms, they are proposing "a more
nuanced, skeptical, and realistic view of what speech can do, one that
looks to self- and class interest, linguistic science, politics, and other
tools of the realist approach to understand how expression functions
in our political system."8 9 At the same time, the critical race
theorists (again, along with other postmodernists) leverage other
constitutional amendments against the First to support their claim
that they intend merely to bring the First Amendment in line with
other values expressed in the Constitution. Under the present
135 Id.
16 Id. at 447 (footnotes omitted).
'37 Id. at 449.
138 See Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in
Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 343, 346-47 (1991) (juxtaposing First Amendment
narrative emphasizing intellectual freedom and resistance to official censorship,
"superstition and enforced ignorance" with the minority-protection narrative
emphasizing the fight against slavery, segregation and racial injustice).
... Delgado, supra note 2, at 170.
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system, Richard Delgado argues, "free speech [is] a powerful asset to
the dominant group, but a much less helpful one to subordinate
groups." 140
The broad nature of the critical race theorists' attacks on the
public/private distinction implicit in the First Amendment belies
their claims of moderation and their commitment to "nuance." The
postmodernists' efforts to undermine the very concept of privacy take
them well beyond the point of simply fine-tuning the ordering of
constitutional values, and force them to embrace a proposal that is
much more radical. The postmodernist attack on current First
Amendment doctrine incorporates a rejection of the very notion of
limited government. If the public/private distinction were aban-
doned, every individual activity would become "public" and,
therefore, subject to government control. And if everything were
public, there would no longer be any limitation on the power of
government to do the bidding of any set of powerful political actors.
This amounts to nothing less than the deconstitutionalization of
American jurisprudence. Under such a system, the axiom "the
personal is political" would take on a meaning much different and
more insidious than the one usually intended by the politically
progressive theorists who are fond of repeating the phrase. The
specific implications of the critical race and feminist positions are
pursued in the next subsection.
B. The Flaws in the Critical Race and Feminist Approaches to
the Public/Private Distinction
1. The Antidemocratic Flaw
The First Amendment model that the critical race theorists and
feminists attack incorporates three of the most basic principles of
constitutionalism: that individuals are separate from the govern-
ment; that the government is the servant of its citizens rather than
vice versa; and that the government may not use its coercive tools to
prevent political attacks on one political faction or coalition of
factions, or to enshrine any political ideology as permanent and
unassailable. The concept of "privacy" arises directly from these
principles. Indeed, it is the specific embodiment of the first
principle-that the government is an institution unto itself, which
exists apart from the citizens served by that government.
1' Delgado, supra note 138, at 385-86.
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The concept of privacy reflects the recognition that even a
responsive democratic government often will have institutional
interests, values and objectives that are quite distinct from those of
individual citizens. Many of these conflicting governmental and
individual interests will relate to the most fundamental personal and
social values. When the reality of fundamentally conflicting interests
is combined with the seductive possibilities presented to the
government by its monopoly on the authorized use of absolute
power-jails, guns, electric chairs-the prospect always exists that the
government will attempt to use its power to settle matters of
fundamental value once and for all in favor of its own preferred way
of perceiving and organizing the world. At that point, the public/
private dichotomy would be eliminated, but then again so would the
possibility of democratic self-governance. Since every citizen would
merely reflect the government's own preferred brand of political and
social reality, it would no longer be possible to claim that the citizens
are deciding anything, except in the farcical Soviet sense of unani-
mous citizen certification of a foregone political conclusion.
The central flaw in the feminist and critical race critiques of the
public/private distinction is that these critiques cannot be reconciled
with democracy's basic need for some separation between the
governors and the governed. Without that separation, democracy
cannot exist because there is no group capable of providing popular
consent to the government's exercise of power. Likewise, if the
government is permitted to break down barriers of privacy and exert
direct control over the thoughts and attitudes of the public on
matters of great political importance, it will no longer be possible for
the public to reject one government and replace it with another
government representing a radically different ideological stance.
Without this possibility of ideological change, it is difficult to see how
such a government could be accurately described as democratic.
MacKinnon is correct when she describes privacy as the corner-
stone of liberal democratic theory,141 but the assertion would be
equally true even if she omitted the qualifier "liberal," because some
fairly substantial degree of individual independence from govern-
ment-i.e., "privacy"-is necessary for any conception of democracy.
An attack on privacy, therefore, is necessarily also an attack on
democracy.
141 See MACKINNON, supra note 115, at 99.
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Just as the preservation of a realm of protected individual activity
is necessary for democratic theory, the elimination of the public/
private distinction is equally necessary to fulfill the objectives of the
postmodern censors. Eliminating the protected realm of individual
privacy is necessary to facilitate the reeducation of citizens, which
postmodernists believe must occur to counteract the negative social
construction that has taken place in the unregulated marketplace of
speech. The postmodern censors want to abandon much of First
Amendment jurisprudence because in their view basic, necessary
social change cannot occur without fundamentally changing the way
people think about themselves and their fellow citizens. Thus,
controlling contrary speech and ideas is actually more important
than any other function of government.
It would be difficult to overstate the importance of these
arguments in postmodem censorship theory. One example of how
seriously the postmodernists take the public/private issue can be
found in one of Delgado's articles on the subject of hate speech
regulation. Delgado argues that traditional civil rights laws will
inevitably fail if the government does not first take control of
citizens' attitudes concerning racial matters:
Not only does racist speech, by placing all the credibility with the
dominant group, strengthen the dominant story, it also works to
disempower minority groups by crippling the effectiveness of their
speech in rebuttal. ... Unless society is able to deal with this
incongruity, the [T] hirteenth and [F] ourteenth [A]mendments and
our complex system of civil rights statutes will be of little avail. At
best, they will be able to obtain redress for episodic, blatant acts of
individual prejudice and bigotry. This redress will do little to
address the source of the problem: the speech that creates the
stigma-picture that makes the acts hurtful in the first place, and that
renders almost any other form of aid-social or legal-useless.
42
It is difficult for many of us to think of the various Civil Rights
Acts enacted since 1957 as covering only "episodic, blatant acts of
prejudice." '43  Provisions such as the public accommodations
' Delgado, supra note 138, at 885-86.
' Id.; see, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.) (creating the
Commission on Civil Rights and establishing causes of action to enforce voting rights);
Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 20 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.) (amending Civil Rights Act
of 1957 to expand protection of voting rights and to extend the power of the
Commission on Civil Rights); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241
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section of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, M for example, changed the
nature of daily life in very basic ways for the entire country. But
Delgado's diminution of these regulations seems quite serious. Note
the last sentence quoted above: Delgado asserts that in the absence
of government control of speech almost any other form of aid will be
useless-not simply less effective. Along the same lines, Delgado
suggests in another article that affirmative action programs will fail
to achieve their integrationist purpose if the hearts and minds of
those affected by such programs are not captured first.
145
This dismissive attitude toward the potential accomplishments of
social welfare legislation enacted and enforced in the face of
continuing political dissent is surprising not because it is new and
radical, but because it is commonplace and reactionary. Every
political interest group in a pluralist democratic society fervently
wishes that it could convince its political opponents to forego their
opposition and get with the program. Likewise, every political
faction asserts that it represents more than one group's particular
interests; every faction tries to cloak its position in the grandiose
terms of fundamental justice and eternal righteousness. These
characteristics are common to every political activist because they
reflect the typical and understandable fear of finally capturing the
government and enacting favorable legislation, only to lose both the
government and the legislation at the next election. No political
group likes to think of its hard-won accomplishments as temporary
and tenuous. So every political group has at the back of its mind the
prospect posed by the postmodernists: Once we win power, let us
devise a method whereby we get to keep it.
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.) (outlawing
employment discrimination on the basis of race and racial discrimination in public
accommodations); Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 25 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.)
(establishing fair housing policy); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105
Stat. 1071 (prohibiting racial bias of any kind in employment as well as in the making
and enforcement of contracts, and establishing the Glass Ceiling Commission).
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994).
'4 He argues:
Incessant depiction of a group as lazy, stupid, and hypersexual-or
ornamental for that matter-constructs social reality so that members of that
group are always one-down. Thereafter, even the most scrupulously neutral
laws and rules will not save them from falling further and further behind as
private actions compound their disadvantage. Affirmative action becomes
necessary, which in turn reinforces the view that members of these groups
are naturally inferior (because they need special help).
Delgado, supra note 2, at 171-72 (foomote omitted).
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2. The Flaw of Political Naivet6
The second flaw in the critical race and feminist attacks on the
public/private distinction is the flaw of political naivet6. Specifically,
what makes the postmodernists believe that their preferred set of
values will be chosen as the rationale for government intervention
into what are now constitutionally protected areas of individual value
formation and expression? To the extent that critical race theorists
and feminists attempt to answer this question in the abstract, their
responses typically resemble Delgado's argument that "speech which
constructs a stigma-picture of a subordinate group stands on a
different footing from sporadic speech aimed at persons who are not
disempowered[.] "146
The problem with this formulation, as with many other aspects of
postmodern censorship theory, is that it could easily be turned to
very different political ends. For example, it would not be difficult
for an anti-abortion government to argue that fetuses are "disem-
powered," and that speech advocating abortion or advising women
how to obtain an abortion is speech "construct[ing] a stigma-picture
of a subordinate group,"147 which must be suppressed.
Related postmodern arguments, such as the claim that the
government is part of a "joint venture"148 with antisocial speakers,
also may be used against the political interests represented by the
postmodern censors. Once the notion that the government is
directly responsible for speech by private persons replaces the
current First Amendment model, the "joint venture" notion will be
available for use by any political group that captures control of the
government. An anti-abortion government could logically claim that
all expression favoring unfettered abortion rights, both public and
private, must be suppressed because otherwise the government would
be engaged in a "joint venture" with baby-killers.
Ensuring that the broad new speech-regulation powers they give
to the government will not be used against them is a persistent
problem for the postmodern censors. Once abstractjustifications for
government suppression (protecting "subordinate groups"; prevent-
ing "joint ventures") are shown to be politically insecure, the
postmodernists' only response to the problem is the ipse dixit that
their own specific preferences and political values are inherently
6 Delgado, supra note 138, at 386.
147 Id.
I" Lawrence, sup'a note 12, at 446.
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different-i.e., more important-than those of their political
adversaries. Delgado articulates the premise that suffuses other
critical race and feminist writings when he asserts that "race-like
gender and a few other characteristics-is different; our entire
history and culture bespeak this difference." '149
As Delgado himself notes, however, "[i] t might be argued that all
speech constructs the world to some extent, and that every speech
act could prove offensive to someone. Traditionalists find modern
art troublesome, Republicans detest left-wing speech, and some men
hate speech that constructs a sex-neutral world." ' So what is the
postmodernists' guarantee that the government would only regulate
private speech pertaining to race and gender and other postmodern
concerns? Simple-they must be sure to control the government,
because in the new, postmodern world of expression, the people who
control the government get to decide for everyone which interests
can be attacked through expression and which ones are sacrosanct.
In short, under the postmodern system we must rely for our
intellectual liberty on the wisdom, knowledge, moderation and good
judgment of politicians.
This is especially problematic in light of the fact that the
postmodern arguments against the public/private distinction in the
First Amendment area also have consequences for related areas of
civil liberties such as Fourth Amendment search and seizure law. If
the postmodern censors are serious about renouncing the public/
private distinction, then they should have no problem breaking down
the constitutional barriers that now obstruct the government's efforts
to see, hear and regulate the expressive activities that occur behind
the closed doors of a private home. And if the postmodern censors
are serious about the need to restrict racist (or sexist or otherwise
impolitic) speech that "constructs a stigma-picture of a subordinate
group," 5' then they should be anxious to suppress that speech
regardless of the form in which the speech appears.
So, does this mean that under a broadly drafted hate-speech (or
pornography) statute, the simple possession of a copy of Mein Kampf
(or Debbie Does Dallas) could be criminalized? If so, would probable
cause that someone possesses such a book (or video) justify a search
warrant permitting the police to roam at will through that person's
private library?'52 What if the police find other questionable
"I Delgado, supra note 138, at 386.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Recall, in contrast to the prevailing ppstmodern attitude, Justice Thurgood
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materials during the course of the search? Could they seize these
additional materials until they had a chance to scrutinize them
carefully for unacceptable ideas? Then, of course, there would arise
the inevitable problems of interpretation. Is Birth of a Nation
equivalent to Mein Kamp? Is Huckleberry Finn?' Would the police
understand the difference?'54 Would a properly "constructed" jury?
Finally, recall the dilemma confronting the postmodern censors if
their side loses the election after the courts are convinced by their
arguments regarding social constructionism and their proposals to
eliminate constitutional protection of the private realm. Catharine
MacKinnon could easily find herself listed beside Andrea
Dworkin 5' on some postmodern conservative government's Index
Librorum Prohibitorum
56
Marshall's approach to this question: "If the First Amendment means anything, it
means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what
books he may read or what films he may watch." Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565
(1969).
I In an era when the Mark Twain House has to hold a week-long conference as
"a pre-emptive effort to bolster the nerve of teachers and keep the book [Huckleberry
Finn] ... from becoming a victim of the culture wars over 'political correctness,'" this
question is posed more seriously than it should need to be. SeeJonathan Rabinovitz,
"Huckleberry Finn" Without Fear: Teachers Gather to Learn How to Teach an American
Classic, in Context, N.Y. TIME, July 25, 1995, at BI.
"* On this point, note the use by the Canadian police and customs officials of the
Canadian Supreme Court's Butler decision. See Regina v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452.
In Butler, the Canadian court held that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
permits the government to regulate, by means including criminal sanctions, expressive
materials that "dehumanize men or women in a sexual context." Id. at 510.
According to the Canadian court, such regulations "demonstrate[] our community's
disapproval of the dissemination of materials which potentially victimize women" and
have a "negative influence ... on changes in attitudes and behaviour." Id. at 504.
After Butler broadened government authority to regulate sexual expression, the
proprietor of The Glad Day Book Shop, a prominent Toronto gay and lesbian
bookstore, told a New Yorker reporter that:
I'd guess that at least one in three of our shipments from the States is
opened, and [Canadian authorities] detain at least one shipment of books
a month .... They tell me they're shipping the books to Ottawa to
determine whether they're obscene. Once they do that, there's really
nothing you can do but wait.
Jeffrey Toobin, X-Rated, NEw YORKER, Oct. 3, 1994, at 70, 72. Books seized by
Canadian customs (some of which were later released) include a book of short stories
entitled A Place I've Never Been by David Leavitt, a novel entitled The Whistling Song by
Stephen Beachy, The Devil's Advocate by Ambrose Bierce, The Man Sitting in the Corridor
by Marguerite Duras, Black Looks: Race and Representation by Bell Hooks, comic books
by R. Crumb, Art Spiegelman and Matt Groening, and selections from the Asterix and
Tintin series. Id. at 73-74. Also, ironically and predictably, two of Andrea Dworkin's
books were briefly detained as obscene. Id. at 74.
'5 See Toobin, supra note 154, at 74.
'5 The Index was published by the Roman Catholic Church and consisted of a list
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All of this is intended to make a simple point: The government
cannot regulate a private person's "bad" ideas without adopting a
style and scope of government power that goes far beyond what any
democratic populace should permit. The concept of "privacy" in all
its manifestations is one way of preventing just this sort of govern-
ment overreaching. If the postmodern censors do not like the
public/private distinction, then perhaps they should think of
restrictions on government regulation of speech and ideas as flowing
from the mind/body distinction. A nontotalitarian government can
control the body of its citizens, but should be absolutely prohibited
from controlling their minds.
3. The Flaw of Rhetorical Excess
The final flaw in the feminist and critical race critique of the
public/private distinction relates to the rhetorical excesses frequently
exhibited in this branch of postmodern censorship literature. Many
of the observations and descriptions used by the postmodern censors
to support their proposals are so overstated and one-dimensional that
they cast doubt upon the theorists' conclusions. Such statements also
suggest that the postmodern censorship proposals are intended to be
more expansive than their proponents readily admit.
Critical race theorists' flaw of rhetorical excess is evident in the
various allegations of bad faith that the theorists aim at those who
reject their proposals to regulate the racist speech of private persons.
One example is Lawrence's claim that the government forms a 'Joint
venture" with racist speakers when it refuses to censor their
speech.157 This implies that the government and those who sup-
port strong First Amendment protections of private speech actually
endorse the ideas of the racists whose rights they defend. These
linkages are a potent rhetorical tool: Free speech is equated with
racism, and the simple enforcement of the First Amendment converts
private racism into governmental racism. If critical race theorists
manage to make these linkages stick, it would become much more
difficult, psychologically and politically, for civil libertarians and
sympatheticjudges to support strong First Amendment protection for
unsavory speakers.
of immoral books. Reading any of the books listed in the Index was considered a sin.
In 1966, the Church announced that it would cease publication of the Index. See 2
CATHOLIC UNIV. OF AM., NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 699-701 (1961); 7 CATHOLIC
UNIV. OF AM., NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 434-35 (1967).
157 See Lawrence, supra note 12, at 446.
AGAINST POSTMODERN CENSORSHIP THEORY
Sometimes the linkage between private free speech and govern-
mental racism is asserted explicitly. Delgado has argued on several
occasions that the predominantly white administrations of universities
refuse to support hate-speech regulations because they benefit from
the sense of unease that hate speech instills in minority students.
I believe that racist speech benefits powerful white-dominated
institutions....
... [T]hey benefit, and ... they know they benefit, from a
certain amount of low-grade racism in the environment.... This
kind of behavior keeps nonwhite people on edge, a little off
balance. We get these occasional reminders that we are different,
and not really wanted. It prevents us from digging in too strongly,
starting to think we could really belong here. It makes us a little
introspective, a little unsure of ourselves; at the right low-grade level
it prevents us from organizing on behalf of more important things.
It assures that those of us of real spirit, real pride, just plain leave-
all of which is quite a substantial benefit for the institution.
58
Delgado's claim is not limited to the university context. In the
broader society as well, Delgado argues that "we must seriously
entertain the possibility that low-grade racism benefits powerful
whites, including the very ones who most sincerely deplore it and
would themselves never utter a racist slur."15 9
Delgado's arguments in support of this bad-faith claim are weak.
First, with regard to the university setting, Delgado's judgment that
white university administrators tend to oppose hate-speech regulation
is inaccurate. Many universities have already adopted speech codes
similar to the ones supported by critical race theorists such as
Delgado and Lawrence. 6 ° Indeed, in the statement quoted above,
Delgado addresses his comments specifically to "[t]he highly
educated, refined persons who operate the University of Wiscon-
sin. " " Evidently, he misjudged the administration's sentiments at
11 Delgado, supra note 138, at 380-81 n.319 (quoting Richard Delgado, Address
to State Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin, Apr. 24, 1989); see also Richard
Delgado &Jean Stefancic, Hateful Speech, Loving Communitis: Why Our Notion of'A Just
Balance' Changes So Slowly, 82 CAL. L. REv. 851, 865-66 (1994) ("We believe a certain
amount of unanswered, low-grade racism and hassling on the nation's campuses may
even confer a benefit on the status quo.")
'59"Delgado & Yun, supra note 95, at 885.
11 According to one study, more than 150 colleges and universities have enacted
hate-speech regulations. See Court Overturns Stanford University Code Barring Bigoted
Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1995, at B8.
' Delgado, supra note 138, at 380 n.319 (quoting Richard Delgado, Address to
State Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin, Apr. 24, 1989).
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that school, because less than two months after he made the
comments quoted above, the University of Wisconsin Board of
Regents adopted a hate-speech regulation (upon the advice of,
among others, Delgado) by a vote of twelve to five.
162
Even if Delgado were correct that predominantly white institu-
tions such as the University of Wisconsin routinely resist adopting
hate-speech regulations, his theory of the linkage between opposition
to such a regulation and benefits to the administration cannot
withstand close scrutiny. In one of his discussions of this topic,
Delgado cites a 1980 article by Derrick Bell which argued that
desegregation occurred only because there was a temporary
convergence of interests between blacks and whites.1"3 According
to Bell, whites supported desegregation for three main reasons: To
promote a positive image of the country to support the government's
cold-war efforts against the Soviet Union, to undermine the rising
tide of black radicalism, and to promote the industrialization of the
South in order to exploit its potential.'
Along the same lines, Delgado argues in the statement quoted
above that the main benefit to white administrators of permitting
racist speech is to squelch activism by minorities. This objective is
accomplished, according to Delgado, by keeping most minority
students uneasy about their place at the institution, and convincing
the braver, more committed students to leave. Unfortunately, if
Delgado is correct that neutralizing activism is indeed the goal of
administrators at these institutions, then he is probably incorrect
about their tendency to oppose hate-speech regulation. If university
administrators have the subliminal desire to suppress radical ideas
and activism among minority populations at their institutions, would
it not be more logical to censor abrasive speech by whites that is
likely to serve as a rallying point for radical organizers in the
minority community? University administrators are instinctively
sensitive to their image among wealthy private benefactors, parents
of potential students, and (in the case of public universities) state
legislators. Thus, the avoidance of conflict and discord whenever
possible is foremost on the mind of every university administrator,
162 See UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (E.D. Wis.
1991). The regulation was later held unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in.
federal district court. Id. at 1181.
163 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REv. 518 (1980), cited in Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 158,
at 863 n.75.
'6 Id. at 524-25.
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especially if that conflict and discord is likely to get press coverage.
It would be logical for an administrator to conclude that the
prominent public expression of racist or sexist remarks will almost
certainly generate some degree of bad publicity. In this light, it is
implausible that university administrators would view themselves,
either consciously or subconsciously, as having similar interests to
persons expressing overtly racist or sexist views. Long periods full of
angry marches and demonstrations held under the harsh glare of
television cameras are not the stuff of which successful careers in
academic administration are built.
Finally, Delgado's attempt to attribute antisocial private speech
to university administrators or other government officials is uncon-
vincing because the argument ignores the political and legal
dynamics of free speech protection in this society. Hate speech is
protected in most contexts because of First Amendment doctrine
developed by the courts, in direct response to efforts by legislatures
and government agencies-usually controlled by whites-to suppress
that speech." 5 Administrative reluctance to censor racist and other
antisocial speech arises not so much from the administrators'
inherent sympathy or implicit alliances with racists as it does from a
reluctant recognition by the administrators that the courts will not
permit them to censor the speech of private persons solely because
of the speech's offensive content. Does this mean that predomi-
nantly white judges have devised a protective First Amendment
jurisprudence because they, too, somehow benefit from the persis-
tence of low-grade racism? Maybe, but the specific benefits low-level
racism would provide to life-tenured judges are hard to fathom.
The more plausible explanation is that Delgado's overheated
rhetoric about the latent racism of judges and other government
officials is just wrong. It may be that the judges who are primarily
responsible for providing First Amendment protection to racist
speech have done so for entirely honorable reasons-because they
are appropriately wary of the many dangers that arise when contro-
versial speech of every sort is subjected to the vicissitudes of any
11 Some obvious examples include R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking
down a St. Paul hate speech ordinance); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)
(per curiam) (overturning the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan member under an Ohio
syndicalism statute and finding the statute to be unconstitutional); UWM Post, Inc. v.
Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (striking down the University
of Wisconsin's speech code); Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D.
Mich. 1989) (striking down the University of Michigan's speech code).
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political agency, regardless of that agency's racial or political
composition.
166
A final example of rhetorical excess in postmodern critiques of
the public/private distinction can be found in Catharine
MacKinnon's attempts to link the concept of privacy to the preserva-
tion of a paternalistic status quo. MacKinnon argues that privacy is
one of the main reasons that women cannot come together to fight
their oppression. "When women are segregated in private, separated
from each other, one at a time, a right to that privacy isolates us at
once from each other and from public recourse." 167 MacKinnon
argues not only that privacy is a hindrance to progress, but also that
privacy actively facilitates great harm. According to MacKinnon,
privacy (and, indeed, individual rights in general"a ) is a concept
used by society primarily to protect endless acts of coercion and
violent abuse of women: "[T]he legal concept of privacy can and has
shielded the place of battery, marital rape, and women's exploited
labor; has preserved the central institutions whereby women are
deprived of identity, autonomy, control and self-definition; and has
protected the primary activity through which male supremacy is
expressed and enforced."169 In general, she says, "[t]his right to
privacy is a right of men 'to be let alone' to oppress women one at
a time."'70
The problem with these statements is that they describe an
extreme type of privacy that virtually no one advocates. Certainly no
one advocates adopting a form of privacy that would permit a person
16' For one recent example of well-intentioned government excess, see Nelson v.
Streeter, 16 F.Sd 145, 148 (7th Cir. 1994). The court denied qualified immunity to
three Chicago city aldermen who physically removed from a student show at the
Chicago Art Institute a painting satirizing Mayor Harold Washington. The court
noted that qualified immunity was denied because the law was clear at the time of the
aldermen's actions that "[city] officials have no more right to enter [the Art Institute]
uninvited and take the art off its walls than they would have to enter a private home
and take 'offensive' art off its walls." Id.
If the postmodern censors are serious about their attacks on the public/private
distinction, then they would presumably reverse the principle articulated by the
Seventh Circuit. Under a postmodern regime, city officials would have just as much
right to remove a racially insensitive painting from the walls of the Chicago Art
Institute as they would to enter a private home and take "offensive" art off its walls.
167 MACKINNON, supra note 115, at 102.
'63 See MACKINNON, supra note 37, at 244 ("The first step [toward changing
women's relation to the state] is to recognize that male forms of power over women
are affirmatively embodied as individual rights in law. When men lose power, they
feel they lose rights. Often they are not wrong.").
169 MACKINNON, supra note 115, at 101.
170 Id. at 102 (citation omitted).
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to physically abuse another without risking legal recourse, including
a severe prison sentence. Nor does the concept of privacy dictate
that an individual-male or female-must descend into a limited and
claustrophobic world completely isolated from supportive, kindred
spirits. MacKinnon's argument is effective only against a desert-
island sort of privacy, which is not the sort that typically exists in a
modern society.
In a modern society, privacy encompasses not only the right of a
person to go inside her home, shut the door, and never come out,
but also the right to join together with other private individuals (that
is, individuals who are not government agents) to militate against
oppression fostered or permitted by the government. Thus, privacy
(in the realistic sense of the term) actually is an essential ingredient
in achieving social change, not a hindrance to it. Contrary to
MacKinnon's assertions, privacy provides an essential locale where
individuals-male and female-can develop their own "identity,
autonomy, control and self-definition" without coercive interference
from the government, which may have an interest in promoting vastly
different ideas about the world. Assuming that government will tend
to be controlled by forces unreceptive to fundamental social change
(which is a fair assumption, since fundamental social change will
often also involve replacement of the government itself), the
preservation of privacy--including the right to generate and consume
written, spoken and filmed messages without interference by the
government-is the only way of ensuring that social change always
remains a viable alternative.
The concept of privacy is merely one conceptualization of the
basic democratic right to be distinctive-in thought, personality and
lifestyle-from the norm set by mainstream society. Privacy is the
realm into which those who are different from the norm can retreat
in peace and safety. In one sense, MacKinnon's own career as a self-
styled gender radical is a testament to the value of privacy and the
notion of individual distinctiveness that privacy serves. She is allowed
to develop her ideas in isolation from government control or
oversight, collect material to support her thesis, and join together
with others who share her views outside the presence of hostile
ideological antagonists. MacKinnon does not hesitate to claim these
benefits of privacy. Like many other objects of media attention,
MacKinnonjealously guards her personal affairs from public scrutiny.
When a reporter for the New York Times interviewed MacKinnon for
a story several years ago, the reporter noted MacKinnon's "insistence
on privacy in the few parts of her life that no interviewer could call
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work-related." 7 ' Other press accounts have noted MacKinnon's
refusal to debate feminists who disagree with her stance on pornogra-
phy.'72 MacKinnon's assertion of her right to shield her private life
from public scrutiny, and her unwillingness to take on her ideologi-
cal adversaries in public is, despite her virulent theoretical claims to
the contrary, an appeal to the concept of privacy. Systematic
protection of privacy is simply a mechanism of guaranteeing to
unknown and insignificant individuals at least some authority to
dictate the terms of their dealings with the public, a power that
prominent and influential individuals such as MacKinnon already
exercise.
C. The Civic Republican Attack on the Public/Private Distinction
The starting point for the civic republican critique of the public/
private distinction is the same as that of the feminist and critical race
theorists' critiques. Like the feminist and critical race theorists, the
civic republicans believe that "the private sphere is constituted by
public decisions." 7 ' Their analysis of this premise leads the civic
republicans to two conclusions about the public/private distinction,
both of which are consistent with feminist and critical race theories
on the subject.
The first conclusion is that authentic private values about social
and political matters can be developed only through participation in
a collective public dialogue. Thus, the function of politics in a civic
republican system "is to select values ... or to provide opportunities
for preference formation rather than simply to implement existing
desires" 7 4 Private preferences formed without the guidance of an
appropriate public dialogue are viewed as "interests as subjectively
perceived" rather than "actual interests," 75 because unguided
individual preferences are simply "a function of current information,
consumption patterns, legal rules, and general social pressures."176
1 Fred Strebeigh, Defining Law on the Feminist Frontier, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1991
(Magazine), at 29.
" According to MacKinnon, participating in such a debate would play into a
"pimp strategy to hide behind feminist women." David Margolick, At the Bar: Catering
to a Feminist Superstar, Judges Find Themselves Tangled in a Free-Speech Debate, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 5, 1993, at Bll.
"r Sunstein, supra note 52, at 1569.
174 Id. at 1545 (footnote omitted).
17 Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1171.
176 Sunstein, supra note 63, at 10.
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The civic republicans' second conclusion is that the protection
of privacy (in the form of individual autonomy in the formulation of
values and preferences) for its own sake is inadvisable because such
protection will tend to reinforce unreflective and distorted collective
influences. Indeed, since "purely private preferences" are merely
"social constructs,"177 in a significant sense the civic republicans
believe that there is no such thing as a truly "private" realm. "On the
republican point of view," Sunstein asserts, "the existence of realms
of private autonomy must be justified in public terms."" 8 In other
words, civic republicans acknowledge the legitimacy of privacy claims
only when such claims reflect the public goals set by the society as a
whole through its government.
Civic republicans do not view their subordination of the private
realm to the public realm as a threat to individual freedom.
According to civic republicans, efforts to protect privacy will often
fail to further the goal of individual freedom because, in the end,
these efforts will merely protect one set of collective values (i.e., the
values cultivated by self-interested collective forces outside the
government) from another (i.e., the public-spirited values cultivated
by a benign government). Under this view, protection of privacy can
actually be harmful to both the individual and society as a whole
because such protection inevitably will favor those who dominate the
marketplace that dictates individual preferences. A central theme
running through the civic republican literature is the need to employ
affirmative government action to counteract marketplace distortions
of this sort. In a nutshell, "the nature and extent of... malfunc-
tions [in the private sector] will support considerable legislative and
judicial intrusion into private preference structures. "179
In applying these conclusions to the regulation of speech,
Sunstein has attempted to link the civic republican attack on
autonomy in the civil liberties context to the modem Supreme
Court's renunciation of free market economics in the economic
regulation context. This argument is based on Sunstein's interpreta-
tion of Lochner v. New Yorkis ° and of the subsequent cases which
overruled that decision's constitutional protection of laissez faire
economic theory.81 Sunstein argues that, in overruling Lochner,
17 Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1133.
17 Sunstein, supra note 52, at 1551.
17 Sunstein, supra note 62, at 1172.
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
1 See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLuM. L. REV. 873, 876-83 (1987)
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the Supreme Court did not merely disavow the Lochner Court's
constitutional enshrinement of neoclassical economics; nor did the
Court adopt Holmes's judicial-restraint axiom that the United States
Constitution "is not intended to embody a particular economic
theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen
to the State or of laissez faire."182 Rather, according to Sunstein,
when the Court overruled Lochner, it adopted the view that the
Constitution does not require the government to remain neutral
toward activities in the private sector, a view that greatly expands the
scope of justifiable government intrusion into private affairs.1
8 3
According to Sunstein, the now-disavowed Lochner approach to
constitutional law represents "not merely an aggressive judicial role,
but an approach that imposes a constitutional requirement of
neutrality, and understands the term to refer to preservation of the
existing distribution of wealth and entitlements under the baseline
of the common law." Thus, when the Lochner Court struck down
New York's statutory prohibition of sixty-hour work weeks in the
bakery industry, the Court assumed that the existing private market
was "natural and inviolate," that government intervention to aid the
disadvantaged bakery workers constituted "impermissible partisan-
ship," and that government neutrality toward existing patterns of
wealth was necessary to maintain proper government neutrality
toward the private affairs of its citizens.'8 5 Sunstein argues that, by
overruling Lochner, the Court abandoned both the requirement of
government neutrality and the protection of the private status quo
that government neutrality inevitably entails.'8 6 In Sunstein's view,
the post-Lochner Court recognized that Lochner's assumptions about
a "natural" and "apolitical" economic reality were wrong. "We may
... understand Lochner as a case that failed because it selected, as the
baseline for constitutional analysis, a system that was state-created,
hardly neutral, and without prepolitical status."'8 7 Sunstein argues
that the common law system of private entitlements used by the
Lochner Court as a baseline was itself the product of legal rules
(discussing Lochner and West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)).
"s Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
"85 See Sunstein, supra note 181, at 880-83 (interpreting the Court's disavowal of
Lochner as a realization that "neutrality is a function of the baseline against which
government action is measured").
18 Id. at 875.
11 Id. at 882.
'8 See id. at 880-81.
187m Id. at 882.
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embodying public, political values. Likewise, by rejecting Lochner, the
Court recognized that the Constitution does not prohibit the
government from replacing preexisting common law rules favoring
the interests of private parties with new rules embodying different
public values that more directly serve the political interests control-
ling the government.
Insofar as Sunstein limits his analysis to the precise area of law
governed by Lochner and the decisions superseding Lochner-i.e.,
government regulation of economic affairs-Sunstein's analysis is
relatively uncontroversial. But Sunstein applies his analysis far afield
of economic affairs, arguing that "[n]umerous [noneconomic
constitutional] decisions depend in whole or in part on common law
baselines or understandings of inaction and neutrality that owe their
origin to Lochner-like understandings.""'8 In particular, Sunstein
cites several aspects of First Amendment law as reflecting "Lochner-
like understandings." In an early article on the subject, Sunstein
focused primarily on First Amendment limits on campaign finance
regulation, arguing that Buckley v. Valeo89 "is a direct heir to
Lochner."' Sunstein specifically criticized the Buckley Court for
asserting that "'the concept that government may restrict the speech
of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative
voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment."'191
According to Sunstein, this statement from Buckley reflected the
Court's "Lochner-like understanding" that "[a]s far as the [F]irst
[A] mendment is concerned, the state must take disparities in wealth,
and the existence of some with more 'voice' than others, as part of
nature for which government bears no responsibility."'92 Sunstein
disagrees with this approach and would instead apply what he
considers the appropriate post-Lochner attitude generally favoring
direct public regulation of all private marketplaces, including the
marketplace of political campaigns.
93
In his early treatment of the subject, Sunstein recognized that the
wholesale application of what he calls "post-Lochner principles" would
effectively nullify the First Amendment by making virtually all private
speech subject to public control by the government. As Sunstein
18 Id. at 875.
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
190 Sunstein, supra note 181, at 884.
I"' Id. (quoting Buckey, 424 U.S. at 48-49).
192 Id.
"I3 See id. at 914-15 (arguing that Buckey was wrongly decided but noting the
potential pitfalls of government regulation of speech in political campaigns).
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notes, such an approach would "wreak havoc with existing [F]irst
[A]mendment doctrine,"194 and would specifically obligate the
Court to permit direct government regulation of both the content
and viewpoint of speech. In his early discussions of the subject,
Sunstein noted that the argument against the broad application to
speech of post-Lochner regulatory principles rests on a recognition
that "[t]he problem of deciding who is powerful and who is not is
too manipulable and too likely to be skewed by impermissible factors
to be the basis for [F]irst [A]mendment doctrine."195  Thus,
Sunstein concluded his early discussion of the issue by asserting
modestly that while Buckley should be overruled, "the principle at
issue there might be confined to financial expenditures without
endangering the general principle of viewpoint neutrality."' 96
After having a few years to reflect on this conclusion, Sunstein
seems to have decided that his early proposal for reforming First
Amendment doctrine was far too moderate. In his more recent
discussions of the application of Lochner-like understandings to First
Amendment jurisprudence, Sunstein goes far beyond the narrow
recommendation that Buckley be overruled and argues instead that
the entire structure of First Amendment law should be revamped to
reflect the post-Lochner principles he favors. 97 Since his earlier
work on the subject, Sunstein discovered that "something important
194 Id. at 914.
'9' Id. at 914-15.
196 Id. at 915.
197 This brings Sunstein's proposals into line with the similarly radical recommen-
dations of Owen Fiss, whose position on the public regulation of antisocial private
speech also purports to bring First Amendment doctrine into line with the principles
of the post-Lochner constitutional era. According to Fiss, the First Amendment "has
long served as the breeding ground of libertarian sentiment." Owen M. Fiss, Why the
State?, 100 HARV. L. REv. 781, 782 (1987). Fiss's description of his approach to this
area of law also fits Sunstein:
As part of the contemporary assault on state activism that so dominates our
politics, Ronald Coase and Aaron Director have confronted New Deal
liberals with the free speech tradition in order to remind them of the virtues
of laissez faire and to build a case against state intervention in economic
matters. My inclination is, of course, just the reverse. It occurred to me
that if Coase and Director can celebrate the libertarian element in the free
speech tradition as a way of arguing against state intervention in the
economic sphere, we should be able to start at the other end-to begin with
the fact of state intervention in economic matters, and then use that
historical experience to understand why the state might have a role to play
in furthering free speech values.
Id. at 783 (citation omitted).
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and strange has happened to the First Amendment."'98 Specifical-
ly, the First Amendment has been appropriated by numerous
individuals and groups whose speech, in Sunstein's view, does not
deserve much, if any, constitutional protection.'99 These social
outlaws were allowed to appropriate the First Amendment, according
to Sunstein, because modem First Amendment theory developed
around notions of government neutrality toward private affairs that
are directly traceable to the Supreme Court's pre-Lochnerunderstand-
ings of reality. "For purposes of speech, contemporary understand-
ings of neutrality and partisanship, or government action and
inaction, are identical to those that predate the New Deal.""'
Thus, Sunstein casts doubt upon the entire edifice of First
Amendment law, rather than just the narrow area covered by Buckley.
He proposes a "New Deal with respect to speech," '' which would
bring First Amendment law into line with post-Lochner constitutional
theory in other areas. It would also bring free speech doctrine into
line with the overarching civic republican presupposition that the
private realm should be directly controlled by the public realm. This
"New Deal" therefore would greatly reduce the requirement of
government neutrality toward private speech by limiting strong free
speech protection to a narrow category of political speech.0 2 In
'g Sunstein, supra note 83, at 258.
' Sunstein's list of new, undeserving free speech claimants is a long one:
Whereas the principal First Amendment suits were brought, in the 1940s,
1950s, and 1960s, by political protesters and dissidents, many of the current
debates involve complaints by commercial advertisers, companies objecting
to the securities laws, pornographers, businesses selling prerecorded
statements of celebrities via '900' numbers, people seeking to spend large
amounts of money on elections, industries attempting to export technology
to unfriendly nations, newspapers disclosing names of rape victims, and large
broadcasters -resisting government efforts to promote diversity in the media.
Id.
200 Id. at 266-67.
201 Id. at 262.
202 For Sunstein's proposal to limit free speech protection to a "core" area of
political speech, see Sunstein, supra note 83, at 301-12. For an earlier version of the
argument, see Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment 1986 DuKE LJ.
589, 622. Although he is unlikely to invite the comparison, Sunstein's proposal is
similar to one made several years ago by Robert Bork, who argued that the First
Amendment should only protect speech concerning "'the discovery and spread of
political truth.'" Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems,
47 IND. LJ. 1, 26 (1971) (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927)
(BrandeisJ., concurring)). According to Bork, "[a] ll other forms of speech raise only
issues of human gratification," and should therefore be subject to government
regulation along with all other means of expressing or satisfying human desires. Id.
Bork and Sunstein even define the "core" political speech category in very similar
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general, Sunstein proposes a broad new theory justifying widespread
government intervention to restrict private speech. According to
Sunstein, "in some circumstances, what seems to be government
regulation of speech actually might promote free speech, and should
not be treated as an abridgement [of free speech] at all." °3 Or, in
a more Orwellian formulation of the same notion, restriction equals
freedom.
terms. Bork defines political speech as including "criticisms of public officials and
policies, proposals for the adoption or repeal of legislation or constitutional provisions
and speech addressed to the conduct of any governmental unit in the country." Id.
at 29. Similarly, Sunstein "will treat speech as political when it is both intended and
received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue." Sunstein, supra
note 83, at 304 (emphasis omitted from original).
The main difference between Bork's and Sunstein's proposals is that Bork is
much more forthright about the implications of this First Amendment model.
According to Bork, "constitutionally, art and pornography are on a par with industry
and smoke pollution." Bork, supra, at 29. Sunstein tries to evade this obvious
consequence of limiting the First Amendment to political speech, by granting some
protection to nonpolitical speech, and by manipulating his definition of "political
speech." Neither of these evasions are reassuring. First, Sunstein states that
nonpolitical speech would be subject to regulation "when government can show a
good reason and a solid connection between the means of regulation and the reason
in question," which would hardly be a difficult standard for the government to meet.
Sunstein, supra note 83, at 310. Second, when Sunstein tries to avoid acknowledging
that his standard (like Bork's) would permit the censorship of controversial artwork,
he is forced to argue that "[w]hen government seeks to censor art or literature, it is
almost always because of the political content, making the censorship impermissible."
Id. at 312. But this reasoning is implausible when applied to work such as Robert
Mapplethorpe's, which is concerned primarily with sexual and aesthetic matters.
These concerns obviously have agreat many political implications, butMapplethorpe's
conception of them does not easily fit within Sunstein's narrow conception of politics
as "public deliberation about some issue." Id. at 304.
Sunstein is faced with the same dilemma that plagued Alexander Meiklejohn's
similar theory almost fifty years ago. SeeALEXANDERMEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM
20-28 (1960) (reprinting Meiklejohn's 1948 book, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO
SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948)) (noting that there is a huge discrepancy between First
Amendment language which guarantees free speech and acts of the legislature which
seek to regulate it). Like Meiklejohn, Sunstein must deal with the unavoidable
problems created by closely linking First Amendment theory to political deliberation.
On one hand, such a theory will leave outside the First Amendment a great deal of
important speech; on the other hand, manipulation of the notion of "politics" to
salvage constitutional protection for intuitively valuable speech merely corrupts the
theory and makes it intellectually incoherent. Like his theoretical precursors,
Sunstein must honestly acknowledge (and endorse) the repressive implications of his
theory, or he must abandon the theory as unacceptable in a society that values open
discussion of all human concerns, regardless of whether they can be narrowly
construed as "political."
203 Sunstein, supra note 83, at 267.
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1. The Details of the Civic Republican Attack:
Media Regulation in the Civic Republican State
Sunstein's extensive discussion of media regulation illustrates how
his "New Deal" for speech would apply outside the campaign finance
area. Although he spends most of his time discussing the traditional
area of radio and television regulation, Sunstein expands the
significance of this area of law by applying the same regulatory
principles to newspapers.0 4 Sunstein's discussion of media regula-
tion is revealing because it demonstrates the magnitude of the
change in existing doctrine that his theory entails, and also because
it reveals Sunstein's deep distrust of a system in which ordinary
citizens are permitted to formulate values and opinions without the
direct and constant guidance of a supposedly benevolent govern-
ment.
Sunstein expressly acknowledges that his version of the "New
Deal" for speech would replace neutrality-which entails the
protection of individual privacy and intellectual autonomy"-with
paternalism-which entails a substantial measure of governmental
intrusion into individual thought and action. Although Sunstein tries
to keep the analysis on the higher plane of theory and abstract
doctrine, much of what he says about the media and its effects
conveys the impression that Sunstein believes the "New Deal" for
speech is necessary because he is dissatisfied with the decisions his
fellow citizens have made under the present system, which has given
them too much freedom to think for themselves.
One example of Sunstein's dissatisfaction can be found in his
discussion of television news programming. Sunstein's "New Deal"
204 Sunstein's rationale for extending content regulation to newspapers seems to
rest on the fact that newspapers use the law to protect their property rights.
It follows that insofar as newspapers invoke the civil and criminal law to
prevent people from reaching the public, we might be able to regulate
them, in a viewpoint-neutral way, without abridging the freedom of speech.
If the government seeks to promote quality and diversity in the newspapers,
courts should uphold mild regulatory efforts, especially in view of the fact
that many newspapers operate as de facto monopolies.
Id. at 294 (footnote omitted). The omitted footnote to this passage notes that "[t] his
claim casts doubt on the outcome, or at least the rationale, in Miami Herald Publ'g Co.
v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 254-58 (1974)," which struck down, as a violation of the First
Amendment, the application of broadcast-style equal-time requirements to newspapers.
Sunstein's phrasing of this principle indicates that a newspaper's monopoly status is
only a supplemental, not the primary, factor in his analysis. This suggests that he
might also extend the principle beyond newspapers to other print media outlets, such
as news magazines and magazines of opinion.
19961
262 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 145: 193
envisions broad new government regulation of such programming
that "might include a compulsory hour of public affairs programming
per evening, rights of reply,.. . or guidelines to encourage attention
to public issues and diversity of view."215 Sunstein also suggests the
possibility of government mandated subsidies from private broad-
casters to public broadcasters or commercial stations that agree to
provide what the government deems to be "less profitable high
quality programming. "206 As these broad proposals indicate,
Sunstein sees little to like in the existing system of television news
programming. Sunstein criticizes local television news for devoting
very little time to what he calls "genuine news." 2 7 When the local
stations do broadcast news, Sunstein complains, "the news stories
tend to focus on fires, accidents, and crimes instead of issues of
government and policy."208 He criticizes network news on similar
grounds. In particular, Sunstein objects to recent network coverage
of political campaigns that focused on "'horse-race' issues-who was
winning, who had momentum"-rather than on the candidates'
speeches and other discussions of the issues. 20 9  Sunstein also
decries the increase in nonpolitical stories on network news
programs, noting that the percentage of time devoted to arts and
entertainment news has increased substantially in recent years, while
political news has diminished.210 He quotes an industry executive
who attributes the shift in network news emphasis to "the necessity
of shrinking ratings. "211
This last quote poses a dilemma for Sunstein, because it indicates
that the programming choices of television broadcasters are not the
real problem. The real problem is the bad taste of television viewers.
The media perceives that viewers do not want to watch what Sunstein
defines as "good" programming. Thus, by Sunstein's own evidence,
there is no indication of a market failure in the broadcasting industry
of the sort evident in Lochner and its progeny.212 The market is not
205 Sunstein, supra note 83, at 289.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 280.
208 Id. at 281.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 281-82.
211 Id. at 282 (quotingJ. Max Robins, Nets' Newscasts Increase Coverage of Entertain-
ment, VARIETY, July 18, 1990, at 3).
212 One of the problems with Sunstein's application of post-Lochner paradigms to
First Amendment jurisprudence is that he subtly misreads what the Supreme Court
did when it overruled Lochner. Sunstein reads the renunciation of Lochner as the
Court's approval of governmental paternalism in the form of social welfare legislation.
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See Sunstein, supra note 181, at 879-80. According to Sunstein's view, the government
is (and should be) separated to some extent from both employers and workers, in
order to create a legal landscape in which the "common good" can be pursued
without favoring one set of interests over the other. This conception is derived from
the traditional civic republican disavowal of pluralist politics in favor of a more
.universalist" model. See Sunstein, supra note 52, at 1554; Sunstein, supra note 57, at
31-32. I suggest that a pluralist interpretation provides a more accurate portrayal of
the actual effects of the decisions overruling Lochner. Under this interpretation, the
decisions overruling Lochner made the government the direct agent of a politically
active working class representing its own interests by exercising political power. Thus,
the defining characteristic of government in the post-Lochner period (in the area of
economic regulation, anyway) is not paternalism, but self-interest. In the simplest
sense, the absence of judicially enforced substantive due process restrictions in the
post-Lochner era means that in the economic regulation context the political majority
can do whatever is necessary to further its own self-interest through government
action.
From a pluralist perspective, when the Supreme Court overruled Lochrer, the
Court specifically permitted the government to align itself with its most powerful
constituents at any given time. According to this view, the primary logical flaw in the
Supreme Courts Lochner opinion was the Court's assertion that the government was
interfering with the economic liberty of workers by imposing limits on the number of
hours they could work daily and weekly. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61
(1905). Contrary to the Court's contention, it is more plausible to assume that
workers in the bakery industry would prefer to work the shorter, healthier hours
dictated in the Lochner legislation. These preferences were thwarted because the
Lochner decision prevented the government from enforcing the legislative product of
concerted political action by the workers. In the absence of government action on
their behalf, the workers were at the behest of employers, who had the economic
clout to set the terms of employment without regard to the workers' preferences or
needs. Read in this way, worker-protection legislation was simply a political
counterbalance to the economic power asserted by the employers. Without this
counterbalance, the workers lost their ability to compete in the marketplace on
roughly equal terms as their employers. Thus, Lochnerskewed the market, not because
it prevented the government from acting on behalf of generalized public values, as
Sunstein argues, see Sunstein, supra note 181, at 877-78, but because Lochnerprevented
the government from acting on behalf of a very specific set of private interests-i.e.,
the interests of the workers. This interpretation is consistent with the language in
later cases overruling Lochner principles as applied to other economic welfare
legislation. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398 (1937)
(upholding minimum wage law and finding that "[t]he legislature of the State was
clearly entitled to consider the situation of women in employment, the fact that they
are in the class receiving the least pay, that their bargaining power is relatively weak,
and that they are the ready victims of those who would take advantage of their
necessitous circumstances").
According to the pluralist explanation of the post-Lochner era, the crucial
difference between the economic cases and the speech cases is that in economic
legislation the government does not assert the ability to discern the "true" wishes of
workers who had not yet realized their own self-interest. Rather, the government acts
on behalf of workers who exercise their political clout in the pursuit of very specific
goals. Thus, Sunstein is wrong about the significance of paternalism in the
constitutional doctrine abandoning the Lochner paradigm, and he is also wrong to
suggest that an almost purely majoritarian constitutional model, which now governs
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failing to provide what the viewers want; rather, the successful
broadcast outlets provide large numbers of viewers with precisely the
kind of programming they desire. Nevertheless, Sunstein argues that
the government should intervene in the news business anyway.
According to Sunstein, although the viewers seem to be getting what
they want, in reality the viewers do not know what they want; that is,
they do not know what they really want. The viewers may think they
want "Beavis and Butthead," but they really want "Washington Week
in Review."
How does Sunstein know this? Because he has somehow
determined that the people demanding "Entertainment Tonight"
have been subtly duped into adopting this preference by something
called the "broadcast status quo." According to Sunstein:
[P]rivate broadcasting selections are a product of preferences that
are themselves a result of the broadcasting status quo, and not
independent of it. In a world that provides the existing fare, it
would be unsurprising if people generally preferred to see what
they are accustomed to seeing. They have not been provided with
the opportunities of a better system. When this is so, the broad-
casting status quo cannot, without circularity, be justified by
reference to the preferences. Preferences that have adapted to an
objectionable system cannot justify that system.21 s
Sunstein concludes that governmental intrusion into this aspect
of the private speech market is justified because "the inclusion of
better options, through new law, does not displace a freely produced
desire."
214
Aside from the problems inherent in determining what is a
"freely produced desire," Sunstein's proposal is inconsistent with his
own evidence in at least three ways. First, Sunstein introduces his
discussion by noting that the television news business has changed
substantially over the last several decades.2 15 This observation is
inconsistent with his conclusion that the public's pervasively
unhealthy television viewing habits have been produced by exposure
to a preexisting "broadcasting status quo," which is dedicated to
training television viewers to prefer "bad" entertainment program-
the economic regulation area, can be applied without significant modification to a
clearly countermajoritarian constitutional area such as the First Amendment. For a
detailed argument on this point, see infra notes 232-41 and accompanying text.
213 Sunstein, supra note 83, at 288 (citation omitted).
214 Id.
215 See id. at 285 ("It might be suggested that in an era of cable television, the
relevant problems disappear. People can always change the channel.").
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ming over "good" public affairs programming. Second, to the extent
that the trend in television news content has moved toward entertain-
ment programming and away from traditional news, Sunstein's own
source attributes this change to declining ratings for traditional news
broadcasts.216 If this is true, then the "broadcasting status quo"
seems to have responded to the deteriorating desires of the public,
not the other way around. Third, as Sunstein himself acknowledges,
"better options" are already included among the choices offered to
the public on the existing menu of television programming, in the
form of public television, which in Sunstein's own words, "offers a
wide range of high quality fare."
217
So if "good" television programming choices are already available,
why is increased government regulation of private broadcasting
necessary? Because most of the public has used its existing freedom
to reject or ignore Sunstein's favored programming in favor of other,
less enlightening alternatives. Thus, since freedom has not increased
the public's appetite for quality television programming, it is
necessary to remove some of that freedom by forcing an increased
diet of "good" programming on a public that does not want it. As
Sunstein puts it, "[i]f better options are put more regularly in view,
we might well expect that at least some people would be educated as
a result, and be more favorably disposed toward programming
dealing with public issues in a serious way."218 In short, Sunstein
proposes a system of telepolitical reeducation.
The declining quality of television viewing habits is, in itself,
hardly the most pressing issue in First Amendment jurisprudence.
But, as noted above, Sunstein suggests that the regulatory logic he
applies to the broadcast industry is also applicable to other areas of
speech.21'9 Also, this discussion of the relatively trivial subject of
broadcast regulation illustrates the recurring themes of Sunstein's
216 See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
217 Sunstein, supra note 83, at 289-90.
218 Id. at 288.
219 See supra note 204 and accompanying text. Sunstein's logic on this score is
quite expansive. For example, Sunstein notes that this logic might apply to
newspapers as well as the broadcast industry because the newspapers' property rights
"also amount to a legally-conferred power to exclude others. Simply as a matter of
fact, that power is a creature of the state." Sunstein, supra note 83, at 276 (citation
omitted). Of course, if nothing more than the assertion of property rights is enough
to justify government regulation of speech, then every writer, editor, publisher and
book store in the country is potentially subject to direct government intervention in
the editorial process "to promote democratic self-government by ensuring that people
are presented with a broad diversity of views about public issues." Id.
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civic republicanism and other versions of postmodern censorship
theory. Sunstein and the other postmodern speech theorists posit
that individual autonomy is chimerical. Likewise, Sunstein and the
other postmodern speech theorists assert that collective, public
determinations of value are inevitably superior to individual, private
determinations of value. This leads Sunstein, along with the other
postmodern speech theorists, to conclude that individual privacy in
the realm of speech (i.e., the private selection of what to say, read,
listen to, and watch) should be subjected to far more government
intervention and control than is permissible under modern First
Amendment doctrine.
The postmodern proposals discussed in this section-i.e., the
proposals to reduce the protection of individual privacy and
autonomy in value formation by allowing the government to channel
individual expressive choice-go to the very heart of both First
Amendment and democratic theory. The civic republican attack on
privacy is distinguished from other postmodern efforts only in that
it purports to move beyond pure theory into the realm of constitu-
tional doctrine. The civic republican case against privacy and
autonomy asserts that those cornerstones of modern constitutional
law can be attacked from within the present framework of constitu-
tional law without reformulating existing doctrine. Thus, the civic
republican case against the protection of privacy and autonomy in
the area of expression depends almost entirely on the claim that
intellectual markets can be analogized to commercial markets in
products and commodities. If the government has constitutional
authority to regulate one market, the argument goes, then the same
constitutional rationale should support regulation of the other.
Unfortunately, the attempt to couple an attack on intellectual
autonomy with the Court's renunciation of Lochnerian economic
autonomy suffers from many of the same flaws as the more purely
theoretical postmodern attacks on privacy and autonomy. The next
section briefly discusses three of the most prominent flaws in
Sunstein's version of the civic republican attack on the public/private
distinction.
D. The Faws in the Civic Republican Approach to the
Public/Private Distinction
Professor Sunstein's attempt to link Lochner and the strong
protection of free speech is flawed in at least three major
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respects. 2 0  First, Sunstein's account ignores the fundamental
differences in the nature of governmental policies regulating
economic activity and speech. Second, Sunstein mistakenly assumes
that the distribution, application and effects of private collective
power are the same in the area of speech as in the area of private
economic activity. Third, Sunstein does not adequately address the
problem of limiting the misuse of political power in a system that
increases significantly the degree of governmental control over the
private sphere.
1. The Different Characteristics of Economic
and Speech Regulations
By analogizing the regulation of speech to the regulation of
economic affairs, Sunstein implicitly asserts that the government's
objectives in these two areas pose similar challenges to the principles
of democratic self-governance. In Sunstein's view, "[f] or purposes of
speech, contemporary understandings of neutrality and partisanship,
or government action and inaction, are identical to those that
predate the New Deal."221 Thus, Sunstein would "abandon, or at
least qualify,"222 the basic principles governing the protection of
free speech by applying "much of the reasoning of the New Deal
attack on the common law to current questions of First Amendment
law. " 221 In particular, he asserts that although "[m]arkets are
generally good things, both for ordinary products and for speech,"
private speech should be regulated "when the legal creation of a
market has harmful consequences for free expression." 24 The key
here is that the government should be allowed to decide when a
particular pattern of speech threatens "harmful consequences for
free expression, "225 just as government should be allowed to decide
that a particular pattern of ownership in the steel industry threatens
harmful consequences for other industrial sectors of the economy.
Contrary to Sunstein's assertion, the regulation of products and
the regulation of speech pose quite different problems for demo-
cratic self-governance. When the government regulates economic
220 These criticisms would also apply to the very similar arguments of Owen Fiss.
See supra note 197.
221 Sunstein, supra note 83, at 266-67.
2 Id. at 263.
22 Id. at 262.
24 Id. at 277.
Id.
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activity, it is focusing on a concrete problem with a series of practical
implications. In the economic realm, the government may consider
such questions as: Is a particular drug dangerous? Does a company's
monopolization of one market sector lead to domestic price gouging,
or is it necessary to achieve economic efficiencies in order to
compete with global competitors? Does raising the minimum wage
help young, untrained workers enter the marketplace, or does it tend
to reduce entry-level job opportunities? Is one form of pollution
control device more effective and reliable than another?
The nature of these problems ensures that government regula-
tions will be constrained in many different ways. If the government
bases an economic decision on inaccurate assumptions about the
practical consequences of the regulatory action, those harmed by the
policy will immediately identify the government's failures and insist
that those failures be corrected. The interests involved will be
concrete, and usually financial in nature. Thus, economic regula-
tions will always be framed by the pragmatic limitations of the
physical environment in which those regulations are implemented,
and the equally practical constraints of economic efficiency and
financial self-interest.
The interests involved in the economic regulation context are
different in kind from the interests involved in the regulation of
speech. The battle over any major economic regulation will usually
entail a series of political compromises by all parties. It is unlikely
that one ideological faction or economic interest group will enact its
entire agenda into law, and also unlikely that one faction will
completely fail to have its interests represented to some degree by
legislation affecting it. Moreover, the rapidly shifting character of
the modem economic landscape ensures that no economic policy
will ever be viewed as permanent. All economic legislation is
transitory, as are the private interests supporting that legislation.
The recent legislative execution of the Interstate Commerce
Commission-once a shining star of the regulatory state, and later a
supine captive of the industries it supposedly controlled 22 6-- is a
good example of how comprehensive and seemingly permanent
economic regulatory schemes mutate over time and eventually die of
natural economic and political causes.
" See David E. Sanger, A U.S. Agenty, Once Powerful, Is Dead at 108, N.Y. TIMF.S,Jan.
1, 1996, atAl (reciting a brief history of the major changes throughout the life of the
ICC).
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These factors-concreteness and a transitory nature-indicate
that economic regulation is unlikely to undermine two of the basic
characteristics of successful democratic government: the broad
dispersion of political power and the temporary nature of all policy.
In a democracy, all elected officials must be subject to removal from
office when they lose the public's support, and all policies enacted
by these officials must constantly be subject to radical revision or
rescission. Political and social opposition to the status quo is
permitted in a democracy because in a democratic political culture
the status quo can never be permanently fixed, since any governing
faction is presumptively impermanent.
Government regulation of private speech differs significantly in
both purpose and effect from the government regulation of private
economic affairs sketched above. In particular, the justifications for
government regulation of private speech undermine the very
characteristics of democratic policy that legitimate economic
regulations-i.e., the dispersion of power and the impermanence of
policy determinations. This difference between the two types of
regulation is due largely to the fact that regulation of private speech
is proposed as a mechanism for the much more comprehensive
public control of private thoughts and values. Whereas economic
regulations are inherently temporary and always subject to change
based on the shifting alliances and interests of private citizens and
their political representatives, speech regulations are proposed as a
means of permanently altering the thought patterns of the citizens
living under the control of the government. According to Sunstein,
it is the role of the proper civic republican government to "instill
principles of virtue."22 7 The need to inculcate "virtue" in individual
citizens is why "a democratic government should sometimes take
private preferences as an object of regulation and control."228
Governmental efforts to control private preferences would be
fruitless unless the "virtue" taught by the government took root and
served as the basis for all the citizens' other political and social
decisions and activities. Unlike the post-Lochner regulatory policies
enacted during the New Deal, which were by definition pragmatically
oriented and subject to significant change over time, Sunstein's
system of civic republican government will succeed only if the
governmental inculcation of "virtue" permanently alters the ideolo-
Sunstein, supra note 57, at 32.
z Sunstein, supra note 63, at 13.
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gical landscape. The very notion of "virtue" connotes a universal and
permanent value.229 Sunstein's own description of the civic repub-
lican conception of government "reflects a belief that debate and
discussion help to reveal that some values are superior to oth-
ers. " 280 Therefore, once the civic republican system produces a
definitive judgment about political or social values, further debate
becomes unnecessary and even counterproductive (since further
discussion may lead weaker members of the community to adopt
values that the system has identified as inferior). At this point, civic
republican theory requires the political community to abandon the
democratic process of constant policy critique and evolution, in favor
of a mechanism-i.e., censorship of antisocial speech-intended to
squelch dissent and perpetuate the "superior" values already
identified by the government.
Thus, there is a stark difference between government regulation
of economics and government regulation of speech, a difference that
is reflected in the current scheme of constitutional jurisprudence
that Sunstein rejects. The present Supreme Court severely restrains
government regulation of private speech because speech regulations
are by nature "universalist" and permanent, and therefore deeply
antidemocratic. Conversely, the Court gives the elected branches of
government broad authority to regulate economic affairs because
economic regulations are by nature pragmatically limited and
assumed by all to be temporary and subject to constant critique and
significant modification over time. Such regulations are therefore
entirely consistent with democratic political assumptions, and do not
require significant and continuing judicial oversight.
21l
2. Individual Autonomy and Collective Power in the Economic
and Speech Regulation Contexts
The second reason the regulation of private economic and
speech markets should receive different constitutional scrutiny is that
individual autonomy and collective power manifest themselves in
different ways in the areas of economic activity and expression. The
civic republican position is that individual autonomy is affected by
Sunstein himself notes the civic republicans' "belief in universalism" and their
"reject[ion of] ethical relativism and skepticism." Sunstein, supra note 52, at 1554.
210 Sunstein, supra note 57, at 31-32.
211 For other arguments defending the asymmetrical treatment of economic and
speech markets, which are consistent with the views expressed in the text, see Sullivan,
supra note 27, at 959-65.
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collective private power in much the same way in both economic and
speech markets. In particular, Sunstein argues that individual
autonomy is hampered whenever disparities in collective power are
permitted to distort the private market in either the expression of
ideas or the distribution of economic goods. Thus, according to
Sunstein, in the market for speech, as in the market for commercial
products, "[w] hen those disparities [in private power] are large, the
principal goals of free speech will be subverted unless the govern-
ment intervenes with corrective measures."
23 2
This position is flawed because Sunstein misconstrues the
political contexts in which economic and speech regulation occur.
In Sunstein's view, the government serves as a sort of paterfamilias
when it regulates either economic affairs or speech. Under this
conception, the government's role in both contexts is overtly
paternalistic: its role is to protect powerless individuals from assaults
on their autonomy by private collective power. This paternalistic
view of government is flawed with respect to both the speech and the
economic regulation contexts.
Contrary to Sunstein's view, the government is not really acting
as a paternalistic entity when it steps in to regulate commercial
activity. A more accurate perspective on the government's role as
economic regulator views the government as the agent of one
collective economic entity (i.e., the group of individuals or organiza-
tions who will benefit from the regulation), in a competition for
power with another (i.e., the group being regulated). The reasons
why the first collective entity seeks to limit the second entity's
activities are irrelevant. For purposes of constitutional analysis, the
key point is that in the struggle over economic power and its
regulation, both groups that are seeking the government's assistance
are collective entities.
When viewed in this way, economic regulation by the government
does not involve a conflict between individual autonomy and
collective power at all, and the government is not-as Sunstein would
have it-paternalistically stepping in to protect individuals from the
excesses of private collective power. Rather, economic regulation
occurs in a context defined by competing spheres of economic power
which defend their collective interests by using very different
strengths and tools. In the famous New Deal cases, the relevant
collective interests were the large-scale economic forces of labor and
2 Sunstein, supra note 202, at 622.
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capital.88 In later years, the government was used by other fac-
tions-including consumers, environmentalists and even racial
minorities-to limit the power of collective private interests to
employ capital in ways that harmed or disadvantaged the faction
controlling the government. Again, the identity and interest of the
faction using the government to do its bidding is irrelevant. The
point is that in all these battles the government was not a disinter-
ested, paternalistic entity rising above ideological conflict to protect
"the common good" or "virtue" or even "individual autonomy."
When the government steps in to regulate economic affairs, it does
so on behalf of one economic faction and against another. When the
government regulates economic affairs, it is simply an enforcer of
one group's preexisting interests. That is, it enforces the interests of
one set of powerful political actors against an antagonistic group of
powerful economic actors.
Sunstein explains the Court's renunciation of Lochner in very
abstract terms, as the Court's recognition that "the existing distribu-
tion of resources and opportunities" is not "prepolitical."234 That
may be true, but there is a more down-to-earth explanation of
Lochner's demise that comes closer to explaining the lack of serious
opposition (either on or off the Court) to the Court's post-1937
abandonment of almost all judicially enforced constitutional limits on
government regulation of economic affairs.8 5 I submit that the
233 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the Fair Labor
Standards Act, which governs wages and hours in industries producing goods for
interstate commerce); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)
(upholding the National Labor Relations Act, which governs collective bargaining in
industries "affecting commerce"); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)
(overturning the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act, which governed wages, hours and
working conditions in the coal mining industry).
4 Sunstein, supra note 83, at 264.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624
(1995), does not indicate a radical shift in the Court's hands-off attitude toward
economic legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause. The key premise of the
Lopez decision is that the activity regulated in the Gun-Free School Zones Act was not
commercial in nature, and therefore did not fall within the ambit of the Commerce
Clause. See id. at 1630-31. Although this opinion clearly limits the scope of the
national government's power over noncommercial activities (to an as-yet undeter-
mined degree), and although the logic of the limitation is open to question, see id. at
1657-71 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that Congress could have determined that
violence in school zones would have an effect on the "quality of education" that would
result in a less effective education system, and so although the presence of a single
gun in a school might have nothing to do with interstate commerce, in the aggregate
the presence of guns there might create such an effect if all educational standards
were thereby reduced), Lopez does nothing to limit the federal government's
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nearly complete lack of concern expressed in Supreme Court
opinions since 1937 about the effects of allocating economic
regulatory power to the elected branches of government stems from
the Court's recognition that the basic principles of democracy are
not threatened by a system that permits large concentrations of
collective power to fight for advantage using all the natural tools at
their disposal.
In the most basic sense, major disputes over the regulation of
economic resources will almost always involve roughly the same
alignment: on one side will be the owner of an economic resource,
and on the other side will be some group that is potentially affected
by the owner's intended use of that resource. The owner will have
all the natural advantages that economic power brings-in essence,
the ability to buy support by promising benefits to nonowners-and
the group potentially affected will have the force of sheer numbers,
which in a democracy gives it a natural advantage because it entitles
it to gain control of the ultimate monopoly on coercive power
represented by the government.
Under this interpretation, the Supreme Court's renunciation of
Lochner was not about governmental paternalism, or the "public
interest," or any other grand, benign justification for government
action that attempts to place the government above the fray created
by competition among economic factions within society. On the
contrary, the Supreme Court's renunciation of Lochner allowed the
government to serve as a direct participant in battles for primacy over
the use of economic resources. In the post-Lochner era, the govern-
ment has become the designated agent of whatever faction can
muster the most political power through a democratic political
process, on the implicit assumption that whatever power sheer
numbers give to one faction will be counterbalanced by the influence
naturally flowing from the deployment of financial resources by the
economic elite.
Justice Holmes got it right in his Lochner dissent: In the
economic context, "the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment
is perverted when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a
dominant opinion."" 6 Like everything else the government does,
regulatory authority over admittedly commercial activities, and does not restrict state
regulatory authority at all. Therefore, Lopez does not augur a return to Lochner-style
constitutional restrictions on the use of government power to regulate economic
affairs.
I Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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economic regulation is about the assertion of power, not the
recognition of virtue or the identification of the "public inter-
est. "237 Despite the cynical trappings of this theory, it provides
much more direct support for the basic theory of democratic self-
governance than the seemingly more idealistic view proposed by
Sunstein. In Sunstein's view of a benign, paternalistic government
pursuing the common good, the beneficiaries of government
economic regulations are placed in the position of subservient but
thankful drones who are taught by the government (through the
government's careful inculcation of civic virtue) to appreciate their
powerful protector. In the harsher, Holmesian view of government
as a directly interested enforcer of one group's interests, the
beneficiaries of government regulation must be viewed as the active
agents of their own destinies, using all the power at their disposal to
realize their desires and protect themselves from their economic
adversaries.
If the government's role in regulating economic affairs in the
post-Lochner era is viewed from the Holmesian rather than the civic
republican perspective, then the flaws in Sunstein's view of the
government's role in regulating speech become evident. Unlike
economic regulation, which by definition involves battles between
large-scale, well-organized collective forces, government regulation
of speech continues to deal with a highly individualistic phenome-
237 In one of his discussions of Lochner Sunstein also quotes the Holmes passage
concerning "the natural outcome of a dominant opinion," but only to disagree with
Holmes's position as "an outgrowth of the very species of constitutional social
Darwinism that it purports to reject." Sunstein, supra note 181, at 879-80. Of course,
it is this same "social Darwinism" that led Holmes to protect free speech on the
ground that "[i]f in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are
destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning
of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way." Gitlow
v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Sunstein correctly
notes that Holmes's position (with which the arguments in the text are consistent)
"treats the political process as an unprincipled struggle among self-interested groups
for scarce social resources." Sunstein, supra note 181, at 880. Sunstein rejects this
model of society, as well as other, similarly pluralist social theories in favor of a
universalist model that "posit[s] the existence of a common good, to be found at the
conclusion of a well-functioning deliberative process." Sunstein, supra note 52, at
1554. If Sunstein's perspective is accurate, then virtually all constitutional constraints
on the government's enforcement of the "common good" seem unnecessary, or even
socially harmful. See Gey, supra note 51, at 841-64. It is my position that the cynical
but realistic perspective of Holmes provides (perhaps ironically) a much stronger
theoretical basis for restraining the totalitarian inclinations of a powerful government
than the well-intentioned but politically naive perfectionism of the civic republicans
and other postmodern censors.
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non, the nature of which has not changed since John Milton
published the Areopagitica in 1644.
Today, as in 1644, the government's objective when it regulates
speech is to control the thoughts of individuals by insulating those
individuals from ideas that the government disfavors. Usually the
immediate target of such regulation-the speaker, writer, singer,
dancer, etc.-will also be an individual, rather than a collective or
corporate entity. Even in situations where the government regulation
targets a speaker that is collective in nature-i.e., speech involving
collaborations by several authors, or speech sponsored or broadcast
by a corporation-the audience will always be composed of individual
citizens who must choose to adopt some ideas proposed by the
speaker and reject others. Participants in the market for speech can
"sell" their ideas only if individual listeners are willing to "buy" those
ideas. Unlike the economic area, in which consumers are forced to
buy and sell a certain number of products (housing, food, clothing)
merely to stay alive, "consumers" of speech can take themselves
entirely out of a particular market segment by refusing to "buy" any
of the products being offered by any of the "sellers" participating in
that segment.
In short, the speech market is different than the economic
market: In the speech market, the individual is still a viable market
participant, whereas in the economic market the individual is almost
totally subservient to collective forces that are, in a very concrete
sense, beyond the individual's control. In the economic market, the
individual mustjoin in collective action through the government (or
unions, or some other mechanism for gaining collective leverage
against collective economic interests) to assert control over his or her
own life. Collective action is an unavoidable means of self-protection
in the economic market. In the speech market, on the other hand,
such collective self-protection is unnecessary; individuals can protect
themselves sufficiently simply by exercising their own individual
prerogative about what they hear, view, read or believe.
Sunstein's only response to this argument, versions of which
appear throughout his work, is that the individual citizen has become
just as irrelevant to the speech market as a nonunionized individual
laborer has become in a large manufacturing industry. This theme
is evident in Sunstein's discussion of broadcast regulation.2 8 As
this discussion indicates, Sunstein believes that private collective
s See supra notes 204-19 and accompanying text.
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forces in the speech market have become such a powerful factor in
society that individuals can no longer rely on their own individual
judgment to effectively protect themselves against "bad" ideas.3 9
Instead, individuals must now rely on the government to provide
protection against ideas, in much the same way that the government
protects them against salmonella in raw chickens.
The simple answer to this argument is that it is fundamentally at
odds with the basic precepts of democracy itself. If individual
judgments have become so tainted by the speech of collective entities
that the individual cannot even be trusted to decide which television
shows to watch,240 then those same individuals certainly should not
be trusted to elect officials to run the most powerful country in the
world. By the same token, if Sunstein's view of corrupted popular
opinion is correct, then the government should feel no particular
obligation to respect popular opinion about complicated matters of
social and economic policy, since popular opinions on such subjects
are probably skewed by the influence of collective forces intentionally
manipulating public opinion in ways that disserve the common good.
z The previous section discusses Sunstein's views on the ominous and powerful
"broadcast status quo." See supra notes 213-19 and accompanying text. Owen Fiss
provides his own colorful rendition of this fearful beast:
[Tihe power of an agency, like the FCC, is no greater than that of CBS.
Terror comes in many forms. The powers of the FCC and CBS differ, one
regulates while the other edits, but there is no reason for believing that one
kind of power will be more inhibiting or limiting of public debate than the
other.
Fiss, supra note 197, at 787. The notion that any media outlet could ever be as
powerful a force in society as a government that controls the application of all
criminal and civil sanctions is dubious even in the abstract. In light of events in the
real world, the notion that CBS is a powerful embodiment of "terror" is laughable.
In one news article describing the recent purchase of CBS by the Westinghouse
Electric Corporation, the New York Times noted that "what [Westinghouse is] getting
for its money is a massive, ramshackle fixer-upper." Bill Carter, In Buying CBS
Westinghouse Takes On a Fixer-Upper, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1995, at Dl. The people who
run networks are much more realistic than law professors about the networks' present
and future potential for instilling "terror" in large portions of the population. In
1990, NBC president Robert Wright told an interviewer that
the networks, which now attract a little less than 60 percent of the potential
audience-and less than 50 percent in major markets-may see the overall
percentage drift "down into the upper 30s before we're finished. It's a
function of how aggressive the cable networks want to be in terms of
programming breadth. If they don't want to compete too much, then we
ought to be able to hang in there somewhere in the upper 30s-I think."
Washington Whispers, U.S. NEwS & WORLD REPORT,July 2, 1990, at 17 (Charles Fenyvesi
ed.).
240 See supra notes 204-19 and accompanying text.
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This conclusion is bolstered by the common perception that
individual opinions about politics and social issues are developed very
haphazardly by most people, and are seldom generated by the
carefully constructed process of "virtuous" civic republican delibera-
tion that Sunstein would prefer. But if (i) the people cannot be
trusted to vote, (ii) their opinions about public matters are haphaz-
ardly defined and probably tainted anyway, and (iii) these factors
mean that the government may essentially ignore popular opinion
until the public has been retrained through the collective inculcation
of "virtue," then Sunstein's arguments seem to propose that we
should move beyond democratic politics into a political system
completely incompatible with the basic premises of the Constitution.
Sunstein would undoubtedly deny that he is antidemocracy, and
in fact much that he has written is specifically focused on the goal of
increasing public participation in governmental affairs. But if this is
his goal, then he must abandon the claim that the government has
a role in "teaching virtue" to its citizens or in controlling the ideas
that those citizens speak or hear. For better or worse, the sine qua
non of democracy is still government by the people, flawed though
the people may be. There is simply no place in a truly democratic
regime for Sunstein's notion that "a democratic government should
sometimes take private preferences as an object of regulation and
control."
241
3. The Special Danger of Government Overreaching
in Speech Regulation
One of the central themes that distinguishes all postmodern
censorship doctrines from more speech-protective perspectives on
the First Amendment is the postmodernists' relative nonchalance
about the possibility of government overreaching in the regulation
of speech. On this score, Sunstein at least gives occasional lip-service
to the fear of government overreaching. 2 2 Although he argues
that post-Lochner constitutional analysis should be extended to the
First Amendment, at least he does not propose relegating speech to
242 Sunstein, supra note 63, at 13.
2 pically, Sunstein raises these concerns only to explain them away with regard
to a particular type of especially dangerous or harmful speech. See, e.g., Sunstein,
supra note 202, at 626 ("In the [F]irst [A]mendment setting, fears about difficult
intermediate cases and misapplication are generally salutary. But at least in the
context of pornography, they have proved a barrier to legislation that would in all
likelihood do more good than harm.").
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the constitutional wasteland of rational-relationship analysis that is
now applied to economic regulations . 43  Sunstein's proposals,
however, reduce significantly the protection for speech that fails to
meet his test of "whether the speech is a contribution to social
deliberation," 244 and the remaining protections for "low-level
speech" would evaporate altogether if the government "can show a
good reason and a solid connection between the means of regulation
and the reason in question." 245 Thus, despite his periodic protesta-
tions to the contrary, Sunstein shares the general postmodern
confidence that the government should be trusted to make sensitive
decisions about censoring antisocial speech.
As is probably obvious by this point, the subtext of this Article is
that such blind trust of government censors is wholly unwarranted.
The most telling cause for skepticism of Sunstein's trusting attitude
is that case reporters are filled with hundreds, if not thousands, of
opinions illustrating how badly governments can misjudge the value
and potential danger of antisocial speech. In the political speech
category, we have examples ranging from the early Espionage Act
cases246 to the Pentagon Papers decision in the Vietnam era.
247
In the area of social and artistic speech (which is where Sunstein
would greatly increase the government's power to dictate "virtue" by
regulating private expression), we have embarrassing episodes
involving the successful suppression of novels such as God's Little
Acre 48 and An American Tragedy49 in the early-to-mid-twentieth
century. More recent, and perhaps equally embarrassing, are the
government's somewhat less successful efforts to suppress works such
as Robert Mapplethorpe's photographs,
25 ° 2 Live Crew's music, 251
24 See Sunstein, supra note 83, at 267.
244 Id. at 309.
245 Id. at 310.
246 SeeAbrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (affirming a conviction under
the Act for engaging in antiwar speech); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919)
(same); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919) (affirming a conviction under
the Act for distribution of antidraft literature); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47
(1919) (same).
21 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam)
(reversing the Second Circuit's approval of an injunction against the publication of
the "Pentagon Papers").
21 See Attorney Gen. v. Book Named "God's Little Acre," 93 N.E.2d 819 (Mass.
1950) (upholding an obscenity conviction for the sale of the book).
24 See Commonwealth v. Friede, 171 N.E. 472, 474 (Mass. 1930) (upholding an
obscenity conviction for the sale of Dreiser's novel, "even assuming great literary
excellence, artistic worth and an impelling moral lesson in the story").
250 See Isabel Wilkerson, Cincinnati Jury Acquits Museum in Mapplethorpe Obscenity
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and the painting of a Chicago Art Institute student who had the
audacity to parody the mayor of Chicago." 2 This list, to put it
mildly, is not comprehensive.
Sunstein undoubtedly would argue that he does not endorse any
of these government actions to suppress valuable speech. Indeed, he
specifically argues that the work of Robert Mapplethorpe should be
protected because it "has the characteristics of social comment-
ary."253 According to Sunstein, Mapplethorpe's work "attempts to
draw into question current sexual norms and practices, and.., bears
on such issues as the right to privacy and the antidiscrimination
principle."254 This is comforting but confusing, since precisely the
same thing can be said about pornography, the regulation of which
Sunstein has advocated for many years.25 ' For purposes of deter-
mining the legitimacy of government suppression, how do we
distinguish between two sexually explicit expressive works that each
call into question current sexual norms? We do not. Under
Sunstein's system, we let the government do it-except that Sunstein
seems to believe that the government officials in Cincinnati got it
wrong. Then again, given the vagueness of Sunstein's standard
(exactly what constitutes "social commentary," anyway?) and his
deferential attitude toward the government inculcation of values, is
it not possible that under the Sunstein standard, Cincinnati got the
Mapplethorpe issue right and Sunstein got it wrong?
The reason why neither Cincinnati nor Sunstein can be deemed
"right" about the value of Mapplethorpe's work is that such a
Case, N.Y TIMEs, Oct. 6, 1990, at Al.
251 SeeLuke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 .2d 134 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
1022 (1992). The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's ruling that the album
"As Nasty As They Wanna Be" was obscene, based in part on the district judge's
finding that although most music "is sufficiently subjective that reasonable persons
could disagree as to its meaning[,] ... music of the 'rap' genre focuses upon verbal
messages accentuated by a strong beat. It is an appeal to 'dirty' thoughts and the
loins, not to the intellect and the mind." Skywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F.
Supp 578, 591 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
22 See Nelson v. Streeter, 16 F.Sd 145 (7th Cir. 1994) (upholding lower court
decision that city aldermen who removed a student's painting of a former mayor
wearing women's underwear were not entitled to official immunity from an action for
a civil rights violation).
I Sunstein, supra note 83, at 308.
M id.
I See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 83, at 309 ("[T] he question is whether the speech
is a contribution to social deliberation, not whether it has political effects or sources.
Thus, for example, there is a distinction between a misogynist tract, which is entitled
to full protection, and pornographic movies.... ."); Sunstein, supra note 202, at 591-
602 (discussing the harms of pornography).
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conclusion depends on determinations concerning social, aesthetic,
and moral values about which citizens of a democracy may legiti-
mately disagree. This is why a system affording the government
greater deference to gauge the value of speech is so dangerous.
Such a system will always dissolve into a raw power-grab by factions
seeking to control the government and its ability (authorized and
encouraged under the civic republican system) to inculcate values in
the citizenry. This power-grab will, in turn, generate a great deal of
self-serving intellectual sleight-of-hand concerning what is considered
"social commentary," "political" or-once we permit government to
regulate speech on the basis of moral or social harms- a "harm"25
In his discussion of broadcast regulation, Sunstein sums up his
general approach to the subject of government regulation of private
speech by noting that "the interest in legally protected private
autonomy from government is not always connected with the interest
in democratic self-governance."5 7 This is the sum and substance
of Sunstein's attack on the public/private distinction. Of course,
Sunstein's alternative to "legally protected private autonomy from
government" would subject private autonomy to direct and extensive
public control through the government.2 58 No matter how much
this alternative is sugar-coated, the basic truth remains that, under
such a system, politically powerful individuals and groups would be
able to impose their views on the rest of society to an extent unheard
of in the present constitutional regime. Sunstein is able to live with
this result because he seems to view government (in the good civic
republican tradition) as an ideologically pure body, aloof from the
dirty realities of self-interest, self-dealing, self-aggrandizement and
self-deception that plague the nongovernmental sectors of collective
human activity. If this blithely benign conception of government is
inaccurate-as I believe it demonstrably is-then Sunstein's deferen-
tial approach to speech regulation is hopelessly flawed.
I For the Meese Commission's contribution to the debate over "harm" vis-a-vis
sexually explicit speech, see ATTORNEY GEN. COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, U.S. DEPT.
OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 303 (1986) ("[W]e certainly reject the view that the only
noticeable harm is one that causes physical or financial harm to identifiable
individuals. An environment, physical, cultural, moral, or aesthetic, can be harmed,
and so can a community, organization, or group be harmed independent of
identifiable harms to members of that community.").
Sunstein, supra note 83, at 277.
mId.
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III. POSTMODERN CENSORSHIP AND EGAUTARIAmSM
The third major cornerstone of postmodern censorship theory is
the notion that constitutional restrictions on the regulation of
antisocial speech should be reduced substantially to permit the
government to advance the competing goals of racial, gender and
social equality. There are several implicit assertions embedded
within this claim. The first implicit claim of this equality theme
asserts that the existence of speech advocating inequality is equiva-
lent to inequality itself. This notion builds on the first and second
themes of postmodern censorship theory discussed in previous
sections-that speech about the world "constructs" the world, and
that private speech should not be distinguished from public speech.
The second implicit premise of the equality theme asserts that the
term "equality" has a definitive meaning, which the government is
capable of ascertaining and enforcing through legislation directed
against speech that contravenes, opposes or rejects the government's
definition of the term. The third implicit premise posits that the
First Amendment is limited by the spirit, if not the letter, of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Thus, the postmodern
censors propose to alter the constitutional landscape by insisting that
constitutional amendments enacted subsequent to the adoption of
the First Amendment have carved out an area of speech about
"equality," which should be afforded reduced First Amendment
protection.
Of the three main themes of postmodern censorship theory
discussed in this Article, the equality theme is the most straightfor-
ward. By positing a direct conflict between free speech and equality,
the postmodern censors are proposing nothing more radical than a
traditional balancing test, under which the government would be
permitted to make difficult judgments about two very important but
competing social values. Many of the equality theme's implicit
premises have been addressed already in the previous sections of this
Article. The remaining elements of the equality theme follow a
pattern common to most constitutional balancing analyses. Thus, a
few examples of the equality theme from the three main strains of
postmodern censorship theory are sufficient to illustrate the
problems inherent in this aspect of the theory.
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A. The Details of the Equality Theme in Postmodern
Censorship Theory
The starting point for discussions of the equality theme in post-
modern censorship literature is the claim that current constitutional
doctrine contains a fundamental and possibly irreconcilable conflict
between free speech and equality. As Charles Lawrence states the
problem: "At the center of the controversy is a tension between the
constitutional values of free speech and equality."259 Catharine
MacKinnon is even more pointed: "The law of equality and the law
of freedom of speech are on a collision course in this country."2"
The postmodernists do not merely view free speech as inconsis-
tent with equality, but actually as a threat to equality in the sense that
speech is used as a weapon to subjugate racial minorities, women and
members of other outsider groups. From the postmodernists'
perspective, free speech is notjust an obstacle to solving the problem
of social inequality, free speech is the problem (or at least a large
part of it). For example, "[c]ross burning inflicts its harm through
its meaning as an act which promotes racial inequality through its
message and impact, engendering terror and effectuating segrega-
tion. Its damages to equality rights [are] not symbolic but real."26
Likewise, "[p] ornography is the material means of sexualizing
inequality; and that is why pornography is a central practice in the
subordination of women.
'26 2
The postmodernists couple the notion that equality and free
speech are competing, and probably irreconcilable concepts, with the
argument that the courts have seriously misconstrued the proper
balance between the two values. In short, the value of free speech
has been given too much deference by the courts in deciding
difficult cases where equality is an issue.
[T] he First Amendment has grown as if a commitment to speech
were no part of a commitment to equality and as if a commitment
to equality had no implications for the law of speech-as if the
upheaval that produced the Reconstruction Amendments did not
move the ground under the expressive freedom, setting new limits
I Lawrence, supra note 12, at 434.
260 MACKINNON, supra note 46, at 71.
26 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography as Defamation and Discrimination, 71 B.U.
L. REv. 793. 805-06 (1991).262 Andrea Dworkin, Against the Male Flood: Censorship, Pornography, and Equality,
8 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 1, 15 (1985).
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and mandating new extensions, perhaps even demanding recon-
struction of the speech right itself.
263
In contrast, the postmodernists would alter the constitutional
equation by emphasizing values of equality much more heavily as a
justification for imposing additional government restrictions on
speech. In fact, postmodernists "see equality as a precondition to
free speech, and [they] place more weight on the side of the balance
aimed at the removal of the badges and incidents of slavery that
continue to flourish in our culture."
261
The postmodernists' concept of a stark antagonism between
equality and free speech leads them to conclude that the courts have
rejected the value of equality by protecting private speech that the
postmodernists consider racist or sexist. According to MacKinnon,
"there never has been a fair fight in the United States between
equality and speech as two constitutional values, equality supporting
a statute or practice, speech challenging it.... [P]ornography
ordinances and hate crime provisions fail constitutional scrutiny that
they might, with constitutional equality support survive."2 65
The postmodern censors explain the courts' rejection of equality
by attributing to the courts a combination of bad faith and negative
social conditioning. For example, MacKinnon asserts that
it was the prospect of losing access to pornography that impelled
the social and legal development of absolutism as a bottom line for
the First Amendment, as well as occasional bursts of passionate
eloquence on behalf of speech per se: if we can't have this, they
seem to say, what can we have?266
In the same vein, Lawrence suggests that "our unconscious racism
causes us (even those of us who are the direct victims of racism), to
view the [F]irst [A]mendment as the 'regular' amendment-an
amendment that works for all people-and the equal protection
clause and racial equality as a special-interest amendment important
to groups that are less valued."
267
The most extensive discussion of what the postmodernists view as
the psychology of free speech protection appears in Richard
263 MACKINNON, supra note 46, at 71.
26 Lawrence, supra note 12, at 467.
265 MAcKINNON, supra note 46, at 85.
266 Id. at 89.
267 Lawrence, supra note 12, at 474-75; see also Matsuda, supra note 29, at 2374-75
(arguing that "[1] egal protection of racism is seen in... the refusal to recognize the
competing values of liberty and equality at stake in the case of hate speech").
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Delgado's work. In one article, Delgado and coauthorJean Stefancic
argue that "[s]peech and equality are not separate values, but rather
opposite sides of the same coin. Their interdependence arises
because they are integral aspects of a more basic phenomenon,
namely the interpretive community. "2' According to this view,
communication depends on a shared set of values, perceptions and
meanings that define the interpretive community. "Without such an
interpretive community, communication is impossible." 2 9  The
problem with First Amendment protection of free speech, Delgado
and Stefancic assert, is that the Amendment's central value is
provided by an interpretive community that excludes everyone but
white males: "Blacks, women, gays and lesbians, and others were not
part of the speech community that framed the Constitution and Bill
of Rights.... Later, when they did speak, their speech was deemed
incoherent, self-interested, worthy of scorn." 270 In this and other
articles, Delgado argues that the linkage between the white male
interpretive community and free speech is so strong that the First
Amendment provides very little value to groups that are not part of
the power structure. "[T]he history of the First Amendment, as well
as the current landscape of doctrinal exceptions, shows that it is far
more valuable to the majority than to the minority, far more useful
for confining change than for propelling it."
271
In the end, Delgado and the other postmodernists always return
to the social constructionist argument to prove their point.
According to Delgado,
racism is, in almost all its aspects, a class harm-the essence of
which is subordination of one people by another. The mechanism
of this subordination is a complex, interlocking series of acts, some
physical, some symbolic. Although the physical acts (like lynchings
and cross burnings) are often the most striking, the symbolic acts
are the most insidious.
72
MacKinnon uses similar comparisons: "Pornography is not an idea
any more than segregation or lynching are ideas, although both
institutionalize the idea of the inferiority of one group to anoth-
2 6 Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 158, at 856.
269 Id.
270 Id. at 862.
n Delgado & Yun, supra note 95, at 883.
1 Delgado, supra note 138, at 383-84.
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er.... In a feminist perspective, pornography is the essence of a
sexist social order, its quintessential social act."
2"3
The postmodernist response to this dilemma is to reduce both
equality and free speech to what Delgado calls conflicting "narra-
tives. "274 This approach manages to trivialize both equality and free
speech by turning them into the plots of different "stories." Which
of these rights gets respected depends on whose story gets told. And
whose story gets told depends almost entirely on who has the power
to command the platform provided by the government. Delgado is
very clear about this position:
My view is that both stories are equally valid. Judges and
university administrators have no easy, a priori way of choosing
between them, of privileging one over the other. They could coin
an exception to free speech, thus giving primacy to the equal
protection values at stake. Or, they could carve an exception to
equality, saying in effect that universities may protect minority
populations except where this abridges speech. Nothing in
constitutional or moral theory requires one answer rather than the
other. Social science, case law, and the experience of other nations
provide some illumination. But ultimately, judges and university
administrators must choose.2
Delgado wrote this statement in the context of discussing
constitutional challenges to university speech codes. But the same
analysis would necessarily apply to other government efforts to
regulate speech. This approach thus returns us to the thread that
unifies all the disparate themes of postmodern censorship theory:
Postmodern censorship theory--like all other theories urging that
the government should be permitted to regulate speech extensively-
ultimately amounts to little more than an apologia for the free
application of political power to squelch dissent. This entire Article
is an attempt to challenge the wisdom of that view, but a few specific
points with respect to the particulars of the postmodernists' equality
theme are warranted here. 6
273 MACKiNNON, supra note 37, at 204.
' Delgado, supra note 138, at 346-47.
27 Id. at 348 (citations omitted).
I have focused in this section on the critical race and feminist variants of
postmodern censorship theory. I leave aside the civic republican version of the theory
because Professor Sunstein has expressed some reluctance to rely as strongly on
equality arguments as his fellow postmodernists. See Sunstein, supra note 88, at 300
n.137; Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 811-12 (1993)
thereinafter Words, Conduct, Caste]. He expresses skepticism, with which I concur, that
the government could ever make judgments about relative power relationships that
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B. The Flaws in the Postmodern Censors'
Speech/Equality Dichotomy
Previous sections of this Article have dealt with the questionable
theoretical underpinnings of the equality theme in postmodern
censorship theory, in particular, the social constructionist arguments
discussed in Part I. This section focuses on three other flaws-partly
were sufficiently reliable tojustify "redistributing" speech. Sunstein, supra note 83, at
300 n.137. He also notes that:
we should regard a decision to silence the views of the powerful as an
objectionable interference with freedom, even if it might promote the goal
of equality. Well-off people might not have any strong claim of right to
distributions of wealth and property that the common law grants them; but
surely they have a right to complain if they are silenced.
Id.
Although I shall not pursue the matter beyond this footnote, I note in passing
two reasons why Sunstein's seeming concession to the value of free speech is not
entirely reassuring. First, the passage quoted in the preceding paragraph is
inconsistent with the overriding theme of the article in which that passage appears.
The theme of that article is that the post-Lochner regulatory model should be applied
to speech markets as well as economic markets. After having advocated collapsing the
constitutional treatment of speech into the constitutional treatment of economic
regulation, it is odd to have Sunstein suddenly endorsing what he calls "the most
conventional Millian arguments for the distinctiveness of speech." Id.
Second, although in several articles Sunstein refuses specifically to rely on an
equality argument to offset claims of free speech, he often hedges his bets. For
example, in one article, after criticizing the equality argument, he notes that "[m]uch
remains to be done on this difficult subject," Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, supra, at
812, and then concludes that same article by making a specific overture to the equality
argument:
I suggest that narrow and well-defined legal controls on pornography and
hate speech are simply part of the attack on systems of racial and gender
caste. If they are understood in this light, and if they are appropriately
narrow and clear, they can operate without making significant intrusions
into a well-functioning system of free expression.
Id. at 844. In another article he translates the equality argument into "harm" terms,
which permits him to avoid the difficulty of confronting the equality/free speech
balance proposed directly by critical race and feminist postmodern theorists:
A third harmful effect of pornography stems from the role it plays as a
conditioning factor in the lives of both men and women. Pornography acts
as a filter through which men and women perceive gender roles and
relationships between the sexes.... The connection between inequality,
unlawful discrimination, and pornography cannot be firmly established. But
pornography undeniably reflects inequality, and through its reinforcing
power, helps to perpetuate it.
Sunstein, supra note 202, at 601.
All of this sounds a lot like the other versions of the equality argument, and to
the extent that Sunstein intends to endorse these views, the criticisms of the argument
in the text applies to his version as well.
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logical and partly practical in nature-in the postmodernists' equality
arguments. First, if the structure of the postmodernists' argument is
correct, then why should the courts not consider constitutional
interests other than equality as potential justifications for reducing
First Amendment protection of antisocial speech? Second, if the
constitutional interest in equality can be used to reduce the
protections offered individuals under the First Amendment, why
should the same constitutional interest not also reduce the individu-
al-rights protections offered by other parts of the Bill of Rights?
Third, how can the postmodernists be sure that their view of the
relationship between speech and equality is the correct one?
Moreover, how can they be sure that their allies will be able to
maintain the necessary political power to impose their particular view
of equality indefinitely?
1. The Balance of Constitutional Interests
and the Demise of the First Amendment
The core of the postmodernists' equality argument is the claim
that the First Amendment is only one constitutional interest and
should not be given precedence over equally important constitutional
interests embodied in the Reconstruction Amendments. The
postmodernists do not argue that equality should itself be given
preeminent status under the Constitution, but only that the political
branches should be permitted to consider equality values on the
same level as First Amendment values when enacting legislation
regulating speech. The postmodernists do not need to go beyond
this argument because, having leveled the field of constitutional
rights so that all constitutional interests are treated identically,
government officials may, to use Delgado's phrase, simply "choose"
which interests the government wants to prefer.277
The problem with this argument is that the government may not
necessarily choose the interests the postmodernists favor. If all
constitutional interests are equivalent, and if the courts should no
longer consider the special functions served by particular constitu-
tional rights when those functions interfere with the realization of
other constitutional goals, then what is to keep the relevant officials
from choosing any one of many other constitutional interests to
offset the claims made on behalf of political and social dissenters
seeking refuge under the First Amendment? The most prominent
2" See Delgado, supra note 138, at 348.
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interests that spring to mind are those related to national security.
Combine the President's constitutional authority as Commander-in-
Chief with Congress's war powers, apply the same logic used by the
postmodernists to argue that antiwar speech advocating draft evasion
significantly impedes the realization of constitutionally authorized
social goals relating to armed conflict, and suddenly the 1919
Espionage Act decisions 278 no longer seem like dusty historical arti-
facts of a more repressive political era. Just as the postmodernists
"see equality as a precondition to free speech, and ... place more
weight on that side of the balance, "279 many people in and out of
government undoubtedly would view constitutional authority relating
to national security as a precondition to free speech and place more
weight on that side of the balance.
The postmodernist equality argument in favor of an outright
balancing approach to constitutional rights is not illogical, but its
logic extends far beyond the postmodernists' own most cherished
values. As soon as the free speech protection of the First Amend-
ment is relegated to the status of one undifferentiated value among
many, then any number of contrary values may be proposed as a
justification for suppressing or sanctioning speech that contravenes
a value favored by the government. Speech advocating violent labor
action or socialist activism arguably impedes Congress's ability to
regulate commerce (i.e., capitalist commerce) among the states;
speech ridiculing the judicial system harms the federal courts'
constitutional authority to command the respect they need to
effectuate their judgments; advocacy of civil disobedience under-
mines the very notion of constitutional government, which must be
defended for any of the more specific constitutional powers to serve
their proper functions. According to the postmodernists' logic, the
government should be permitted to suppress the speech involved in
all of these examples to preserve the government's constitutional
powers over commerce, the judiciary and democratic governance in
general.
The postmodernists' logic also leads to another odd conclusion.
If constitutional rights are no longer to be interpreted in light of
their peculiar function in the political system, and instead are subject
to being balanced by the government, ad hoc, against other
constitutional values, then the government seemingly could free itself
27 See supra note 246.
21 Lawrence, supra note 12, at 467.
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from its obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment simply by
deciding to "choose" to emphasize some constitutional value other
than equality. And in their defense, these newly empowered
legislators could simply quote Delgado: "Nothing in constitutional
or moral theory requires one answer rather than the other."28 The
choice is theirs to make, which is to say: Power is everything.
2. The Preeminence of Equality and the
Demise of the Bill of Rights
There is a way around the dilemma of the leveled Constitution.
The postmodernists could redefine their theory to include the
assertion that the First Amendment must give way to equality because
equality is the preeminent constitutional value. This is inconsistent
with much of what the postmodernists explicitly assert about the
equality theme, but it is consistent with the general tenor of those
discussions, which clearly are intended to increase the value of
equality arguments in constitutional disputes over antisocial speech.
It is also consistent with statements to the effect that "equality [is] a
precondition to free speech, '21 which appear frequently in the
postmodern censorship literature.
But this approach poses even more problems than the leveling
approach to constitutional values. If equality is reconstituted as a
constitutional trump card, which prevails every time it comes into
conflict with another constitutional value, then virtually the entire
range of liberty values protected by the Constitution are put at risk.
The question is this: If the postmodernist conception of constitu-
tional equality is sufficient to reduce the protection of the First
Amendment, then why is it not also sufficient to reduce the protec-
tions of other amendments as well? Thus, the warrant requirement
of the Fourth Amendment could be eliminated, or at least moderat-
ed, whenever the police had "good faith" suspicion that pornography
was on a bookshelf inside a dwelling, or that a group of Nazi's was
meeting at someone's house to discuss their theories of racial
superiority. Likewise, the protection against self-incrimination
provided by the Fifth Amendment might be eliminated for someone
who was being asked to confess to membership in a racist group. Or
perhaps prosecutors would be permitted to comment on a racist's
refusal to take the stand to defend himself against charges brought
280 Delgado, supra note 138, at 348.
281 Lawrence, supra note 12, at 467.
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under a hate-crimes statute. Or-to take this argument to a
(hopefully) absurd end-the Eighth Amendment's restrictions on
cruel and unusual punishments could be lowered just a bit for
someone convicted of a hate crime. After all, if the First Amend-
ment's embodiment of liberty, privacy and autonomy values may be
sacrificed when they become impediments to the realization of
equality, then the same should be true of those same values as
embodied in other parts of the Bill of Rights.
The obvious problem here is that if the government is permitted
to enact legislation pursuing equality through warrantless invasions
of individual residences, or coerced confessions, or even torture,
then we have converted the pursuit of a positive social value into a
recipe for political tyranny. This is the major failing of the postmod-
ernist censorship scheme in general, and the equality theme in
particular: The theory fails to take into account the structural
importance of the constitutional limitations on the use of political
power for any end-even good ones. The end does not always justify
the means, because the use of tyrannical means will often corrupt the
end. Which brings us to the third problem with the equality theme:
Having freed the government to pursue "equality," how can the
postmodernists ensure that the government will always choose to
pursue the correct form of "equality?"
3. The First Amendment Value of Equality
Equality means many things to many people. Affirmative action
provides one obvious illustration-both opponents and proponents
of affirmative action purport to defend "equality." Neither side of
the affirmative action debate is wrong or intellectually dishonest in
appealing to "equality" to support their position; the two sides of the
debate merely define the term differently. In the context of
affirmative action, the concept of "equality" merely sets the debate
in motion, it cannot settle the issue.
The postmodernists use the term "equality" in a very specific
manner. The key to the postmodernists' version of equality is that
it is a group right, rather than an individual right. In other words,
unlike traditional, "formal" equality, which proposes that different
individuals should be treated equally, the postmodernists pursue a
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vision of equality that requires different groups to be treated
equally." 2 The postmodernists acknowledge that the requirements
of individual equality and group equality will often conflict. Thus,
it is not difficult for the postmodernists to articulate circumstances
in which free speech-by definition an individual right-will
interfere with the concept of equality defined in terms of social,
racial or gender groups. This is the source of the postmodernist
claim that there is some inescapable "tension between the constitu-
tional values of free speech and equality."8 ' Like all claims con-
cerning equality, however, the postmodernists' definition of the term
is subject to debate, and in order to prevail in their efforts to under-
mine traditional First Amendment protections, the postmodern
censors must establish that their group-based model of equality
should be applied to the sphere of intellectual freedom and
expression.
Clarifying the meaning of "equality" removes a great deal of the
rhetorical force behind postmodern censorship theory. It is one
thing to paint your opponents as willing to sacrifice "equality" for
mere speech. It is quite another to muster support for the notion
that individual freedom must be sacrificed for the sake of group
social parity of undefined dimensions. The postmodernists'
rhetorical position is also weakened when confronted with the strong
connotation of equality inherent in First Amendment law itself.
Contrary to the postmodemists' claims that free speech protec-
tions are intrinsically opposed to "equality," the concept of equality
is at the very core of modem First Amendment jurisprudence. For
many years, the Supreme Court has been very explicit about
protecting intellectual equality: "There is an 'equality of status in the
218 Lawrence recently drew this distinction between the traditional interpretation
of equality and his view. His view
is to think of racial equality as a substantive societal condition rather than
as an individual right. The substantive approach sees the disestablishment
of ideologies and systems of racial subordination as indispensable and
prerequisite to individual human dignity and equality. The nonsubstantive
approach sees the individual right to be treated without reference to one's
race as primary. This individualist right is asserted unconstrained by
reference to continuing societal conditions of inequality and it is privileged
in relation to the eradication of those conditions. This privileging of
individual rights over the goal of systemic change is what leads process
theorists to see affirmative action as an "extraordinary remedy."
Charles R. Lawrence HI, Foreword: Race, Multiculturalism, and the Jurisprudence of
Transformation, 47 STAN. L. REV. 819, 824-25 (1995) (citation omitted).
283 Lawrence, supra note 12, at 434.
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field of ideas,' and government must afford all points of view an
equal opportunity to be heard."284 This is the basis for the strong
First Amendment presumption against content-based regulation of
speech,285 and the even stronger rule prohibiting government
action discriminating against particular viewpoints. 286  The effect
of these rules is to limit sharply the power of political majorities to
punish the speech of those who do not have political power. These
rules have the effect of equalizing the political playing field by
providing benefits to those whose relatively weak political standing
would not enable them to obtain those benefits otherwise. These
egalitarian principles within First Amendment jurisprudence thus
demonstrate that defending the value of free speech does not
necessarily entail a renunciation of "equality" because the modern
understanding of free speech is itself defined by equality.
Of course, this argument depends on an individualistic notion of
"equality," with which the postmodernists disagree. But the First
Amendment treatment of equality is not as far afield from the
concerns expressed by postmodern censors as those theorists might
have us believe. In particular, the First Amendment concern with
equality is almost exclusively focused on the need to protect outsiders
to the political process from oppressive applications of power by
those who dominate the political process-which presumably is also
the primary concern of the postmodernists.
The postmodernists claim that this First Amendment guarantee
of equality in fact protects only a false equality because this guaran-
tee ignores the inequality inherent in a physical reality in which
"free" speech cannot truly exist. According to Catharine
MacKinnon's version of this point, for example, existing constitu-
tional doctrines "show virtually total insensitivity to the damage done
to social equality by expressive means and a substantial lack of
recognition that some people get a lot more speech than others."
28 7
This contention is subject to dispute on several levels.
Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (quoting MEIKLEJOHN, supra note
202, at 27) (overturning an ordinance prohibiting certain types of picketing in front
of schools).
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) ("Content-based
regulations are presumptively invalid.").
21 "Viewpoint discrimination is... an egregious form of content discrimination.
The government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating
ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the
restriction." Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2516 (1995)
(invalidating a University's decision not to provide funding to a Christian newspaper).
287 MACKINNON, supra note 46, at 72.
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First, even if the postmodernist portrayal of private reality is
correct, it is unclear how they would prevent that unequal private
reality from reconstituting itself in a much more powerful form
through control of the government. If the protections of the First
Amendment were significantly reduced, as the postmodernlsts
propose, nothing would prevent the very same political factions that
have created the current social reality from gaining control of the
government and using their newly enhanced authority over speech
to entrench the present social system even more deeply by silencing
the dissent of their opponents. Unless MacKinnon and the other
postmodern censors are certain that they could command a
perpetual political majority in this historically conservative country,
it would be political suicide to dismantle one of the primary means
(i.e., constitutionally protected free speech) by which they can try to
force at least incremental change in the status quo.
Second, the postmodern claims on behalf of "equality" are
asserted as if there is no room for honest debate about either the
precise contours of this social objective, or the means for achieving
it. The postmodernists assert in absolutist terms that the types of
speech with which they disagree are unprotected because they are
"wrong""' or "false,"8 9 and that claims to the contrary are noth-
ing more than the product of "unconscious racism."290 The self-
certainty of the postmodern censors on the subject of equality says
something very disturbing about how they would behave if they ever
obtained real political power in the absence of constitutional limits
on the exercise of that power. Accusations of "collaboration" come
a little too easily to the lips of the postmodern censors.2 91 If the
history of speech regulation has taught us anything, it is that citizens
in a democracy should be both skeptical and fearful of well-intended
true believers who seek to give themselves unfettered power to
remake the world.
Finally, the notion that the postmodernists are defending true,
"concrete" equality against the false and inherently oppressive
"abstract" reality292 of modern First Amendment jurisprudence does
s Matsuda, supra note 29, at 2380.
's MACKINNON, supra note 46, at 107.
n0 Lawrence, supra note 12, at 475; see also Matsuda, supra note 29, at 2374-75
(arguing that "[1] egal protection of racism is seen in... the refusal to recognize the
competing values of liberty and equality at stake in the case of hate speech").
291 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, On Collaboration, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra
note 34, at 198-205 (attacking feminist lawyers who oppose her antipornography
stance).
m See MACKINNON, supra note 46, at 109 (suggesting that the current model of
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not accurately describe how the system of free speech protection
actually works. A particularly egregious manifestation of this
inaccuracy is Richard Delgado's claim that modern First Amendment
doctrine is the product of an interpretive community dominated by
white males, which has generated a constitutional right that is "far
more valuable to the majority than to the minority."2 9
One wonders how compelling Ken Saro-Wiwa would have found
such claims.294  Or Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.295  Or Zhang
Yimou. 29 6 None of these political and artistic dissidents are (or, in
free speech be replaced with one in which "principle will be defended in terms of
specific experiences, the particularity of history, substantively rather than abstractly").
Delgado & Yun, supra note 95, at 883.
Mr. Saro-Wiwa was a prominent Nigerian poet, newspaper columnist and
environmentalist, who spoke out for many years as one of the Nigerian government's
most effective critics. He was hanged by the government last year, after being
convicted on murder charges that are widely assumed to have been fabricated as a way
of permanently silencing Nigeria's foremost dissident. See Howard W. French, N4geria
Executes Critic of Regime: Nations Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1995, at Al. According
to reports from Nigeria, Mr. Saro-Wiwa was starved for three days before being
executed. See Cameron Duodu, Hanged Activists Were Starved, OBSERvER, Nov. 19, 1995,
at 24. Because of "faulty equipment," it took the Nigerian hangman five attempts to
kill Mr. Saro-Wiwa. See Bob Drogin. Mandela to Seek OilEmbargo Against Nigeia Military
Regime, LA TIMES, Nov. 16, 1995, atA12. A testament to the ease of silencing writers,
and yet to the futility of government attempts to silence their work, Mr. Saro-Wiwa's
famous antiwar novel Sozaboy was published in the United States in 1994 and is still
in print.
191 Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi is the leader of the democracy movement in Myanmar.
Detained by her government under house arrest for six years, she was finally released
in July 1995. See Philip Shenon, Head of Democratic Opposition Is Released by Burmese
Military, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1995, at Al. Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi's opponents in the
government of Myanmar are more amenable than she is to the postmodemist position
on civil liberties such as free speech. At a meeting of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations, Myanmar Foreign Minister, U Ohn Gyaw, stated: "We respect the
norms and the ideals of human rights... [b]ut as in any other country in Southeast
Asia, we have to take into consideration our culture, our history, our ethos. What is
good in other countries cannot be good in our country." Seth Mydans, BurmeseJunta
Seems Headed for Showdown, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1996, atA2. Underscoring the Foreign
Minister's point, in September 1996 the Myanmar government once again blockaded
Ms. Aung San Suu Kyi's house, prevented her from making her weekly address to the
nation, and arrested hundreds of her supporters. See Seth Mydans, Burmese Military
Tightens Crack Down on Democracy Leader, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1996, at A5.
I Mr. Zhang is a Chinese film director, who was "requested" by his government
to drop his plans to attend the New York Film Festival in 1995 because the festival
intended to show a documentary about the government's attack on students in
Tiananmen Square. See William Grimes, Beijing Thwarts U.S. Film Festival, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 27, 1995, at Cll. This is only the latest sanction that the Chinese government
has imposed on Zhang. The government has deemed Zhang's film "Ju Dou" unfit for
Chinese audiences because of its sexual content, and to date, neither that film nor
"Raise the Red Lantern" has been released in China. See id. The government
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the case of Mr. Saro-Wiwa, were) Euro-American males, but each one
of them has been forced to understand at the most basic level the
reality of a political system that is unburdened by the structural
protections of individual liberty-protections that the postmodernists
find so unnecessary and culture-bound. Postmodernist claims to the
contrary, these examples demonstrate that there is nothing about the
excessive use of power over intellectual activity (or personal freedom
generally) that is tied to any particular "interpretive community."297
Dissidents of every political tendency and every race in every
community of the world suffer in exactly the same way when they are
subjected to the unconstrained application of raw political power.
A constitutional system that prevents the majority from bringing the
entire force of the state down on one lone dissenter because of that
dissenter's speech cannot plausibly be described as a system that is
"far more useful for confining change than for propelling it."298
Just ask the widow of Ken Saro-Wiwa.
CONCLUSION:
THE NEW CENSORSHIP AND THE POSTMODERN FANDANGO
The "postmodernist" moniker that I have attached to the new
generation of censors discussed in this Article is intended to be partly
serious and partly ironic. The serious aspect of the "postmodern"
classification refers to three main characteristics of the new censors'
work. First, the new censors share with their "postmodern" col-
leagues in other academic disciplines a rejection of the modernist
rationalism that represents the essential spirit of the Enlighten-
ment."' Of course, this modernist rationalism is also the basis of
prohibited Mr. Zhang from attending the Cannes Film Festival in 1994 because one
of his films presented a critical view of the Cultural Revolution, and as further
punishment for that infraction, the government temporarily shut down production of
Mr. Zhang's film "Shanghai Triad." See id.
See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 158, at 856.
s Delgado & Yun, supra note 95, at 883.
Georges Bataille and Michel Foucault are two of the most commonly cited
exemplars of this aspect of nonlegal postmodernism. See GEORGES BATAILLE, THEORY
OF RELIGION (1989) (positing incompletion and impossibility as truths of the human
situation); GEORGES BATAILLE, VISIONS OF EXCESS (1985) (embracing the "heteroge-
neous"-animality, flies, excrement-in rebellion against "reason"); MICHEL
FOUCA ULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS (1973) (challenging the Western classical ordering
of knowledge in order to restore the reality of instability and flaws); MICHEL
FOUCA ULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE (1980) (postulating the mutual interaction and
interdependence of power and knowledge). It is worth noting that near the end of
his life, Michel Foucault began to view the Enlightenment and that period's
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both the First Amendment and liberal constitutionalism generally.
Second, the new censors share with their cultural postmodernist
counterparts a tendency toward millenarianism-that is, a sense that
they are heralding a new, more righteous era in constitutional theory
that will fundamentally alter all existing doctrine."° Third, there
is a certain degree of faddishness in the new censorship, which is also
evident in other forms of cultural postmodernism. It is the latest
batch of raw material for the academic cottage industry of symposia
and conferences, in which participants spend hours, if not days,
nodding solemnly in deep consideration of the shiny new academic
toy.
The ironic aspect of the term "postmodern censors" is a
reference to the fact that these legal postmodernists exhibit a very
unpostmodernist single-mindedness in seeking to justify the uses of
legal authority and political power to constrain and channel human
discourse. The nonlegal postmodernists would have little patience
with this aspect of postmodern censorship theory. The nonlegal
postmodernists set themselves against all "totalizing" or reductivist
attempts to describe discourse and its effects.3 0' The postmodern
censors, on the other hand, have determined precisely what "bad"
discourse entails, and they know precisely how to fix it.
For all their postmodernist trappings, the new censors disagree
vehemently with the central tenets of postmodern thought in the
cultural sphere-the equality of all ideas, the malleability of values,
and the inherent instability of all cultural, political and legal
hierarchies. In contrast to the cultural postmodernists, the postmo-
dern censors are almost Victorian in their insistence on certain moral
characteristic emphasis on rationalism in a more positive light. See Michel Foucault,
What Is Enlightenment?, in THE FOUCAULT READER 32-50 (Paul Rabinow ed., 1984)
(characterizing the Enlightenment's ethos of philosophical interrogation in both a
negative and a positive light).
'0 Foucault is, once again, a good nonlegal example of this trait. He immodestly
claimed that "a new form of history is trying to develop its own theory," MICHEL
FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 5 (1972) (contemplating the
indigenous transformation of historical knowledge), and he presented himself as
history's happy handmaiden in that effort. Unfortunately, he was never able to
provide much in the way of detail about this new theory, beyond the vague notion that
"something new is about to begin, something we glimpse only as a thin line of light
low on the horizon." FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS, supra note 299, at 384.
301 See generally FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE, supra note 299 (extensively
critiquing Marxism and psychoanalysis); see also FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS,
supra note 299, at xiv (admonishing that "[d]iscourse... is so complex a reality that
we not only can, but should, approach it at different levels with different [analytic]
methods").
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and political absolutes: Some ideas are better than others, central
values (equality, for example) are eternal, and the legal/political
hierarchy should be given the authority to enforce these eternal
verities with civil (and in some circumstances criminal) sanctions
against those who disagree through antisocial speech. Many of the
new censorship themes discussed in this Article-especially those on
the construction of reality through language, and the collapse of the
private into the public-reflect the postmodern mindset while
contradicting the essence of postmodernism. This poor attempt to
cloak censorship with a postmodern mantle brings us full circle to a
point made at the beginning of this Article: that postmodern
censorship arguments are but refurbished versions of the same
arguments historically used to silence antiwar protesters and
socialists-the same arguments used to justify previous government
efforts to control speech. Postmodern censorship theory adds
nothing substantial to the list of reasons for censoring speech. At
best, the new generation of censors have managed to repackage in
postmodernist clothing society's recurring fear of the verbal
cacophony produced by a raucously diverse culture. And despite the
best efforts of the new censors to demonstrate the contrary, there is
simply nothing very postmodern about fear.
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